Propension à la guerre qui ne serait pas exempte de tensions internes graves, au sein même des deux cercles de pouvoir concernés...
Les préparations, aussi bien en Syrie qu'en Iran, battent leur plein et attendraient des livraisons supplémentaires de la part de la Russie (migs-29 et 31) pour provoquer de nouvelles confrontations...
Certains sites ont remis en cause la véracité des images et le nombre exact de stations essence brûlées (de 1 seule mise en scène, selon-Iran-resist.org) à 15 selon Pajamas media, 17 pour Iran-press-service, jusqu'à la cinquantaine sur www.anti-mullahs.com. En l'absence d'envoyés spéciaux sur place, on est en droit de se faire un avis en procédant à un étalonnage, voire à des effets de moyenne entre les diverses topographies contrastées...
Néanmoins, il est difficile d'en conclure à une simple manoeuvre du pouvoir, voulant faire d'Ahmed Inezad le seul épouvantail à moineau de l'affaire, préservant ainsi l'essentiel du Régime, lorsque le fossé entre l'élite et la population iranienne semble s'accentuer pour cet ensemble mollachique et pas seulement à l'égard de celui qui lui servirait de prête-nom face à la communauté internationale...
اندکی پیش از نیمه شب ؛ مردم آخرین تلاش های خود را برای دسترسی به بنزین
صد تومانی به خرج می دهند.
مردم بزرگراه را می بندند...
Selon des sources tournées vers l'analyse et le renseignement, les émeutes de l'essence en Iran ne seraient pas tant liées à l'effet restrictif des sanctions économiques contre le Régime des Mollahs qu'à des stockages militaires en vue d'une éventuelle confrontation avec les Etats-Unis en Irak (franchissements de frontières du Sud irakien? à confirmer) et Israël au Sud-Liban et sur le Golan, par le sous-traitant syrien des Mollahs, Bachar al Assad...
(en attente de traduction : )
Friday, June 29, 2007
Iran, Syria Make Strenuous Preparations for Combat-Readiness, Partly Reflecting Major Internal Leadership Schisms
Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor. GIS.
A pattern of Iranian and Syrian cooperation is emerging which indicates intensive preparations for imminent hostilities, even in the face of — and perhaps even because of — growing public unrest within their societies.
The June 26-27, 2007, gasoline rationing riots which struck Tehran and other major Iranian cities were perceived by Western media analysts to highlight the weakness of the Iranian clerical Government of Pres. Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad.
In fact, more detailed intelligence shows that the clerical leadership not only anticipated the Iranian public unrest over petroleum rationing; that it had adequate reserves of refined petroleum and chose not only not to release these reserves to the public but rather to further ration normal supply; and then to deal strenuously and confidently with the protestors.
The Iranian Government has, in recent weeks and months, been acquiring refined petroleum on the international market at an unprecedented rate, and has paid cash for the oil, rather than its traditional approach of offering crude oil in barter for refined oil.
The Associated Press said on June 27, 2007, that “[t]he rationing is part of a Government attempt to reduce the $10-billion it spends each year to import fuel that is then sold to Iranian drivers at less than cost, to keep prices low.”
Intelligence sources, however, indicate that this is not so: the Iranian Government has been increasing its spending on refined petroleum imports, particularly in recent months, but has been stockpiling the fuel for military use. Indeed, the fuel rationing now seems to be part of the process of ensuring that adequate stocks of refined petroleum are available for military purposes.
The Iranian Government moves on stockpiling refined petroleum products parallel a variety of other indicators which show that Tehran is preparing for a worsening of the current international embargoes against the country to the point of war.
It is also working extensively to overcome the international embargo on the provision of weapons to Iran through major deals being conducted via Syria, and pushing Syria itself — Iran’s principal regional ally, or surrogate — into preparation for conflict as well.
Significantly, however, rifts in the Syrian leadership structure are also cause for concern in Tehran, but may, in fact, be contributory to the Syrian-Iranian preparations for external conflict as a means of bolstering support for the respective governments by their communities.
Quite apart from the divisions in the Iranian leadership (discussed below), and the division between the clerical ruling élite and the population itself, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad leadership ‘Alawite leadership group is itself becoming divided and rudderless in some respects, and is also facing a need to galvanize its population around a common cause.
There seems to be a major breakdown within the ruling elements of the Assad family in Damascus. Essentially, the President, Dr Bashar al-Assad, and his brother-in-law, Assaf Shawqat, the Director of Military Intelligence, were, according to highly-placed sources, inclined to spark the region in order to “rally the troops behind the flag”. This accords with Tehran’s need to develop a united front to simultaneously confront the US and Israel.
Significantly, however, even if Bashar was not inclined to work in concert with Tehran, his leadership is to a substantial extent predicted upon Tehran’s ability to blackmail the ‘Alawite leadership over the “legitimacy” of the ‘Alawites as a Shia sect.
The April 1973 fatwa issued by the late (officially only “missing”) Imam Mussa Sadr certifying the ‘Alawites as Ja'afari Shi’ites. Because Sadr “disappeared” (killed by Libyan intelligence officers on the orders of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi), no replacement could be nominated (because of the Shi’ite obsession with occultation) and his legal archive was moved to the High Court in Qom, Iran.
Hence, the certification of the ‘Alawites as Muslims is now beholden to the goodwill of the mullahs in Tehran, making the Assads of Damascus effectively hostages to this goodwill. Thus, talk in Washington about convincing Damascus to de-link from Tehran is wishful thinking.
Moreover, the Bashar al-Assad Government is facing the increasing effectiveness and appeal of the leadership of the exiled uncle of the President, Rifaat al-Assad, who is seen as perhaps the only ‘Alawite leader who could have the strength to govern Syria without Iranian support, and even without the blessing and affirmation of the Shia leadership in Qom. He is, in other words, a national Syrian leader in his own right.
But in order for the existing Syrian and Iranian leadership attempts to bolster and protect their rule against internal opposition, by promoting the idea of international threats to the countries, both Damascus and Tehran are building defense readiness.
From June 18-21, 2007, Syrianair cancelled most of its scheduled air services and diverted aircraft into an airlift of weapons from Tehran to Damascus, with some of those weapons shipments going on to HizbAllah in Lebanon.
As well, Iran Air and, reportedly, Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) aircraft were pressed into service to airlift military supplies from Tehran to Damascus (again, with some shipments moved by surface transport on to Lebanon for HizbAllah).
At the same time, Syria reportedly took delivery in June 2007 of five MiG-31E advanced combat aircraft, and may have already begun accepting delivery of further MiG-29 variants — reportedly MiG-29M/M2s — for possible on-shipment to the IRIAF. The IIRAF already had some 25 Mikoyan MiG-29 and 15 two-seat MiG-29UB Fulcrum fighters in its inventory.
The Syrian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Arabiya as Souriya) had appr. 42 MiG-29A Fulcrum fighters, 14 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum air defense and air superiority aircraft, and six Mikoyan MiG-29UB Fulcrum operational trainers in its inventory. The MiG-31 is a development of the MiG-25 series, and it is reported that the MiG-29M/M2 is, in fact, similar in its subsystems and capabilities to the model being offered as the MiG-35 for the Indian Air Force.
It is probable that Russia took back some of Syria’s older MiG-25 Foxbat high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft as trade-ins for the MiG-31Es.
The MiG-31E is the export version of basic MiG-31 prototype (“903”), which was first noted in 1997; it has simplified systems over the MiG-35, with no active jammer, downgraded IFF, as well as downgraded radar and DASS. The Syrian Air Force has less than 15 Mikoyan MiG-25PD Foxbat air defense aircraft in its inventory; eight Mikoyan MiG-25RB reconnaissance; and two MiG-25RU Foxbat operational trainers.
It is possible that Tehran and Damascus have been awaiting delivery of the advanced models of the MiG-25 and MiG-29 series before declaring readiness for a major, coordinated upsurge in confrontation with the US and Israel. Certainly, Syrian and Iranian aircrew and technicians have been undergoing training in Russia on the new systems.
The use of Syria as a front for the purchase of advanced systems for Iran is not new. Even as recently as April-May 2007, it was reported that some of Syria’s 36 new Pantsir-S1E air defense systems were on-shipped to Iran.
Meanwhile, it will be of key importance to note when the DPRK (North Korea) also begins steps to upgrade its confrontation, or return to a confrontational mode, with the US. This would indicate that the alliance of Iran, Syria, and the DPRK is ready to make moves, with the DPRK providing strategic diversion to an escalation in the Middle East.
At the same time, however, the rifts within the clerical leadership are also coming to a head. There is a significant movement by former Pres. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who has found common cause with the “Supreme Leader”, “Ayatollah” Ali Hosseini-Khamene‘i, to attempt to work against Pres. Ahmadi-Nejad, who Rafsanjani is convinced is moving Iran too close to an unwinnable war with the US.
Some Tehran sources indicate that Rafsanjani has already hinted to Saudi and US officials that he would, if he and Khamene‘i could remove Ahmadi-Nejad, begin a rapprochement with the US.
This kind of leakage could, however, also be designed to cause the US to pull back from military confrontation with Iran, given the predilection in the US State Department to follow the recommendations of former Secretary of State James Baker to “normalize” US-Iranian relations, regardless of the fact that this would work against US long-term interests by perpetuating a radical clerical Administration in office in Iran.
As one Tehran source said: “These so-called ayatollahs may all hate each other and scheme against each other, but the ‘reformers’ are now different from the hard-liners when it comes to power issues; they are both the same side of the same coin. The ‘reformers’ only allow women to have a less strict dress code, and may — as Rafsanjani is hinting — make the nuclear program less visible. But they still will foment terrorist activities; they will still work to use HizbAllah to destroy Israel. They are all the same.”