Libnanews – 16 mars – Le ministre des Télécommunications M. Marwan Hamadé a assuré, au cours d’une interview sur les ondes de la radio locale VDL pendant le programme « Majaless Bil Amanet », que le gouvernement libanais décidera de ne pas participer au sommet de Damas qui se tiendra dans la capitale syrienne le 29 mars, estimant qu’il ne faut pas que le Liban soit assis autour d’une table présidée par le chef d’état syrien Bashar el-Assad qui s’évertue à dissimuler  ses crimes en dissertant sur le Liban.

Affirmant que les directives américaines et européennes n’ont rien à voir avec le fait de décliner l’invitation au sommet de Damas, le ministre a rappelé qu’il est temps que les sessions parlementaires ordinaires commencent alors que les portes du Parlement sont toujours fermées depuis plus d’un an et demi, ce qui révèle une tentative d’assassiner le Liban après avoir massacré son indépendance pour fuir le Tribunal International chargé de juger les présumés coupables du meurtre de l’ancien Premier ministre feu Rafic Hariri.

Indiquant que l’initiative arabe est toujours valable, M. Hamadé a considéré que cette dernière n’a pas de chance pour arriver à bon port par l’entremise du sommet de Damas, parce qu’elle peut bénéficier d’un parrain dans plusieurs capitales arabes sauf à Damas.

Rappelant que les sommets arabes n’ont jamais été mis de côté et que le Liban y a toujours été représenté même lors du mandats contesté du président Emile Lahoud, M. Hamadé a vu dans la participation au prochain sommet de Damas un retour de l’hégémonie syrienne avec l’ingérence du président Assad dans l’atteinte d’une solution concernant l’échéance présidentielle, la formation d’un gouvernement et la loi électorale, insistant sur le fait que toutes les décisions doivent être prise au Liban.

En ce qui concerne le recours à l’élection présidentielle par la formule de la majorité simple, Hamadé a signalé que le camp de la majorité n’a toujours pas pris cette décision, mais elle est toujours sujette à être adoptée selon les circonstances afin de permettre l’élection du général Sleimane à la présidence, ajoutant que le gouvernement poursuivra ses responsabilités et sa mission et est disposé à mener des négociations avec les autorités religieuses et politiques afin d’élargir le gouvernement et le rétablir si cela s’avèrerait nécessaire.

Commentant les critiques faites par le général Michel Aoun sur le document politique publié par la coalition du 14 mars, le ministre des Télécommunications a indiqué que le général Aoun a dû lire ce document de travers, mettant l’accent sur les paragraphes où l’alliance du 14 mars a critiqué ses positions actuelles et critiqué ce qu’il désapprouvait lui-même dans le temps avant de s’insérer dans l’axe syro-iranien.

With the intervention of the Organization of American States (OAS), it looks like the war clouds hanging over Colombia and Venezuela may be clearing. But since the cause of this dangerous storm system remains—namely, Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez and his growing ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—Washington’s allies in Colombia should brace for more heavy weather. In fact, we may just now be entering the eye of the storm.

As is so often the case with bullies and aggressors, Chavez blames those who are defending themselves for triggering this crisis. Colombia did launch a military strike on FARC safe havens in Ecuador, but it did so in pursuit of rebel leaders who are responsible for decades of indiscriminate death and destruction inside Colombia’s borders. Among those targeted and killed were Raul Reyes, a key leader of the FARC, along with 23 of his aides and guerilla fighters. (Ecuador’s rant about violations of sovereignty is a subject for another essay, but this much we know: When a country is unable or unwilling to prevent its territory from being used as a launching pad for attacks into another sovereign country, it invites external intervention.)

In response to Colombia’s action, Chavez sent thousands of troops to the Venezuelan-Colombian frontier in late February, turning a case of self-defense and hot pursuit into a full-blown continental crisis.

Even after the OAS agreed to set up a commission to study the incident and brokered a nuanced compromise resolution that called for the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador” to be respected, while making sure not to condemn Colombia for defending its own territory, Chavez continued his saber-rattling and ordered his military commanders to complete the deployment of 10,000 troops and scores of tanks.

If the move was provocative and unnecessary before the OAS acted, it’s even more so now—that is, unless Chavez has something to be worried about.

He does.

Laptop computers seized during the Reyes raid appear to prove what many have suspected—that Chavez and his intermediaries are supporting the thuggish FARC, which traffics in drugs to fund its killings and kidnappings. (The UN estimates that the FARC generates $204 million a year from the drug trade.)

As AP reports, “If authentic, the computer files suggest Chavez has been in league with the rebels for more than a decade.” And they appear to be authentic.

The files contain detailed notes and discussions about a Venezuelan emissary to the FARC, Ivan Marquez, who has made it clear to his contacts that Chavez wants to undermine Colombia’s tenacious president, Alvaro Uribe, while helping to change the FARC’s “international pariah status,” in the words of the AP report.

The computer files quote Marquez as saying that Venezuela intends to use information from the FARC to build a consensus against Colombia, leading to the U.S. ally’s “denunciation before the world.” Another letter from Marquez details how Chavez plans to carry out a regional lobbying effort on the FARC’s behalf.

Perhaps most damning, the Colombian National Police conclude that the files also provide evidence that Chavez has funneled $300 million to FARC rebels.

It pays to recall that the FARC is not some enlightened independence movement. Even if their grievances were once legitimate—which is a debatable point—their methods remove all legitimacy from their cause. They use gas-cylinder bombs to kill indiscriminately. They carry out more than 100 kidnappings a year. They even hold American citizens hostage.

Inside Venezuela, as Javier Corrales details in Foreign Policy magazine, Chavez has “found a way to make authoritarianism fashionable again.” After all, he has rewritten the constitution, abolished the Senate, reconfigured the Supreme Court, created a private army loyal not to the state but to him, and taken control of the National Electoral Council (the body that verifies election results).

Chavez, who tried to seize power through a military coup in the early 1990s before his election in 1998, also controls the country’s oil consortium. Although Chavez has never cut off shipments into the U.S., he has threatened to do so. There could be more than bluster and bravado here: The Congressional Research Service has reported concerns inside Washington that Chavez might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11 percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S. economy. 

Far more worrisome is the State Department’s 2006 assessment that Chavez had “virtually ceased its cooperation in the global war on terror,” was seeking closer relations with Iran, and was tolerating terrorists on his territory. In fact, the State Department notes “the FARC often uses the Colombia-Venezuela border area for cross-border incursions and considers Venezuelan territory as a safe haven.”

Chavez is not just asking for war with his neighbors—he seems to be preparing for it. For example, he has acquired high-tech Su-30 fighter jets from Russia and large transport planes from Spain. He recently purchased 100,000 combat assault rifles from Russia and wants to buy 5,000 Russian-made Dragunov sniper rifles, which “have become one of the most lethal and effective weapons against American troops and their allies in Iraq,” according to a recent report by The International Herald Tribune.

“Sales like this, and other sales of military equipment and arms to Venezuela, don’t seem consistent with Venezuela’s needs,” deputy assistant secretary of state David Kramer told the Tribune. “It does raise questions about their ultimate use.”

If Chavez really wants war—and he may in order to divert attention from his disastrous economic policies—it won’t be a fair fight. Colombia’s highly professionalized, U.S-trained military is bigger and much stronger than Venezuela’s. The Washington Post provides the order of battle here. Unlike Venezuela’s small, albeit increasingly well-armed, military, the 210,000-strong Colombian military is war-ready, having fought the FARC since Uribe’s election in 2002. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates puts it, “The Colombians can take care of themselves.”

Yet Chavez may get his death wish. Like the Argentine junta that invaded the Falklands a quarter-century ago, his bully regime would end up losing the war—and its grip on power.

http://www.mediarabe.info/spip.php?article1312

Retour sur l’assassinat de Maghnieh à Damas

vendredi 7 mars 2008 - 11h16, par Chawki Freïha

La suspicion entre le Hezbollah, les Palestiniens de service, la Syrie et l’Iran n’est plus au rendez-vous depuis l’assassinat mystérieux du chef militaire du Hezbollah, Imad Maghnieh, à Damas. L’hebdomadaire "Al Shiraa" s’étale sur l’évolution des relations triangulaires entre Damas, Téhéran et le parti chiite au Liban, et explique le silence iranien quant à l’élimination de son homme de confiance.

L’hebdomadaire libanais « Al Shiraa » revient, dans son dernier numéro, sur l’assassinat du chef militaire du Hezbollah, Imad Maghnieh, tué dans une explosion à Damas (12 février). « Al Shiraa » s’interroge sur ses assassins et met la lumière sur les convocations et interrogatoires croisés menés par les Syriens à Damas et par le Hezbollah à Beyrouth.

L’hebdomadaire révèle en effet que deux semaines après l’assassinat de Maghnieh, « des unités du Hezbollah ont perquisitionné des immeubles de la banlieue sud de Beyrouth et ont arrêté les concierges de nationalité syrienne, qui y sont employés ». Ces gardiens d’immeubles, soupçonnés de travailler pour les Services syriens, ont été conduits dans les locaux du parti chiite, les yeux bandés. Ils ont été interrogés avant d’être libérés, et leurs familles ont été menacées de mort si elles divulguaient ces arrestations. Deux jours après ces perquisitions, ajoute l’hebdomadaire, la veuve de Maghnieh, Saada Badreddine, a accusé la Syrie d’avoir assassiné son mari. Le Hezbollah a également arrêté des dizaines de Palestiniens des camps de réfugiés de Beyrouth, pour les interroger sur d’éventuelles fuites concernant les déplacements de Maghnieh.

A Damas, les enquêteurs syriens ont convoqué les responsables du Hamas et du Jihad islamique que Maghnieh venait de rencontrer le soir de son assassinat. Seul Ahmed Jibril du FPLP-CG n’a pas été inquiété. Damas lui accorde toute sa confiance, étant un pur produit de ses Services. Khaled Mechaal (Hamas) et Abdallah Chalah (Jihad islamique) ont été interrogés pour identifier l’origine de la fuite concernant la présence de Maghnieh à Damas ce soir là. Car, à part ces dirigeants palestiniens, seuls le président Bachar Al-Assad, son frère Maher et leur beau-frère Assaf Chawkate connaissaient Maghnieh et son emploi de temps. Ainsi, souligne « Al Shiraa », si le Mossad israélien a pu tuer Maghnieh, il l’aurait fait par l’intermédiaire ou grâce à l’une de ces cinq personnes (Bachar, Maher, Assef, Mechaal et Chalah).

L’hebdomadaire souligne cependant que les Syriens n’informent ni le Hezbollah ni les Iraniens de l’état d’avancement de leur enquête, de même que le Hezbollah ne fait plus confiance à Damas et refuse de l’associer à son enquête menée à Beyrouth. Citant des sources palestiniennes, « Al Shiraa » souligne que « l’explosif utilisé dans l’assassinat de Maghnieh correspond parfaitement aux deux charges utilisées dans l’assassinat de George Haoui, ancien secrétaire général du Parti communiste libanais, et Samir Kassir, le journaliste du quotidien “An-Nahar” ». Ces deux opposants à la Syrie ont péri dans l’explosion des sièges de leur voiture. Ce qui signifie, conclue l’hebdomadaire, que « Maghnieh n’aurait pu être assassiné sans l’implication, la participation ou l’autorisation de certains services syriens », avec des forts soupçons qui pèsent sur Chawkate.

En tout état de cause, le ministre syrien des Affaires étrangères, Walid Al-Moallem, avait promis une enquête efficace et rapide. or, rien n’a encore filtré, à part les insinuations syriennes sur une implication saoudienne dans le meurtre de Maghnieh. Ce retard vise, selon « Al Shiraa », à exploiter la situation contre Riyad. Si les saoudiens décident de ne pas participer au sommet arabe de Damas, le 29 mars, ou s’ils adoptent des positions hostiles à la Syrie durant le sommet, les accusations seront prêtes à être divulguées pour mettre en difficulté le régime des Saoud. Au contraire, si Riyad cède et se soumet à la volonté de Damas et si le chantage syrien réussit à berner une nouvelle fois les Arabes, comme ce fut depuis les années 1970, d’autres boucs émissaires seront désignés dans l’assassinat de Maghnieh.

Enfin, « Al Shiraa » tente d’expliquer le silence de Téhéran quant à cet événement. Pourtant, Maghnieh était l’homme les plus précieux pour les Iraniens et le coordinateur de leurs activités subversives extérieures. L’hebdomadaire souligne à cet égard que l’assassinat de Maghnieh pourrait servir l’Iran pour mieux asservir la Syrie. Car, toute amélioration des relations entre Damas et les capitales arabes est bénéfique pour la République islamique. Mais aussi, toute dégradation de ces relations poussera davantage la Syrie dans les bras de l’Iran. Dans tout les cas de figure, Téhéran semble prêt à digérer l’assassinat de son bras armé extérieur, au nom de ses intérêts stratégiques.

Traduction et synthèse de Chawki Freïha.

Lire l'article original : Al Shiraa

PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe

The United States and Turkey have recently begun to cooperate with each other against the PKK presence in northern Iraq, but the organization's relatively unnoticed European criminal networks and fronts remain a lifeline that, if unchecked, will allow it to remain well funded and supplied indefinitely. For their fight against the PKK to be successful, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union must tackle the group's European activities.

Criminal Fundraising in Europe

The State Department's April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism stated that the PKK finances its operations through fundraising and criminal activity in Europe. Similarly, a recent NATO Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) report found that the PKK is involved in illegal economic operations such as smuggling, tax evasion, and other forms of organized crime, including drug and counterfeit money trafficking as well as illegal foreign currency exchanges. The report also stated that PKK members apply coercion in collecting funds.

According to figures presented at the NATO Reinforced Economic Committee meeting in November 2007, the illicit narcotics industry is the PKK's most profitable criminal activity. The committee's subsequent report found that the PKK is involved in all phases of the narcotics trade, from raw production in Pakistan and distillation in Iraq to street sales and "taxation" of non-PKK-produced drugs in Europe. The report also showed human trafficking as the PKK's second most profitable illicit activity.

Europol has made a similar case about the PKK's criminal activities, offering specific evidence in its April 2007 Terrorism Situation and Trend Report: "Two PKK members were arrested in France in 2006 for money laundering aimed at financing terrorism. At the end of 2005, three members of the PKK were arrested in Belgium and another one in Germany suspected of financing the PKK. In Belgium, the authorities seized receipt booklets indicating that the arrested suspects were collecting 'tax' from their fellow countrymen. The rise of fundraising activities by the PKK in the EU is related to the escalation of the terrorist campaign of Kurdish terrorists in Turkey."

Fronts and Legal Loopholes

In addition to its criminal network, the PKK also uses fronts and legal loopholes to raise funds in Europe. The TTIU report stated that the group raises a total of $50 to $100 million per year. Although the bulk of this amount comes from criminal operations in Europe, approximately $12 to $15 million is raised through legitimate or semi-legitimate commercial activities and donations. According to Turkish authorities, the PKK has a vast network of 400 affiliated organizations in Europe -- about half of which are in Germany -- engaged in these commercial activities. The network includes affiliate or sympathizer organizations such as the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD, headquartered in Brussels) and the International Kurdish Businessmen Union (KAR-SAZ, in Rotterdam).

The PKK also has a vast European propaganda and fundraising network that includes two news agencies, four television stations, thirteen radio stations, ten newspapers, nineteen periodicals, and three publishing houses. These media organizations are scattered across Europe and range from Roj TV in Denmark to the Firat News Agency in the Netherlands.

Purchasing Weapons

Revenues from the PKK's criminal activities and fronts have long funded the group's weapons purchases in Europe. Between 1984 and 2006, Turkey confiscated a total of 40,045 PKK weapons. The origin of many of the weapons could not be detected due to intentional destruction of identifying marks by producers, smugglers, or the users. Nevertheless, more than 16,000 of them have so far been traced. Some originated in European countries, including Italy, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, and Russia. Moreover, of the 8,015 mines captured by Turkey, 4,857 came from Italy and 2,268 from Russia and the ex-Soviet republics. Such large amounts of weapons, often stored in military depots, normally would not disappear without alerting the authorities.

European Cooperation: Slow but Increasing

The PKK has enjoyed safe conduct in some European countries for quite some time. Today, these nations are beginning to understand the global effects of terrorism and the need for international cooperation, and are accordingly taking steps to ban or restrict PKK activities. For instance, as reported by the Turkish daily Sabah, the British Foreign Office acknowledged in January 2008 that the PKK and its affiliate organizations had been active in Britain and other European countries since 2001. As a result, Britain announced that "foreign terrorist organizations would not be allowed to exploit the territories of the United Kingdom to fundraise any more."

Most European states have also officially recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization (though some, such as Norway, have not yet done so). Accordingly, they are taking some concrete steps against the group. For example, in January 2008, a local Berlin court found a Turkish citizen guilty of leading an underground PKK cell in Bavaria since 1994 and sentenced him to nearly three years in prison.

U.S. Role in Facilitating European Cooperation

According to the European Council's 2002 Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, member states are obligated to take necessary measures to ensure that any involvement with a terrorist group -- whether it be directing, funding, supplying, or participating -- is punishable by law. Unfortunately, European countries have been slow in implementing this legislation.

In order to be successful, the U.S.-Turkish strategy against the PKK presence in northern Iraq should include strong U.S.-Turkish-European counterterrorism tools to shut down the group's European criminal networks and fronts. In this regard, the United States should bring Turkey and Europe together by facilitating joint work among American, Turkish, and European law enforcement agencies.

DEBKAfile Exclusive: Saudis send extremist preacher SheikSheik SafarSafar al Hawali to raise funds for Hamas

January 26, 2008, 10:58 PM (GMT+02:00)

Osama bin Laden's friend told by Riyadh to help Hamas

The Saudi SheikSheik SafarSafar al Hawali is an eminent al Qaeda ideological authority and a close personal friend of Osama bin Laden. During US President George W. Bush’s visit to Riyadh earlier this month, the Saudi security authorities placed him under house arrest and forbade him to issue a proclamation condemning the visit. No less than bin Laden himself, Hawali’s name is a byword in Islamic jihadi circles in and beyond SaudiSaudi ArabiaArabia. For them, his canonic works are compulsory reading. This week, Riyadh assigned the radical preacher the mission of launching a fund-raiser on behalf of Hamas in the oil kingdom and Gulf. His son, Abdallah Hawali, was given charge of organizing events.

DEBKAfile’s counter-terror sources add that all al Qaeda’s resources for raising hundreds of millions of dollars in the oil-rich Arab Gulf states are therefore pressed into service to support Hamas and the al Qaeda networks operating in the Gaza Strip and Sinai.

According to our sources, the top Saudi leadership has decided to take advantage of Hamas’ thrust into northern Sinai to shift the brunt of al Qaeda’s activities out of the ArabianArabian PeninsulaPeninsula and Gulf and over to Israel’s borders. This shift has had the effect of deepening ties between the two most violent fundamentalist Sunni terrorist groups, the PalestinianPalestinian HamasHamas and al Qaeda.