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26 juillet 2009 7 26 /07 /juillet /2009 00:09

Obama prend un râteau à l’est

Havel, Walesa et consorts ne sont pas obamaniaques

 

http://www.causeur.fr/obama-prend-un-rateau-a-l%E2%80%99est,2739


24 juillet 2009 • RecommanderImprimer

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Luc Rosenzweig

Ancien journaliste au "Monde", Luc Rosenzweig est l'auteur de plusieurs essais dont "Lettre à mes amis propalestiniens" (La Martinière) et "Ariel Sharon" (Perrin).

 

Avant la chute du communisme, on les appelait les dissidents : Sakharov, Havel, Walesa ont connu la prison, d’autres furent contraints à l’exil. Pendant que les gouvernements de l’Occident démocratique cherchaient des accommodements avec l’Union Soviétique, ils incarnaient la résistance intraitable au totalitarisme communiste. Grâce à eux, quelques intellectuels maoïstes français furent dispensés d’une cure de silence repentant dans une quelconque Trappe laïque, après s’être reconvertis dans la défense des persécutés de derrière le Rideau de fer.

Aujourd’hui, alors que l’on va bientôt célébrer le vingtième anniversaire de la chute du mur de Berlin, cette génération dissidente a, pour l’essentiel, quitté le devant de la scène politique où elle avait été propulsée après l’effondrement des régimes communistes.

Mais elle n’a pas renoncé à s’exprimer publiquement au nom de leur expérience historique, et à dire leur fait sans détour aux dirigeants d’aujourd’hui, comme ils le firent jadis face aux tyrans post-staliniens.

En ce mois de juillet, le Tour de France, les bonbonnes dans les usines en voie de liquidation et la castagne au PS ont barré, à de rares exceptions près, le chemin des médias à une lettre ouverte fort intéressante adressée au président des Etats-Unis par vingt anciens responsables politiques de pays d’Europe centrale et orientale. On retrouve dans cette liste les icônes de la dissidence qui sont encore de ce monde, et même un ex-communiste, l’ancien président polonais Alexander Kwasniewski. Ce sont ceux à qui, en mai 2003, Jacques Chirac avait reproché d’avoir « manqué une bonne occasion de se taire » pour cause de soutien à la guerre d’Irak. L’injonction venue de l’Elysée provoqua chez eux plus d’hilarité que de colère : ils avaient tenu tête à Brejnev et au Kremlin, alors une gueulante de Corrézien, ils pouvaient faire avec.

Ces gens-là ne sont donc pas du genre à se laisser intimider, fût-ce par celui qui dispose à la fois de la puissance militaire la plus considérable et d’une popularité sans égale dans la foule mondialisée, le président des Etats-Unis Barack Obama.

Ils tirent la sonnette d’alarme devant ce qu’ils considèrent comme un désengagement des Etats-Unis de l’Europe centrale et orientale au profit de la recherche d’un accord global avec la Russie de Poutine et Medvedev, notamment sur la réduction des arsenaux nucléaires.

En terme choisis, ils reprochent à Obama de se faire balader par des Russes qui, écrivent-ils, « mènent une politique extérieure comme une puissance du XIXe siècle avec les méthodes du XXIe siècle », cherchant à étendre leur zone d’influence par toutes sortes de moyens, y compris les plus technologiquement sophistiqués, comme la piraterie informatique.

Ils s’inquiètent également de la passivité de cette OTAN à laquelle ils ont adhéré avec enthousiasme devant les agressions militaires ou économiques de pays qui se sont émancipés de la tutelle soviétique et sont sortis de l’orbite russe, comme la Géorgie et l’Ukraine. Ils donnent au passage une petite leçon de kremlinologie moderne à une Administration américaine qui semble avoir oublié les leçons de la Guerre froide, sous prétexte que les Russes ont, pour l’instant renoncé à disputer aux Etats-Unis la suprématie planétaire : « Au niveau mondial, la Russie se comporte, sur la plupart des sujets, comme une puissance soucieuse du maintien du statu quo. Au niveau régional et vis à vis de nos nations, cependant, elle agit comme une puissance révisionniste. Elle conteste nos droits à faire nos propres expériences historiques. Elle revendique une position privilégiée quant à la détermination de nos choix en matière de sécurité. Elle fait usage de tous les moyens, licites et illicites de guerre économique – blocus énergétique, investissements politiquement ciblés, corruption et manipulation des medias – pour faire prévaloir ses intérêts et faire obstacle à l’intégration atlantique de l’Europe centrale et orientale. »

Par ailleurs, ils constatent dans leurs pays respectifs, une désaffection croissante à l’égard des Etats-Unis, et un repli vers des positions nationalistes, voire fascisantes et antisémites dont on a pu voir les effets électoraux lors du dernier scrutin européen.

Il serait pour le moins réducteur de ne voir dans cette lettre qu’un combat d’arrière-garde de ceux qui ont soutenu George W. Bush dans ses entreprises les plus hasardeuses. Ses auteurs, qui ont le nez historiquement fin, sentent dans les premiers pas de la diplomatie est-européenne d’Obama, un parfum de Yalta qui ne leur plait pas du tout, et on les comprend.

Ils le jugeront sur son attitude dans deux dossiers qui leur tiennent particulièrement à cœur : la mise en place, en Pologne et en République Tchèque du système antimissile projeté par l’administration précédente, et le soutien des Etats Unis aux projets de gazoducs permettant d’éviter d’être soumis au chantage énergétique de Moscou.

Enfin, il y a des petites vexations qui sont irritantes lorsqu’elles sont infligées à des gens réputés amis, notamment sur la question des visas. Ainsi, nos épistoliers s’étonnent que Lech Walesa, comme tous les Polonais, soit contraint à demander un visa pour se rendre aux Etats-Unis, alors que notre José Bové national peut, lui, se présenter quand il veut où il veut aux agents US de l’immigration muni de sa moustache et de son seul passeport.

Certes, il existe dans le monde d’autres injustices plus dommageables, mais comme dirait Boris Vian, c’est « en protestant qu’on peut finir par obtenir des ménagements ».

 

An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe

by Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, Aleksander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, Janos Martonyi. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Rotfeld, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Alexandr Vondra, Lech Walesa.

We have written this letter because, as Central and Eastern European (CEE) intellectuals and former policymakers, we care deeply about the future of the transatlantic relationship as well as the future quality of relations between the United States and the countries of our region. We write in our personal capacity as individuals who are friends and allies of the United States as well as committed Europeans.
Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States. Many of us know firsthand how important your support for our freedom and independence was during the dark Cold War years. U.S. engagement and support was essential for the success of our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell twenty years ago. Without Washington’s vision and leadership, it is doubtful that we would be in NATO and even the EU today.
We have worked to reciprocate and make this relationship a two-way street. We are Atlanticist voices within NATO and the EU. Our nations have been engaged alongside the United States in the Balkans, Iraq, and today in Afghanistan. While our contribution may at times seem modest compared to your own, it is significant when measured as a percentage of our population and GDP. Having benefited from your support for liberal democracy and liberal values in the past, we have been among your strongest supporters when it comes to promoting democracy and human rights around the world.
Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however, we see that Central and Eastern European countries are no longer at the heart of American foreign policy. As the new Obama Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities, our region is one part of the world that Americans have largely stopped worrying about. Indeed, at times we have the impression that U.S. policy was so successful that many American officials have now concluded that our region is fixed once and for all and that they could “check the box” and move on to other more pressing strategic issues. Relations have been so close that many on both sides assume that the region’s transatlantic orientation, as well as its stability and prosperity, would last forever.
That view is premature. All is not well either in our region or in the transatlantic relationship. Central and Eastern Europe is at a political crossroads and today there is a growing sense of nervousness in the region. The global economic crisis is impacting on our region and, as elsewhere, runs the risk that our societies will look inward and be less engaged with the outside world. At the same time, storm clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon. Like you, we await the results of the EU Commission’s investigation on the origins of the Russo-Georgian war. But the political impact of that war on the region has already been felt. Many countries were deeply disturbed to see the Atlantic alliance stand by as Russia violated the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the territorial integrity of a country that was a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euroatlantic Partnership Council –all in the name of defending a sphere of influence on its borders.
Despite the efforts and significant contribution of the new members, NATO today seems weaker than when we joined. In many of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant – and we feel it. Although we are full members, people question whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense in some future crises. Europe’s dependence on Russian energy also creates concern about the cohesion of the Alliance. President Obama’s remark at the recent NATO summit on the need to provide credible defense plans for all Alliance members was welcome, but not sufficient to allay fears about the Alliance´s defense readiness. Our ability to continue to sustain public support at home for our contributions to Alliance missions abroad also depends on us being able to show that our own security concerns are being addressed in NATO and close cooperation with the United States
We must also recognize that America’s popularity and influence have fallen in many of our countries as well. Public opinions polls, including the German Marshall Fund’s own Transatlantic Trends survey, show that our region has not been immune to the wave of criticism and anti-Americanism that has swept Europe in recent years and which led to a collapse in sympathy and support for the United States during the Bush years. Some leaders in the region have paid a political price for their support of the unpopular war in Iraq. In the future they may be more careful in taking political risks to support the United States. We believe that the onset of a new Administration has created a new opening to reverse this trend but it will take time and work on both sides to make up for what we have lost.
In many ways the EU has become the major factor and institution in our lives. To many people it seems more relevant and important today than the link to the United States. To some degree it is a logical outcome of the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. Our leaders and officials spend much more time in EU meetings than in consultations with Washington, where they often struggle to attract attention or make our voices heard. The region’s deeper integration in the EU is of course welcome and should not necessarily lead to a weakening of the transatlantic relationship. The hope was that integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU would actually strengthen the strategic cooperation between Europe and America.
However, there is a danger that instead of being a pro-Atlantic voice in the EU, support for a more global partnership with Washington in the region might wane over time. The region does not have the tradition of assuming a more global role. Some items on the transatlantic agenda, such as climate change, do not resonate in the Central and Eastern European publics to the same extent as they do in Western Europe.
Leadership change is also coming in Central and Eastern Europe. Next to those, there are fewer and fewer leaders who emerged from the revolutions of 1989 who experienced Washington’s key role in securing our democratic transition and anchoring our countries in NATO and EU. A new generation of leaders is emerging who do not have these memories and follow a more “realistic” policy. At the same time, the former Communist elites, whose insistence on political and economic power significantly contributed to the crises in many CEE countries, gradually disappear from the political scene. The current political and economic turmoil and the fallout from the global economic crisis provide additional opportunities for the forces of nationalism, extremism, populism, and anti-Semitism across the continent but also in some our countries.
This means that the United States is likely to lose many of its traditional interlocutors in the region. The new elites replacing them may not share the idealism - or have the same relationship to the United States - as the generation who led the democratic transition. They may be more calculating in their support of the United States as well as more parochial in their world view. And in Washington a similar transition is taking place as many of the leaders and personalities we have worked with and relied on are also leaving politics.
And then there is the issue of how to deal with Russia. Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. At a global level, Russia has become, on most issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vis-à-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one. It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.
We welcome the “reset” of the American-Russian relations. As the countries living closest to Russia, obviously nobody has a greater interest in the development of the democracy in Russia and better relations between Moscow and the West than we do. But there is also nervousness in our capitals. We want to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western interests does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia. Today the concern is, for example, that the United States and the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for a “Concert of Powers” to replace the continent's existing, value-based security structure. The danger is that Russia's creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the region. There are differing views within the region when it comes to Moscow’s new policies. But there is a shared view that the full engagement of the United States is needed.
Many in the region are looking with hope to the Obama Administration to restore the Atlantic relationship as a moral compass for their domestic as well as foreign policies. A strong commitment to common liberal democratic values is essential to our countries. We know from our own historical experience the difference between when the United States stood up for its liberal democratic values and when it did not. Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to “realism” at Yalta. And it benefited when the United States used its power to fight for principle. That was critical during the Cold War and in opening the doors of NATO. Had a “realist” view prevailed in the early 1990s, we would not be in NATO today and the idea of a Europe whole, free, and at peace would be a distant dream.
We understand the heavy demands on your Administration and on U.S. foreign policy. It is not our intent to add to the list of problems you face. Rather, we want to help by being strong Atlanticist allies in a U.S.-European partnership that is a powerful force for good around the world. But we are not certain where our region will be in five or ten years time given the domestic and foreign policy uncertainties we face. We need to take the right steps now to ensure the strong relationship between the United States and Central and Eastern Europe over the past twenty years will endure.
We believe this is a time both the United States and Europe need to reinvest in the transatlantic relationship. We also believe this is a time when the United States and Central and Eastern Europe must reconnect around a new and forward-looking agenda. While recognizing what has been achieved in the twenty years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is time to set a new agenda for close cooperation for the next twenty years across the Atlantic.
Therefore, we propose the following steps:
First, we are convinced that America needs Europe and that Europe needs the United States as much today as in the past. The United States should reaffirm its vocation as a European power and make clear that it plans to stay fully engaged on the continent even while it faces the pressing challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the wider Middle East, and Asia. For our part we must work at home in our own countries and in Europe more generally to convince our leaders and societies to adopt a more global perspective and be prepared to shoulder more responsibility in partnership with the United States.
Second, we need a renaissance of NATO as the most important security link between the United States and Europe. It is the only credible hard power security guarantee we have. NATO must reconfirm its core function of collective defense even while we adapt to the new threats of the 21st century. A key factor in our ability to participate in NATO’s expeditionary missions overseas is the belief that we are secure at home. We must therefore correct some self-inflicted wounds from the past. It was a mistake not to commence with proper Article 5 defense planning for new members after NATO was enlarged. NATO needs to make the Alliance’s commitments credible and provide strategic reassurance to all members. This should include contingency planning, prepositioning of forces, equipment, and supplies for reinforcement in our region in case of crisis as originally envisioned in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
We should also re-think the working of the NATO-Russia Council and return to the practice where NATO member countries enter into dialogue with Moscow with a coordinated position. When it comes to Russia, our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West’s security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well. Furthermore, the more secure we feel inside NATO, the easier it will also be for our countries to reach out to engage Moscow on issues of common interest. That is the dual track approach we need and which should be reflected in the new NATO strategic concept.
Third, the thorniest issue may well be America’s planned missile-defense installations. Here too, there are different views in the region, including among our publics which are divided. Regardless of the military merits of this scheme and what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has nevertheless also become -- at least in some countries -- a symbol of America’s credibility and commitment to the region. How it is handled could have a significant impact on their future transatlantic orientation. The small number of missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia's strategic capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide the future of the program as allies and based on the strategic plusses and minuses of the different technical and political configurations. The Alliance should not allow the issue to be determined by unfounded Russian opposition. Abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the United States across the whole region.
Fourth, we know that NATO alone is not enough. We also want and need more Europe and a better and more strategic U.S.-EU relationship as well. Increasingly our foreign policies are carried out through the European Union – and we support that. We also want a common European foreign and defense policy that is open to close cooperation with the United States. We are the advocates of such a line in the EU. But we need the United States to rethink its attitude toward the EU and engage it much more seriously as a strategic partner. We need to bring NATO and the EU closer together and make them work in tandem. We need common NATO and EU strategies not only toward Russia but on a range of other new strategic challenges.
Fifth is energy security. The threat to energy supplies can exert an immediate influence on our nations’ political sovereignty also as allies contributing to common decisions in NATO. That is why it must also become a transatlantic priority. Although most of the responsibility for energy security lies within the realm of the EU, the United States also has a role to play. Absent American support, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would never have been built. Energy security must become an integral part of U.S.-European strategic cooperation. Central and Eastern European countries should lobby harder (and with more unity) inside Europe for diversification of the energy mix, suppliers, and transit routes, as well as for tough legal scrutiny of Russia's abuse of its monopoly and cartel-like power inside the EU. But American political support on this will play a crucial role. Similarly, the United States can play an important role in solidifying further its support for the Nabucco pipeline, particularly in using its security relationship with the main transit country, Turkey, as well as the North-South interconnector of Central Europe and LNG terminals in our region.
Sixth, we must not neglect the human factor. Our next generations need to get to know each other, too. We have to cherish and protect the multitude of educational, professional, and other networks and friendships that underpin our friendship and alliance. The U.S. visa regime remains an obstacle in this regard. It is absurd that Poland and Romania -- arguably the two biggest and most pro-American states in the CEE region, which are making substantial contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan -- have not yet been brought into the visa waiver program. It is incomprehensible that a critic like the French anti-globalization activist Jose Bove does not require a visa for the United States but former Solidarity activist and Nobel Peace prizewinner Lech Walesa does. This issue will be resolved only if it is made a political priority by the President of the United States.
The steps we made together since 1989 are not minor in history. The common successes are the proper foundation for the transatlantic renaissance we need today. This is why we believe that we should also consider the creation of a Legacy Fellowship for young leaders. Twenty years have passed since the revolutions of 1989. That is a whole generation. We need a new generation to renew the transatlantic partnership. A new program should be launched to identify those young leaders on both sides of the Atlantic who can carry forward the transatlantic project we have spent the last two decades building in Central and Eastern Europe.
In conclusion, the onset of a new Administration in the United States has raised great hopes in our countries for a transatlantic renewal. It is an opportunity we dare not miss. We, the authors of this letter, know firsthand how important the relationship with the United States has been. In the 1990s, a large part of getting Europe right was about getting Central and Eastern Europe right. The engagement of the United States was critical to locking in peace and stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today the goal must be to keep Central and Eastern Europe right as a stable, activist, and Atlanticist part of our broader community.
That is the key to our success in bringing about the renaissance in the Alliance the Obama Administration has committed itself to work for and which we support. That will require both sides recommitting to and investing in this relationship. But if we do it right, the pay off down the road can be very real. By taking the right steps now, we can put it on new and solid footing for the future.

Valdas Adamkus, Former President of the Republic of Lithuania
Martin Butora, Former Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United States
Emil Constantinescu, Former President of the Republic of Romania
Pavol Demes, Former Minister of International Relations and Advisor to the President, Slovak Republic
Lubos Dobrovsky, Former Defense Minister of the Czech Republic, former Ambassador to Russia
Matyas Eorsi, Former Secretary of State of the Hungarian MFA
Istvan Gyarmati, Ambassador, President of the International Centre for Democratic Transition in Budapest
Vaclav Havel, Former President of the Czech Republic
Rastislav Kacer, Former Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United States
Sandra Kalniete, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia
Karel Schwarzenberg, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic
Michal Kovac, Former President of the Slovak Republic
Ivan Krastev, Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria
Aleksander Kwasniewski, Former President of the Republic of Poland
Mart Laar, Former Prime Minister of Estonia
Kadri Liik, Director of the International Centre for Defence Studies in Tallinn, Estonia
Janos Martonyi, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hungary
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Former Vice-president of the European Parliament, former Defense Minister, Poland
Adam Rotfeld, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
Alexandr Vondra, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, Czech Republic
Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Former President of the Republic Latvia
Lech Walesa, Former President of the Republic of Poland

DOWNLOAD: An Open Letter to the Obama Administration

 

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A tous nos chers lecteurs.

 

Ne vous est-il jamais venu à l'esprit d'en savoir un peu plus sur le titre de ce blog ?

Puisque nous nous sommes aujourd'hui habillés de bleu, il conviendrait de rentrer plus a fond dans l'explication du mot lessakel.

En fait Lessakel n'est que la façon française de dire le mot léhasskil.

L'hébreu est une langue qui fonctionne en déclinant des racines.

Racines, bilitères, trilitères et quadrilitères.

La majorité d'entre elle sont trilitères.

Aussi Si Gad a souhaité appeler son site Lessakel, c'est parce qu'il souhaitait rendre hommage à l'intelligence.

Celle qui nous est demandée chaque jour.

La racine de l'intelligence est sé'hel שכל qui signifie l'intelligence pure.

De cette racine découlent plusieurs mots

Sé'hel > intelligence, esprit, raison, bon sens, prudence, mais aussi croiser

Léhasskil > Etre intelligent, cultivé, déjouer les pièges

Sé'hli > intelligent, mental, spirituel

Léhistakel > agir prudemment, être retenu et raisonnable, chercher à comprendre

Si'hloute > appréhension et compréhension

Haskala >  Instruction, culture, éducation

Lessa'hlen > rationaliser, intellectualiser

Heschkel > moralité

Si'htanout > rationalisme

Si'hloul > Amélioration, perfectionnement

 

Gageons que ce site puisse nous apporter quelques lumières.

Aschkel pour Lessakel.

 

 

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