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2 juillet 2007 1 02 /07 /juillet /2007 09:50

Sunday, July 01, 2007



Tehran behind US attache disappearance?

James LewisThe US Military Attache to Cyprus has disappeared, according to the Nicosia US Embassy website.


1996 Chevrolet Impala SS, license 48CD47

"One of our Embassy employees, Thomas Mooney, has not been in touch with the Embassy for more than 48 hours. Anyone with information which might be helpful in locating him should contact the local police station.

"Mr. Mooney has a large black American car with tinted windows (1996 Chevrolet Impala SS, license 48CD47)."

While the website does not identify who Mr. Mooney is, the AP points out that a Lieutenant Col. Mooney is the Military Attache in Cyprus, which is a traditional site of both visible and covert espionage activity in the Levant.

It is impossible to say what happened to Col. Mooney, and whether he will turn up soon, alive and well. However, the Iranians have accused the United States of kidnapping five Iranian diplomats in Iraq several months ago.

The US has refused to return them, saying they were enabling and directing sophisticated IED attacks that were killing US Soldiers and Marines. In addition, the fanatical Islamic Revolutionary Guard has seen several high-level defections recently, which must have had major behind-the-scenes repercussions in the mullahcracy.

Kidnapping Col. Mooney might be a tit-for-tat move by Tehran against the United States. President Ahmadi-Nejad has long been deeply involved with the El Qods Brigade of the IRGC, which has carried out assassinations and bomb attacks abroad ever since the Khomeinist regime came to power. It is entirely possible that the fanatical regime in Tehran would interrogate and perhaps torture Col. Mooney to gain information about US covert activities against the regime. Or he may be kept to trade for IRGC members arrested in Iraq.

Ahmadi-Nejad is also turning the screws at home, by arresting and warning tens of thousands of civilians wearing Western clothing, imprisoning students involved in anti-regime protests, and raising the price of gasoline -- a move that has caused a public uproar and some rioting.

Anti-Mullah just published a thoughtful report arguing that the regime is preparing for war by diverting gasoline supplies to the military. Both Iran and Syria have also made huge investments in advanced warplanes and air defense systems from Russia, essentially equipping themselves with entire new air force fleets.

However, such new weaponry presumably requires a learning curve before it can become maximally effective.

Both the US and Israel have made clear that they will not tolerate this regime's production of nuclear weapons. Exactly at what point a red line would be crossed has been left deliberately vague, but Israeli sources mention the year 2008 quite often. More effective sanctions may be on the way as well.

It is in the interest of the West to keep the regime worried to the point of panic over a long period of time, degrading its domestic support base without paying the cost of war. Covert actions against the regime are also much cheaper for the Bush administration to carry out in terms of domestic political costs. However, the Iran crisis is driven by the unavoidable advances in its nuclear program. At some point the shadow war may therefore burst out into the light of day.

That is apparently what Tehran expects, and may be what it wants. When Supreme Guide Khamenei allowed Ahmadi-Nejad to become President, he deliberately chose to favor the war faction over the pragmatists led by Rafsanjani. Ahmadi-Nejad has been constantly boastful and confrontational, following a foolish and self-destructive course by Western political standards.

He has created many enemies who used to be on the fence, but who are now preparing to turn against the regime, including European and Sunni Arab countries. Only recently Ahmadi-Nejad openly threatened Egypt and Jordan, calling them "traitors" to Islam.

Those are fighting words in the Middle East. With Egypt fighting
the Muslim Brotherhood domestically, it must show strength against Islamist radicals of any stripe.

Ultimately, Iran's strategy of public insult, intimidation and confrontation only works if it is backed up by a willingness to escalate to large-scale force. So far, nothing has worked to dissuade the regime from its dangerous course, although the pragmatists are presumably very worried and unwilling to be dragged into a suicidal gambles. Ahmadi-Nejad may personally thrive on the prospect of a martyrdom war, but billionaire Rafsanjani does not look like a martyrdom fan.

The Supreme Guide Ayatollah Khamenei could rein in Ahmadi-Nejad, but has shown no willingness to do so thus far. The mullahcracy may therefore be gambling that it can provoke a war with Israel and the West and survive. That makes no sense on the evidence as we understand it in the West. It is still possible that the regime will back away from the abyss, but today it seems less and less likely.

If Col. Mooney was indeed kidnapped by IRGC agents on Cyprus, it would be yet another signal of Tehran's reckless rush toward confrontation.

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2 juillet 2007 1 02 /07 /juillet /2007 01:18
Entendu sur CNN, vers 1h du matin, heure française :  la chaîne  rapporte que les autorités américaines présentes en Irak  ont accumulé les preuves de l'implication du Hezbollah libanais, suppléant l'Iran, dans des actions de terrorisme et des tentatives de kidnappings, contre les forces US et britanniques, notamment dans la Région de Bassorah,  au sud de l'Irak. La comparaison est faite avec l'action du Hezbollah dans le déclenchement de la guerre du Liban contre Israël, durant l'été 2006.

Nous aurons sûrement droit à de plus amples développements et à des rapports plus précis dans les  heures à avenir. *

Mais cette fois, la guerre entre le Hezbollah et les Etats-Unis n'est plus confinée au seul domaine des actions discrètes...

(à suivre)...

Le Scoop de CNN : il s'agit en fait de l'arrestation d'un des experts en explosifs du Hezbollah : Ali Mussa Daqduq :
rapport traduit comme suit :

CNN : Des militaires Américains pincent le chef du Hezbollah allié de Sadr (Jaysh al-Mahdi).
Scoop labellisé "les partenaires de la Terreur", le présumé terroriste est suspect d'implication dans le meurtre de soldats américains.
Posté il y a 3h et 9 minutes (à 7h 47 heure française)
Les trois premières phrases du rapport exclusif pour CNN de Michaël Ware :
BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- Un officier supérieur des opérations spéciales appartenant à la milice suppléante de l'Iran, le Hezbollah libanais a été capturé en Irak, où les responsables américains expliquent qu'il a joué un rôle-clé dans l'attaque de janvier qui a tué 5 Américains.
Ali Mussa Daqduq, un expert en explosifs, a été capturé en mars dans la ville du sud de l'Irak de Bassorah (Basra), où il supervisait l'entraînement et dirigeait le combat des milices shi'ites contre les Forces de la Coalition, ont raconté à CNN des responsables du Renseignement.
Daqduq a prétendu être sourd et muet, lorsqu'il a été capturé, et son identité n'a pu être percée à jour durant des semaines, ont ajouté ces responsables.

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1 juillet 2007 7 01 /07 /juillet /2007 23:39

Is there a viable military strategy for disarming Iran? (Part II)

By Tom Snodgrass | 

The lessons of RAF colonial air control and Allied interdiction in World War II lay out a clear blueprint the US could use to disarm our implacable Islamic enemy, the mullah government of Iran.

Is There a Viable Military Strategy for Disarming Iran? (Part I)

What is “air control?”

“Air control” was an idea pioneered by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) following World War I to employ the military power of combat aircraft to enforce political administration and restore order when necessary in British colonial possessions.  The “Great War,” as World War I was called at the time, had financially drained Britian’s treasury and left His Majesty’s Government with huge financial and military problems. Britain entered the war in 1914 with substantial colonial holdings that subsequently became restive, as the British could not spare forces from the European war to police their far-flung empire.  This deteriorating, wide spread political situation was exacerbated when Britain was assigned control of additional territories in Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine, Egypt, and Transjordan as a result of the peace agreement ending the war. In view of the need for economy, Air Chief Marshall Hugh M. Trenchard put forward a plan that convinced Secretary of State for the Colonies Winston S. Churchill to use airpower instead of the army to deal with colonial conflicts.

Almost immediately airpower showed itself very useful during 1919-1920 in quelling disturbances in Somaliland, Mesopotamia, and the Indian Northwest Frontier Province (Pakistan). The initial concept in Trenchard’s plan was to use de Havilland DH-9 bomber biplanes to assert British authority in inaccessible tribal areas while the size of the army detachments in the colonies was reduced. As the concept evolved in the various colonies that had been added to the British mandate, RAF commanders were given the sole responsibility of exercising military control, replacing the army in combating indigenous insurgencies.

The RAF air detachments were augmented by highly mobile armored car companies.  The typical RAF detachment was composed of eight air squadrons, with approximately 12 aircraft each, and four armored car companies, approximately 24 vehicles apiece. The mainstay aircraft generally were the de Havillands into the 1930’s, while the armored cars were the Rolls Royce Type As on the Silver Ghost chassis with a turret mounting the Vickers 303 Caliber Machine Gun. Depending on the locality, British officer-led native levies provided additional ground force support as needed.

How did RAF air control perform?

The following assessments offered by Lt. Col. David J. Dean and Maj. George R. Gagnon are typical among students of military history.

Perhaps the most important lesson we can extract from this phase of Royal Air Force history is that air power can be shaped in creative ways for effective political results. The methods used by the British to achieve simple solutions were not all that simple, at least as the doctrine involved grew with experience. It took a very sophisticated combination of superb intelligence, communications, and psychological warfare coupled with a judicious application of firepower to achieve the desired outcome: pacification of a troubled colonial area with minimum violence, lasting results, and minimum cost. To design such a program required a flexibility of thinking that was most impressive.
– Lt Col David J. Dean, “Air Power in Small Wars: the British air control experience,” Air University Review, July-August 1983.

Air control is a strategy that uses airpower as the principal military tool to obtain the grand strategic objectives of a nation. An analysis of this strategy reveals that it offers the United States the means to preserve its vital interests through military applications short of war, or if necessary, through the combat application of airpower.

The notion of air control evolved shortly after World War I. The Royal Air Force (RAF) and the British government used it to help administer Britain's colonial empire.
– Maj George R. Gagnon, Air Control: Strategy for a Smaller United States Air Force, Air University Press, 1993.

Both of these officers’ assessments reflect the point of view that was promulgated by the RAF initially in order to carve out and justify a mission independent of the British Army in the post-World War I military drawdown and the accompanying drastic curtailment of service funding. As time worn on, the success of RAF air control of the colonies became service dogma. However, that is not to say the success was untrue, rather the success was not quite as glowing as frequently stated. The primitive aviation technology of the 1920’s and 1930’s had much to do with acknowledged shortcomings like bombing inaccuracy that may have diminished air control effectiveness to a certain extent. But there is no historical evidence disputing the statement: “Air control is a strategy that uses airpower as the principal military tool to obtain the grand strategic objectives of a nation.” Air control did permit the British Government to police remote areas of its empire economically with airpower.

What relevance does air control have in the 21st century?

It was my purpose in my last article to advance a viable military strategy to disarm Iran that avoids the difficulties we have encountered disarming Iraq, such as getting involved in house-to-house counterinsurgency fighting.  In fact, I would submit that disarming Iran will alleviate many of the counterinsurgency problems in Iraq and somewhat less in Afghanistan because Iran is the logistical source that continues to direct and sustain the Jihad in Iraq. Iran is the enemy’s center of gravity of the war in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. In my judgment, destruction of Iran’s military capability to resupply and intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by the exercise of air control over Iran that ensures the continued disarmament of Iran, will obtain the US’s grand strategic objectives of defeating the Jihadists in Iraq and denying the Iranian mullahs possession of nuclear weapons, as well as cutting into the Jihadist insurgent capability in Afghanistan.

Is air control a viable strategy?

To my way of thinking the principal argument against employing air control is put forth by Dr. James S. Corum as follows.

Air control was never as effective as advertised, and it could not provide answers to the political causes of colonial insurgencies. Except in the case of minor policing, airpower served mostly as a support arm to ground forces. A colonial power in the 1920s could employ such a doctrine on the far reaches of the empire against natives who had no direct contact with parliament or the media. Even then, the RAF’s air-control methods set off a considerable amount of protest from politicians. Basically, one could barely justify air control as a doctrine 80 years ago, and people who advocate an updated version of such doctrine for current US Air Force operations have misread history.
– Dr James S. Corum, “The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History,” Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000.

Stripped down to the basics, Dr Corum’s observation has a great deal of merit that deserves consideration. Here is the issue: Do Democrat, as well as Republican, politicians have the will to preemptively take action that will permit US airpower to decimate Iranian military capability with a Desert Storm type of “shock & awe” bombing campaign and then continue to restrike targets of opportunity using air control to prevent the Iranians from reconstituting their military capability?

Political will in protecting US national security is the crux issue, not the technological shortcomings of early aviation frequently cited by historical critics of RAF air control as diminishing its usefulness. The viability of air control is a political question, not a technological or military one.  The answer to this political question is beyond the scope of this essay. My concern is to lay out a workable military strategy that would disarm the most dangerous Islamic regime in the world today, while not repeating the mistakes that continue to haunt us in Iraq. Sooner or later national security must take precedence over the diplomatic appeasement and politically correct military strategy we currently pursue.

To what extent would RAF colonial air control differ from US air control of Iran?

Obviously there are huge differences in the objectives of RAF colonial air control and US air control of a disarmed Jihadist Iran.  While the two military regimes would share the similarities of reduced cost military enforcement using airpower versus ground force occupation and the resulting reduced friendly casualties, the imperial political control of Britian’s subjugated colonial peoples would differ greatly from aerial patrolling using manned and unmanned platforms to seek out and destroy military capabilities deemed a threat to US interests. The British had to consider political compliance and compromise with colonial peoples in executing violence through air control. The US objective of preventing the accumulation of Jihadist military power on Iranian territory would require no Iranian political cooperation, so the exercise of US force need not consider limiting the destructiveness of weapons, except as dictated by American humanitarian concerns.

Sustained air control of Iran would be more like the interdiction campaign over northern France in spring 1944, when the Allied airpower isolated the Normandy beachhead from Nazi logistical resupply depots in Germany, than the RAF bombing of Middle East tribal villages in the 1920’s. During this World War II interdiction campaign, Allied fighter-bombers ranged unchallenged over Nazi-controlled territory destroying anything that would add to Wehrmacht military capability to repel the Operation Overlord D-Day invasion. Gen William W. Momyer summarized the effectiveness of airpower in stripping away enemy military capability as a result of this air campaign.

OVERLORD'S LESSONS: Every major ground campaign through the remainder of World War II was coordinated with an interdiction campaign . . . With the interdiction campaign destroying critically needed supplies, the Wehrmacht was then forced to fall back, or if units stood and fought, their positions could be overrun because of the logistics failure. Regardless of their will to fight, the lack of needed weapons, food, and ammunition made it infeasible for German units to stay in the battle.

From these lessons of World War II, the concepts of interdiction developed: (a) Strike the source of the war material; (b) concentrate the attacks against the weak elements of the logistical system; (c) continuously attack, night and day, the major lines of communication supporting the army in the field; (d) inflict heavy losses on enemy logistics and forces before they approach the battlefield where the difficulty of successful interdiction is greatest . . .
– Gen. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars, USAF, 1978.

As I have written previously (here, here, here, here, here, and here), the essential elements of war are contained in this equation: WAR = MOTIVATION + CAPABILITY. Forces in the field and logistics to resupply those forces comprise the CAPABILITY in my equation. Therefore, the targets of opportunity in Iran for air control that would parallel the Overlord interdiction campaign would be concentrations of nuclear facilities, Jihadist forces, Jihadist training camps, and their supporting logistics that could threaten US interests in Iraq and Afghanistan.  At present the US strategy is to attempt to interdict Jihadist forces and logistics after they have already entered Iraq and Afghanistan.  As Gen. Momyer makes clear, this wrongheaded strategy contradicts this lesson learned in World War II: “inflict heavy losses on enemy logistics and forces before they approach the battlefield where the difficulty of successful interdiction is greatest . . .”

What is the conclusion?

The lessons of RAF colonial air control and Allied interdiction in World War II lay out a clear blueprint the US could use to disarm our implacable Islamic enemy, the mullah government of Iran, while avoiding the cost and casualties of a ground invasion and occupation. Will such air control action on our part occasion outrage in the Muslim world and protests from our erstwhile allies? Undoubtedly yes, but any action the US takes to curtail the Jihadist capability of Iran will bring a similar reaction. Therefore, I propose that we use our greatest strength, technological warfare, to counter the existential threat against us, rather than being drawn into asymmetric insurgent warfare where the Jihadists hold an advantage.

My experience and understanding of the logistics inform me that the decimation and continuing suppression of Iran’s military capability would quickly and totally reverse the momentum of battle in the Middle East that is currently running against the US because it would make our warnings to Syria to stop the resupply of the Jihadist insurgency in Iraq suddenly credible. Syria knows that without their Iranian Jihadist patron they would have no possibility of continued defiance of US demands, or those of Israel for that matter, to cease their aggressive actions against US and Israeli interests. The effect would be to immediately cut off logistical support from east and west to both the Sunni and Shia Jihadists in Iraq, essentially placing those Jihadists in the same battlefield condition as the Wehrmacht with their logistics interdicted as described by Gen. Momyer: “Regardless of their will to fight, the lack of needed weapons, food, and ammunition made it infeasible for German units to stay in the battle.” Furthermore, the bold use of American power would also provide incentive to the Saudi Royal Family to redouble their efforts to stop Jihadist personnel and funds from entering Iraq across the Saudi border. Additionally, with Iran out of the fight, resupply to the Jihadists in Afghanistan would be proportionally reduced, easing the situation for US and NATO forces fighting on that front.

Finally, we are left with the question posed by what has become popularized as the Powell Doctrine: what is the “exit strategy?” When will this employment of air control as the primary means of war against the Sharia-faithful Muslims come to an end? Simply put, “it depends” on the course of events in the aftermath of the elimination of our enemy’s military capability to prolong the Jihadist war against us. Whatever the length of commitment that is required to end the current Jihadist war, air control does not involve us in a “quagmire” of counterinsurgency wherein American military personnel are held hostage to suicidal fanatics, as they are at present. Instead of ceding the insurgency battlefield advantage to primitive combatants, the US would be conducting the war using our strongest military asset – lethal technology from the sky which the Jihadists would find impossible to resist or counter.

The fact that our war against the Jihadists would be waged from the air would dramatically scale back the human and financial costs from those we are currently enduring in Iraq while pursuing an ineffectual, manpower-intensive, counterinsurgent strategy. We maintained the “no-fly zone” combat patrols over Iraq for twelve years, but we did not seriously threaten or reduce the threat posed by Saddam Hussein because of restrictive rules of engagement. The difference in an air control scenario over Iran would be that our airpower would aggressively destroy threats as they appeared, whereas the Iraqi no-fly zone patrols were only authorized to return hostile fire. The days of that kind of restraint ended on 9/11.   Should we be required to continue air control of Iran for years, the cost is manageable considering the lesson of Iraq.

While I don’t wish to over-sell air control over Iran as a panacea to worldwide Jihad, it would send the important message to the Shari’a-faithful that Allah was not smiling on their Jihadist efforts as the main source of Jihad in the Middle East was ground under the heel of the hated infidel. Those who maintain that the Shari’a-faithful should be “reasoned with,” placated, or be encouraged to reform do not understand Islam.  Historically Jihad has only gone into a dormant retreat when it is confronted by an overpowering force that destroys the Jihadist military capability. Air control of Iran could be just that overpowering force in this century, especially if accompanied by psychological warfare measures to portray it as such. It is time to “think outside of the box.” Drastic times require drastic measures.

Colonel Tom Snodgrass, retired U.S. Air Force, is Advisor on Military Intelligence and Strategy to the Society of Americans for National Existence (SANE). Colonel Snodgrass spent 30 years in active military duty. He spent much of his time in the military as a senior intelligence officer and has been an instructor at several war colleges. He is a highly decorated Vietnam War veteran and holds a Master of Arts degree in History and Political Science.

Read more articles in Foreign Affairs, National Defense.
Read more articles by Tom Snodgrass
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1 juillet 2007 7 01 /07 /juillet /2007 23:35

Is There a Viable Military Strategy for Disarming Iran? (1rst Party)

By Tom Snodgrass 

Dealing a deathblow to the Iranian resupply of Shi’ite and Sunni Jihadists would strike at both the insurgents' capability in Iraq and the motivation of Islamic Jihadists throughout the world.


Why are we at war?


To answer that question during World War II, the US Army Signal Corps produced a series of seven films under the supervision of Frank Capra (director of the post–war Christmas classic It’s a Wonderful Life) entitled Why We Fight.  The film series explained with graphics and newsreel footage the issues, strategies, and consequences involved in our war to the death with the Axis Powers of Germany, Japan, and Italy. While the presentations in these films would be considered “dated” and “unsophisticated” by today’s standards, they were effective in their time to unite the American public behind the US war effort on the homefront as well as overseas.


Such unity of American effort is woefully lacking today. Obviously this is a conspicuous weakness of the Bush administration. But President Bush’ war team is not just bad at communication. Indeed, arguably, they are bad at communication because their message is so bad. For example, we were told for three years effectively that all was going as well as can be expected in Iraq. But the truth was and is that we are losing the war because we did nothing to cut off the flow of money, arms, personnel, and strategy flowing across the borders, notably the southern one with Iran. When a belligerent is not winning in a counterinsurgency, it is losing. Only after losing the last mid-term election, are we told that a reassessment is in order. But even then, the answer was a surge without any clear rationale for how the surge was going to actually make a difference beyond platitudes and wish lists.


More to the point, the Bush administration has remained steadfast in its resolve not to identify the enemy to the American people. We are only told that we are fighting terrorism and terrorists. At times, we are told they are radical Islamists who have somehow hijacked the noble religion of peace. But had President Bush made clear that our enemy is every nation, every regime, every network, every conspiracy, and every individual who preaches, teaches and advocates Shari’a (Islamic law), which is a political ideology bent on world domination, the ability to communicate war goals, progress and strategy would have become infinitely more effective. Instead, he and his defense team insist we are fighting some kind of tactic without faces other than a few al Qaeda types, which leads people to wonder what we are doing in Iraq and even in Afghanistan.


While Bush began with a real strategy (i.e., Bush’s unqualified pledge to “deny the militants control of any nation, which they would use as a home base and launching pad for terror”), he has taken quite the opposite approach in fact. First, he announced that the goal in Iraq and Afghanistan was not victory but democracy. What that meant of course was that the “militants” gained credibility and access as part of the government. Second, Bush and his generals have affirmatively not applied this war strategy to two flagrant terrorist states, Iran and Syria.


The Bush administration’s bumbling approach to the war has cost it the confidence of the American public. The majority of the American people have an idea of what is at stake in this war against the Sharia-faithful Islamic Jihadists and have no desire to lose, but the uncertainty and lack of success in Iraq has left them confused, dissatisfied, and demoralized.  The situation is not irredeemably lost, but changes must be made by the US Government to regain public confidence, and with increased confidence reinvigorate the national will to fight on until the Jihadist threat is smashed.


What is war?


As an aside at this point, in an effort to simplify my discussion of war for the reader, I have distilled into an equation the components of war which the preeminent military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, saw as comprising its essential elements:




While these components are fairly self-explanatory, for any who wish more explanation, I direct your attention to these previous essays (here, here, here, here, here, and here).  The objective of any warring power is to remove one or both of these components from the enemy’s war equation and thus bring about the cessation of hostilities on your terms.


Now back to the question: Why are we at war? Obviously we are at war because we were attacked on 9/11 by Sharia-faithful Islamic Jihadists, which in truth was the proverbial straw after more than a decade of similar but less dramatic terrorist attacks directly against the US or against US interests abroad. But the crucial issues concerning any war are: who to fight, where to fight, how to fight, what are the war aims, and how long will the fighting last?  These are the questions that must be convincingly and clearly answered in the public’s mind, if the government is to have a unified national consensus supporting the troops in the field.  Unified national consensus (especially in a democratic or representative government) is directly related to the essential MOTIVATION component that must be maintained as a part of a belligerent’s equation to effectively wage war.


As noted earlier, it is no wonder the American people have no clarity about who we are fighting when the Bush administration named the tactic of “terror” as our opponent and not the Sharia-faithful Islamic Jihadists who are using terror to conduct a highly effective psychological warfare campaign. The Muslim Jihadists know full well that their strategy is effectively attacking and eroding American MOTIVATION.


The difficulty with the Bush administration’s failure to specifically and inclusively identify the Shari’a-faithful enemy is that it has permitted the traditionally anti-war Democrat Party the opening to mischaracterize the war as a limited police problem and to undermine American MOTIVATION by disingenuously contending that only Jihadists directly involved in the attack of 9/11 are the enemy. Consequently, in spite of the Democrats’ early support for the preemptive attack against Saddam’s terror-sponsoring Iraqi state when the Iraq invasion was riding on a wave of popularity after the successful campaign in Afghanistan, the anti-war Elites quickly disavowed the Iraq campaign when the situation began to drag on with no end in sight by claming that Saddam was not involved in the 9/11 plot; therefore, American deaths and expenditures were not justified.


The failure to locate the much-heralded weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was just icing on the Democrats’ “stop-the-war-at-any-price” cake.  President Bush’s failure to inclusively specify the Sharia-faithful and those supporting them as our enemies (which clearly included Saddam) provided the Democrats with the opportunity to do what they did during the Civil War and the Vietnam War – undermine US troops in combat.  So, irrespective of the Democrats' protestations of “patriotism” to the contrary and notwithstanding the similar cries of “me-too” from their Republican Party “finger-in-the-wind” fellow travelers, there is a bipartisan anti-war movement aligned with the Sharia-faithful in attacking American MOTIVATION to combat the Islamic Jihad against the West. And the Bush administration’s failure to acknowledge the true nature of our Islamic enemy has created this calamity for its own political fortunes and for the nation’s long-term security.


What are the opposing war strategies?


As noted above, both MOTIVATION and CAPABILITY must be present to maintain a belligerent’s fighting forces while engaged in active warfare and to provide a base of support in the belligerent’s population.  In our war with the Sharia-faithful, each side is basically targeting different components of the war equation in different ways.  The Islamic Jihadists clearly recognize that they will never be able to put more than a superficial wound on America’s military CAPABILITY; therefore, they are using every method, including suicide at one extreme and democracy Jihad at the other, to maximize the political impact of American troop deaths with the objective of destroying US political MOTIVATION to continue the war. The underbelly of the Elite in America they have identified is the Democrat-led US domestic anti-war movement. There is no greater ally in this strategy than the mainstream media and the university professorate. The Islamic Jihadists have skillfully and realistically crafted their total war strategy, which knows no boundaries in the types of weapons it chooses to utilize (other than the limitation of availability) or how and upon whom they use those weapons.


On the other hand, the Bush administration has adopted a limited war strategy that is dysfunctional. In order to target the Sharia-faithful’s MOTIVATION, the US Government is attempting to introduce a completely alien concept of democracy into the Islamic culture that opposes individual freedom of choice based on fundamental religious doctrine. The probability that Islamic culture will reject Jihad, which is mandated in the Quran, and instead embrace a foreign Western political ideology, which is contrary to 1,300+ years of tradition and the current Islamic community organization, is effectively zero.


The second part of this fanciful US strategy of attack on the Islamic-faithful’s MOTIVATION is that once Islamic culture adopts democracy, the Muslim democrats will become US allies against their religious Jihadist brethren. Is there even a need to analyze this absurdity?


Regarding the enemy’s CAPABILTY component, the Bush team’s limited war strategy seeks to nullify the Islamic Jihadist military CAPABILITY by employing strictly in-country counterinsurgency, while ignoring the logistical resupply to the insurgents sustaining their military CAPABILITY from beyond Iraqi borders. So, regardless of how much insurgent military CAPABILITY we destroy in Iraq, it will be readily replaced from outside. In these circumstances, our attempts to destroy the enemy’s CAPABILITY will go on hopelessly until the Islamic Jihadists succeed in destroying our MOTIVATION.


Given these misapplications in strategic component targeting, it would appear that it is only a matter of time until the Islamic Jihadists’ strategy prevails in Iraq, if nothing changes.


What are the critical issues in war and how are they linked?


The issue of “where to fight” is inseparably linked with “whom to war against.” Since the Taliban and al-Qaeda were clearly involved in 9/11, there was no question about the appropriateness of carrying the battle to Afghanistan.  However, for the domestic reasons discussed above, Iraq is proving to be the political anvil on which the MOTIVATION of the US war against Islamic Jihad may be shattered.  But the US combat success in Iraq is faltering for reasons that are peculiar to the limited war doctrine practiced by the Bush administration.


Having already discussed the fallacy of this type of warfare at length (again, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here), I will simply say that limited war is doomed to fail when faced with a fanatical enemy who is (1) religiously inspired to die in his cause of conquering the world to impose Islamic Law on every human being (i.e., motivation), and (2) when the war is sustained unimpeded from outside the country (i.e., capability). The logistical resupply from Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to the Islamic insurgents, Sunni and Shi’ite, in Iraq sustains the CAPABILITY of our enemy.  Whereas the outside support from Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia could actually be used to end the Islamic insurgency in Iraq by destroying these absolutely vital logistical centers of gravity, the Bush limited war prohibition against carrying the combat outside the borders of Iraq will eventually guarantee a victory for the Sharia-faithful, unless rectified.


Just as there is a definite linkage of whom to fight and where to fight, so too is there a concomitant linkage between “how to fight” and “what are the war aims (the result sought).”  These two aspects of strategy should be totally synchronized because “the how” will determine “the result.”  A quick comparison of the two different methods employed by the Sharia-faithful and the Bush team illustrates this fact clearly. The Islamic Jihadists have unleashed a no-holds-barred campaign to kill as many Iraqis and US forces as possible to both outrage and wear down the will to fight of the average American. The “how” of indiscriminate killing is on the brink of bringing about the collapse of US MOTIVATION and the withdrawal from Iraq is the “result” they seek.  While the Bush administration’s limited war – the “how” — in the form of counterinsurgency is proving poorly designed to produce the “result” of destroying either the Sharia-faithful’s MOTIVATION or CAPABILITY. And, worse, it is predictably ill-suited to do so.


The “who,” “where,” “how,” and “what result,” all combine to determine the answer to the crucial question: “how long?” The Bush strategy opted for a guaranteed multi-year war because the limited war counterinsurgency approach requires a minimum of 7-10 years for success, both in theory and in those instances where it was applied successfully. Such a prolonged timetable is well suited to the Islamic Jihadists’ strategy, since wearing down American MOTIVATION is their objective and seemingly never ending casualty reports bombarding the American people over a prolonged period of years serves that objective perfectly.


Where are we now?


Without rearguing all the hoary WMD and “was the invasion of Iraq justified?” rhetorical battles, the fact is we are locked in an unrelenting combat in Iraq with the two top contenders for leadership of the worldwide Islamic Jihad – the Iranian Twelver Shi’ites and the al-Qaeda Salafist Sunnis.  While Iran and al-Qaeda are in cutthroat competition to win the allegiance of the Islamic ummah by defeating the forces of America, aka “the Great Satan” in the Islamic world, they nevertheless have found it advantageous to engage in a wartime alliance, much as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to a mutually beneficial pact in 1939 before those mortal enemies fought one of the most vicious wars in human history. Similarly it appears that the Iranian Shi’ites believe it is in their best interest at present to provide logistical resupply to the al-Qaeda Sunnis who are bitterly contesting control of al-Anbar Province with US forces and our Iraqi allies. This classic “marriage of convenience” will probably last until the fate of Iraq is decided.


Meanwhile the Bush administration began the occupation of Iraq with the confused strategy of “nation-building,” while not fighting the counterinsurgency that ignited in the summer of 2003 by denying that it was occurring. President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld naively believed that they could turn over the policing of Iraq to the Iraqi army and police and quickly withdraw US forces, thus avoiding a repeat of the Vietnam counterinsurgency warfare. And yet one of the first things that they did was to disband the Iraqi army and police?!


Finally, when the Bush administration could no longer deny the existence of the insurgency, they fought a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq with the same lack of skill as the French displayed in Vietnam during the early 1950’s. US forces were largely in a defensive “force protection” posture, which naturally and ultimately resulted in more US casualties, rather than fewer. The January 2007 decision to “surge” and put General Petraeus, the US counterinsurgency guru, in command in Iraq is an attempt to salvage the situation for domestic political purposes.  Unfortunately we are continuing to pursue a strategy for defeat with limited war counterinsurgency that seeks basically to contain the struggle within Iraq, not to prevail over the Islamic Jihadists.


In addition to not attacking the sources of Islamic insurgent CAPABILITY in Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, the Bush Iraqi strategy has another complicating weakness. It is that conducting counterinsurgency in an Islamic country starts from a deficit because dar al-Islam (any territory where the Sharia has been supreme law) is fundamentally hostile turf for counterinsurgency as Muslims consider the presence of kuffār (كفّار — non-believers in Islam) in dar al-Islam, especially in the context of an occupying army, to be a mandatory rallying cause for Jihad. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the current US presence in Iraq provide conclusive evidence of this fact.


Can the situation be turned around?


The irony is of course that if the US truly wanted to deal a crushing blow to the worldwide Islamic Jihad we could not ask for a more ideal situation than the one we are in now. The key to warfare is logistics; without logistic resupply eventually there is no combat CAPABILITY. Iran is the principal logistics resupplier of the CAPABILITY that sustains both Shi’ite and Sunni insurgents in Iraq.  Dealing a deathblow to the Iranian resupply of Shi’ite and Sunni Jihadists would strike at both the insurgent CAPABILITY in Iraq and the MOTIVATION (morale) of Islamic Jihadists throughout the world. That is the way warfare functions.


War is much like a football game where momentum can be a determining factor. Knocking Iran out of the world Jihad currently underway would have a devastating effect.  It should be noted that the way the West has historically rolled back Jihad was to administer overwhelming physical defeat (Tours-632, Vienna-1519, Lepanto-1571, Vienna-1683) which destroyed Jihadist CAPABILITY and put a stop to the expansion of dar al-Islam for extended periods of time. While it is unlikely that, short of nuclear eradication of Mecca and Medina, the West will ever be able to completely extinguish Jihadist MOTIVATION, the historical Western victories over Jihadist CAPABILITY also served to severely dampen Jihadist MOTIVATION and to curtail their Jihad for varying periods of time.  As with the oriental concept of the “mandate of heaven” to rule, Jihadists believe that they have the mandate of Allah to subjugate the world to Shari’a; however, as in the past, if and when they will be thwarted by a massive defeat, the MOTIVATION for Jihad will wither away.


Additionally, administering defeat to Iran would have the effect of putting Syria on notice that their continued logistical support of Islamic Jihadists in Iraq will no longer be tolerated.  We have been telling Syria to stop the re-supply of insurgents across their border for four years, and they have ignored us.  Why shouldn’t they? The Bush limited war strategy of containing the war to Iraq has made US threats ring hollow.  Those who advocate “soft power” fail to appreciate that soft power doesn’t exist when there is no steel fist inside the velvet glove. Defeat of Iran would restore the US ability to exercise soft power with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other Islamic countries. Military defeat of Iran is the key to turning the situation around, and that brings me to the question: How?


Is there a viable military strategy for disarming Iran?


I have compiled a number of quotes that I believe provide a historical framework for a viable military strategy for Iran that revolves around airpower. As one of the early airpower theorists, Alexander P. De Seversky, pointed out (a) that once total control of the air (air supremacy) is gained in warfare, the victor’s will can be imposed unchallenged; (b) that in some cases destruction to eliminate the power of the defeated enemy makes occupation and subjugation unnecessary; and (c) that the greater the enemy’s MOTIVATION, the greater the destruction that may be necessary to subdue him.

Once control of the air over hostile territory is assumed, the further disposition of that area is normally at the will of the conqueror . . . he may find the elimination of the country as a world factor more desirable, or more expeditious, than its actual subjugation . . .

The deeper the civilization and the national pride of a people, the more likely it is to be subjected to the method of extermination, since such a people cannot be reconciled to living the life of the vanquished.
– Alexander P. De Seversky, Victory through Air Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1942), p. 145.

My second series of quotes are taken from a work by J.E. Peterson, which detail how the British successfully policed their Middle East Empire using airpower for approximately twenty years. This historical lesson should be of special interest since this is the same difficult terrain and peoples that pose similar problems to us, although obviously no two historical situations are going to be exactly the same. The lesson I take away from the British experience is that hostile elements in Iran could be controlled without occupation, once air supremacy is assured. 

As early as 1919, air sorties were carried out against recalcitrant tribes of the interior, as well as against the Yemen imamate and Somaliland, and a flight was stationed permanently at Aden in 1920. When overall responsibility for the defense of the colony and protectorate was given over to the RAF in 1928, a squadron of bombers from Iraq replaced the existing garrison of British and Indian troops . . .

They exhibited an obvious advantage in reconnaissance, both in the ability to quickly and safely map unknown countryside and in gathering intelligence on enemy movements. Their mobility could be particularly useful in theatres of operation involving relatively small forces spread out over extensive territory. Attack by air was seen as particularly effective where the countryside was rugged and ground movements restricted to a limited number of roads and passes. Aircraft could be used for dropping communications and even some supplies to besieged positions. Finally, artillery spotting could be done more efficiently from the air . . .

The use of aircraft to support political authorities in maintaining order seemed to be an application of air power that was even more appropriate for "peacetime" conditions in many areas of the newly expanded empire. In particular, the advantages of air power over ground forces in "punitive expeditions" were seen to include the ability to: (1) strike a quick blow at a great distance; (2) keep forces concentrated without sacrificing mobility; (3) destroy the morale of tribesmen unable to counter air attacks; and (4) speed up negotiations with rebellious tribes by dropping government terms and landing negotiating officials.
– J.E. Peterson, Defending Arabia, “Chapter 2: Air Power and Empire in the Arabian Peninsula,” online edition from
www.JEPeterson.net (posted September 2000).

The third set of quotes is taken from the book I consider the classic work of American military history, Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War. Weigley reconfirms De Seversky’s point that air supremacy permits the power exercising it the freedom to range over the countryside and destroy the enemy’s CAPABILITY at will. The other very salient point made by Weigley is that the American people’s tolerance for extended war is quite limited. He cites Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt as being very aware of this fact, which can only make one wonder what Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush were thinking about when they both embarked on war strategies in Vietnam and Iraq, respectively, which were certain to prolong the conflicts.

When the skies over a nation are captured, everything below lies at the mercy of the enemy's air weapons. There is no reason why the job of annihilation should at that point be turned over to the mechanized infantry, when it can be carried out more efficiently and without opposition from overhead.

Like Lincoln's government before it, President Roosevelt's in World War II labored under an acute awareness that the American electorate might not show patience with a prolonged war. General Marshall had made his observation that a democracy cannot fight a seven years' war . . . If the American people were to remain patient enough to see the Pacific war through to the unconditional surrender of Japan, then the pace of the war must not be allowed to lag.
– Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 239 281.

The final quotation I have chosen to illustrate my points is from a recent column by Andrew McCarthy in National Review Online which specifically addresses our situation in Iraq, thereby reaffirming that American patience is short and that we have occupied our last Islamic country.

. . . [I]f Iraq proves anything, it is that we Americans lack the patience for long, difficult occupations — especially if our leaders fail to convince us that our own security, as opposed to a better life for the occupied, is at stake. Barring a perception-altering reprise of 9/11, U.S. counterterrorism for the foreseeable future will have to be about suppressing radical Islam without sticking around to see that the swamps stay drained — something which, by the way, would call for a ruthlessness I frankly doubt we have the stomach for.
Andrew C. McCarthy, “Preoccupied with Democracy in Iraq,” National Review Online, May 23, 2007.

Briefly stated, the strategy I propose for disarming Iran is to unleash a real “shock and awe” air campaign reminiscent of Desert Storm 1991.  Without having access to classified intelligence, I would structure my Air/Special Ops attack on Iran along these priorities.


1. Air Defenses/Iranian AF Bases
2. Nuclear Production/Storage Facilities
3. Mullahcracy HQs
4. Iranian Navy Ships/Facilities/Strait of Hormuz Defenses
5. Ballistic Missile Production/Storage/Launch Facilities
6. Iranian Revolutionary Guards'(IRG) HQs, Barracks, Training Camps, Equipment and Ammo Depots
7. Hezbollah's HQs, Barracks, Training Camps, Equipment and Ammo Depots
8. Gasoline Refining/Importation/Storage/Distribution Facilities
9. Iranian Army HQs, Barracks, Training Camps, Equipment and Ammo Depots
10. Restrikes (As Necessary)/Any Other Facilities With Military Use Potential


I would target for death the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.


In other words, I would destroy all Iranian military capability. Then I would send the message to the Iranian people: “So far Jihad has cost you only your military, while we have spared electrical, water, and civilian communication facilities. If your country ceases exporting Jihad, these facilities will continue to be spared. We have no desire to invade and occupy your country; however, we will monitor activities all over Iran from the air and any attempts to reconstitute a Jihad capability or even the threat to do so will be met by further devastating air attacks. When we are satisfied that Iran is no longer engaging in Jihadist activities, US air monitoring will cease.”


Combining the British experience of policing their Middle East Empire from the air, which the RAF designated “air control,” with our experience of interdiction in World War II and our policing the “no fly zones” over Iraq, there is ample historical precedent to use airpower for protecting our interests in the Middle East.  I realize that there will be the shoulder-fired man-pack surface-to-air missile threat, but with our satellite and drone surveillance capabilities and our Special Ops insertion capability to put eyeballs on the target, we should face no insurmountable threats.


I submit this essay as a “think piece” that does not address all of the issues, such as keeping the Iranian oil flowing. But, considering the immeasurable stakes involved, I am certain that a way could be found to deal with these types of concerns.

Colonel Tom Snodgrass, retired U.S. Air Force, is Advisor on Military Intelligence and Strategy to the Society of Americans for National Existence (SANE). Colonel Snodgrass spent 30 years in active military duty. He spent much of his time in the military as a senior intelligence officer and has been an instructor at several war colleges. He is a highly decorated Vietnam War veteran and holds a Master of Arts degree in History and Political Science.
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1 juillet 2007 7 01 /07 /juillet /2007 17:58

Propension à la guerre qui ne serait pas exempte de tensions internes graves, au sein même des deux cercles de pouvoir concernés...

Les préparations, aussi bien en Syrie qu'en Iran, battent leur plein et attendraient des livraisons supplémentaires de la part de la Russie (migs-29 et 31) pour provoquer de nouvelles confrontations...

Certains sites ont remis en cause la véracité des images et le nombre exact de stations essence brûlées (de 1 seule mise en scène, selon-Iran-resist.org) à 15 selon Pajamas media, 17 pour Iran-press-service, jusqu'à  la cinquantaine sur www.anti-mullahs.com. En l'absence d'envoyés spéciaux sur place, on est en droit de se faire un avis en procédant à un étalonnage, voire à des effets de moyenne entre les diverses topographies contrastées...
Néanmoins, il est difficile d'en conclure à une simple manoeuvre du pouvoir, voulant faire d'Ahmed Inezad le seul épouvantail à moineau de l'affaire, préservant ainsi l'essentiel du Régime, lorsque le fossé entre l'élite et la population iranienne semble s'accentuer pour cet ensemble mollachique et pas seulement à l'égard de celui qui lui servirait de prête-nom face à la communauté internationale...




بزرگراه نیابش - پیش از بامداد ششم تیر 86


اندکی پیش از نیمه شب ؛ مردم آخرین تلاش های خود را برای دسترسی به بنزین

صد تومانی به خرج می دهند.


بزرگراه نیایش - پس از تقاطع سردارجنگل


بزرگراه نیایش - پیش از تقاطع شهید ستاری


روبروی پمپ بنزین نیایش

مردم بزرگراه را می بندند...


بزرگراه نیایش - تجمع مردم در جلوی پمپ بنزین


پمپ بنزین نیایش در آتش می سوزد



آتش بیشتری پمپ بنزین را فرا می گیرد




Selon des sources tournées vers l'analyse et le renseignement, les émeutes de l'essence en Iran ne seraient pas tant liées à l'effet restrictif des sanctions économiques contre le Régime des Mollahs qu'à des stockages militaires en vue d'une éventuelle confrontation avec les Etats-Unis en Irak (franchissements de frontières du Sud irakien? à confirmer) et Israël au Sud-Liban et sur le Golan, par le sous-traitant syrien des Mollahs, Bachar al Assad...

(en attente de traduction : )
Friday, June 29, 2007
Volume XXV, No. 52 Saturday, June 30, 2007

Special Report

Iran, Syria Make Strenuous Preparations for Combat-Readiness, Partly Reflecting Major Internal Leadership Schisms
Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor. GIS.

A pattern of Iranian and Syrian cooperation is emerging which indicates intensive preparations for imminent hostilities, even in the face of — and perhaps even because of — growing public unrest within their societies.
The June 26-27, 2007, gasoline rationing riots which struck Tehran and other major Iranian cities were perceived by Western media analysts to highlight the weakness of the Iranian clerical Government of Pres. Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad.

In fact, more detailed intelligence shows that the clerical leadership not only anticipated the Iranian public unrest over petroleum rationing; that it had adequate reserves of refined petroleum and chose not only not to release these reserves to the public but rather to further ration normal supply; and then to deal strenuously and confidently with the protestors.

The Iranian Government has, in recent weeks and months, been acquiring refined petroleum on the international market at an unprecedented rate, and has paid cash for the oil, rather than its traditional approach of offering crude oil in barter for refined oil.

The Associated Press said on June 27, 2007, that “[t]he rationing is part of a Government attempt to reduce the $10-billion it spends each year to import fuel that is then sold to Iranian drivers at less than cost, to keep prices low.”

Intelligence sources, however, indicate that this is not so: the Iranian Government has been increasing its spending on refined petroleum imports, particularly in recent months, but has been stockpiling the fuel for military use. Indeed, the fuel rationing now seems to be part of the process of ensuring that adequate stocks of refined petroleum are available for military purposes.

The Iranian Government moves on stockpiling refined petroleum products parallel a variety of other indicators which show that Tehran is preparing for a worsening of the current international embargoes against the country to the point of war.

It is also working extensively to overcome the international embargo on the provision of weapons to Iran through major deals being conducted via Syria, and pushing Syria itself — Iran’s principal regional ally, or surrogate — into preparation for conflict as well.

Significantly, however, rifts in the Syrian leadership structure are also cause for concern in Tehran, but may, in fact, be contributory to the Syrian-Iranian preparations for external conflict as a means of bolstering support for the respective governments by their communities.

Quite apart from the divisions in the Iranian leadership (discussed below), and the division between the clerical ruling élite and the population itself, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad leadership ‘Alawite leadership group is itself becoming divided and rudderless in some respects, and is also facing a need to galvanize its population around a common cause.

There seems to be a major breakdown within the ruling elements of the Assad family in Damascus. Essentially, the President, Dr Bashar al-Assad, and his brother-in-law, Assaf Shawqat, the Director of Military Intelligence, were, according to highly-placed sources, inclined to spark the region in order to “rally the troops behind the flag”. This accords with Tehran’s need to develop a united front to simultaneously confront the US and Israel.

Significantly, however, even if Bashar was not inclined to work in concert with Tehran, his leadership is to a substantial extent predicted upon Tehran’s ability to blackmail the ‘Alawite leadership over the “legitimacy” of the ‘Alawites as a Shia sect.

The April 1973 fatwa issued by the late (officially only “missing”) Imam Mussa Sadr certifying the ‘Alawites as Ja'afari Shi’ites. Because Sadr “disappeared” (killed by Libyan intelligence officers on the orders of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi), no replacement could be nominated (because of the Shi’ite obsession with occultation) and his legal archive was moved to the High Court in Qom, Iran.

Hence, the certification of the ‘Alawites as Muslims is now beholden to the goodwill of the mullahs in Tehran, making the Assads of Damascus effectively hostages to this goodwill. Thus, talk in Washington about convincing Damascus to de-link from Tehran is wishful thinking.

Moreover, the Bashar al-Assad Government is facing the increasing effectiveness and appeal of the leadership of the exiled uncle of the President, Rifaat al-Assad, who is seen as perhaps the only ‘Alawite leader who could have the strength to govern Syria without Iranian support, and even without the blessing and affirmation of the Shia leadership in Qom. He is, in other words, a national Syrian leader in his own right.

But in order for the existing Syrian and Iranian leadership attempts to bolster and protect their rule against internal opposition, by promoting the idea of international threats to the countries, both Damascus and Tehran are building defense readiness.

From June 18-21, 2007, Syrianair cancelled most of its scheduled air services and diverted aircraft into an airlift of weapons from Tehran to Damascus, with some of those weapons shipments going on to HizbAllah in Lebanon.

As well, Iran Air and, reportedly, Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) aircraft were pressed into service to airlift military supplies from Tehran to Damascus (again, with some shipments moved by surface transport on to Lebanon for HizbAllah).

At the same time, Syria reportedly took delivery in June 2007 of five MiG-31E advanced combat aircraft, and may have already begun accepting delivery of further MiG-29 variants — reportedly MiG-29M/M2s — for possible on-shipment to the IRIAF. The IIRAF already had some 25 Mikoyan MiG-29 and 15 two-seat MiG-29UB Fulcrum fighters in its inventory.

The Syrian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Arabiya as Souriya) had appr. 42 MiG-29A Fulcrum fighters, 14 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum air defense and air superiority aircraft, and six Mikoyan MiG-29UB Fulcrum operational trainers in its inventory. The MiG-31 is a development of the MiG-25 series, and it is reported that the MiG-29M/M2 is, in fact, similar in its subsystems and capabilities to the model being offered as the MiG-35 for the Indian Air Force.

It is probable that Russia took back some of Syria’s older MiG-25 Foxbat high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft as trade-ins for the MiG-31Es.

The MiG-31E is the export version of basic MiG-31 prototype (“903”), which was first noted in 1997; it has simplified systems over the MiG-35, with no active jammer, downgraded IFF, as well as downgraded radar and DASS. The Syrian Air Force has less than 15 Mikoyan MiG-25PD Foxbat air defense aircraft in its inventory; eight Mikoyan MiG-25RB reconnaissance; and two MiG-25RU Foxbat operational trainers.

It is possible that Tehran and Damascus have been awaiting delivery of the advanced models of the MiG-25 and MiG-29 series before declaring readiness for a major, coordinated upsurge in confrontation with the US and Israel. Certainly, Syrian and Iranian aircrew and technicians have been undergoing training in Russia on the new systems.

The use of Syria as a front for the purchase of advanced systems for Iran is not new. Even as recently as April-May 2007, it was reported that some of Syria’s 36 new Pantsir-S1E air defense systems were on-shipped to Iran.

Meanwhile, it will be of key importance to note when the DPRK (North Korea) also begins steps to upgrade its confrontation, or return to a confrontational mode, with the US. This would indicate that the alliance of Iran, Syria, and the DPRK is ready to make moves, with the DPRK providing strategic diversion to an escalation in the Middle East.

At the same time, however, the rifts within the clerical leadership are also coming to a head. There is a significant movement by former Pres. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who has found common cause with the “Supreme Leader”, “Ayatollah” Ali Hosseini-Khamene‘i, to attempt to work against Pres. Ahmadi-Nejad, who Rafsanjani is convinced is moving Iran too close to an unwinnable war with the US.

Some Tehran sources indicate that Rafsanjani has already hinted to Saudi and US officials that he would, if he and Khamene‘i could remove Ahmadi-Nejad, begin a rapprochement with the US.

This kind of leakage could, however, also be designed to cause the US to pull back from military confrontation with Iran, given the predilection in the US State Department to follow the recommendations of former Secretary of State James Baker to “normalize” US-Iranian relations, regardless of the fact that this would work against US long-term interests by perpetuating a radical clerical Administration in office in Iran.

As one Tehran source said: “These so-called ayatollahs may all hate each other and scheme against each other, but the ‘reformers’ are now different from the hard-liners when it comes to power issues; they are both the same side of the same coin. The ‘reformers’ only allow women to have a less strict dress code, and may — as Rafsanjani is hinting — make the nuclear program less visible. But they still will foment terrorist activities; they will still work to use HizbAllah to destroy Israel. They are all the same.”
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29 juin 2007 5 29 /06 /juin /2007 13:13

L’Enjeu : Et si Arafat avait fait basculer le destin de l’Iran ?

31.03.2006  http://www.iran-resist.org/article1853

Commentaire : Nous avons trop pris l'habitude de comprendre le rôle de l'Iran dans le conflit inter-palestinien comme une conséquence récente de l'hégémonie mollachique au détriment des pays arabo-musulmans d'obédience sunnite, dits "modérés" (Arabie Saoudite, Jordanie, Egypte...). Selon notre conception biaisée, cette satellisation remonterait au plus à une décennie, réalisée grâce à la planification d'actions terroristes palestiniennes par le maître d'oeuvre hezbollahni, s'ingérant dans les affaires palestiniennes après le retrait israélien du Sud-Liban de mai 2000 et à la faveur de l'Intifada II déclenchée par Arafat.

Les documents saisis par l'armée israélienne lors de l'opération "rempart" de 2002 à la Mouqata révélait la constance de ces liens entre Fatah et Hezbollah (donc Iran, par extension). Mais, à ce stade, on peut encore percevoir Arafat comme "pressurisé" par de nouveaux maîtres d'oeuvre régionaux.

Il s'agirait encore d'une "inféodation", au vu de l'extension grandissante de l'influence mollachique, dont le Peuple Palestinien serait la "victime", comme de tant d'autres phénomènes où il est sujet aux pressions régionales diverses. Son acteur principal serait aujourd'hui le Hamas, dans une partition à deux choeurs de la question palestinienne, entre un Abbas et son Fatah, encore (tout juste) fréquentables et les méchants islamistes ne cherchant guère à nous le cacher : le Hamas.

Nous accrochant presque malgré nous à cette perception très occidentale, c'est encore une façon d'éviter de comprendre les liens qui unissent consubstantiellement le premier OLP d'Arafat et la Révolution islamiste, dès ses origines. Arafat a prêté main forte aux Mollahs et, historiquement, ceux-ci le lui ont bien rendu, lorsque c'est lui qui avait besoin d'eux. Mais, sans lui, la Révolution islamique aurait peut-être avorté : 

dans un article très détaillé (il existe une version plus courte), Iran-resist.org décrit minutieusement l'action des Fedayins d'Arafat dans le fameux "vendredi noir" qui décrédibilisa le pouvoir du Shah, du fait de sa supposée répression" : de fait, les Fedayins placés sur les toîts massacrèrent plus de 70 % de militaires et de policiers palhavistes et 30% de civils pour accréditer la thèse macabre officielle, dans une "mise en scène" à laquelle Arafat nous a habitué depuis. Dès lors, le Shah, à la recherche de réformes de dernière minute, avait "massacré" son propre peuple et plus rien ne pouvait plus le sauver, aux yeux des Iraniens, encore moins aux yeux des pouvoirs et publics occidentaux (rôle de Jimmy Carter et de la France de Valéry Giscard D'estaing, en sous-main de l'Union soviétique instrumentalisant ses guerilleros les plus sûrs : les Fedayins d'Arafat, ou d'autres groupes comme l'OMPI)

Cela change qu'il ne s'agit nullement d'une intrusion ad'hoc dans un énième conflit, après le Liban, mais d'un parti-pris conjoint marxo-islamiste qui est fondateur, autant pour l'un que pour l'autre. Le Hamas est, depuis, devenu un autre visage paroxystique et un nouveau bras armé de l'Iran. Cela ne retire rien de l'implication historique de l'OLP dans la naissance de la République des Mollahs, qui menace aujourd'hui "Israël d'être rayé de la Carte", conformément à une connivence et des objectifs planifiés de longue date, entre les deux comparses...


[1] Arafat et Khomeiny | Le rôle des Fedayins d’Arafat dans la révolution islamique en Iran

-  L’Enjeu : Et si Arafat avait fait basculer le destin de l’Iran ? (version courte) |

Autre lien à mettre en perspective avec celui-ci : Fatah, l'Iranian Connection


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27 juin 2007 3 27 /06 /juin /2007 21:48

Reste à connaître les raisons exactes de ce rationnement qui provoque la colère de l'Iranien de la rue : à cause des "sanctions" (puisque l'Iran riche en pétrole importe néanmoins 40% de ses besoins, ne disposant pas de suffisamment de raffineries), ou à cause des besoins de stockage de l'armée iranienne, en prévision d'un prochain conflit?

voir également : http://www.iran-resist.org/article3575



Iran/troubles : violentes réactions sociales contre le rationnement de l’essence

Selon des sources iraniennes, une douzaine de stations-services ont été brûlée, à Téhéran, dans la soirée de mardi. Les automobilistes en colère entendaient ainsi protester contre l’introduction d’un rationnement du carburant (100 litres par mois pour les privés, 300 litres pour les voitures officielles, 600 litres pour les résidents étrangers et 800 litres pour les taxis) qui les frappe durement.

Cette crise sociale qui pourrait se propager à d’autres villes iraniennes souligne l’incompréhension qui entoure, dans la rue, l’action du président Ahmadinejad. Lors de sa campagne électorale, il avait promis une meilleure répartition de la « rente pétrolière », mais l’Iran, qui dispose pourtant d’énormes réserves, importe 40% de l’essence qu’elle consomme faute de capacités de raffinage suffisantes. Mercredi matin, de longues files de voitures s’étendaient devant les stations services de la capitale.

Photo Gallery
Iranians Outraged by Sudden Gas Rationing
World's Second-Biggest Exporter of Oil Imports 40% of its Gasoline
Posted 2 hr. 1 min. ago
Photo by Behrouz Mehri/AFP-Getty Images

Tehran, IRAN: Iranians block a highway by setting fire in front of a petrol station today in the northwest of Tehran, after the government announced it was going to begin rationing fuel. Since the announcement of the rationing plan yesterday, which allows for only 100 liters (26 gallons) of petrol per month for private cars, long queues started appearing at fuel pumps not only in Tehran but also in the countryside.
An Iranian man shows his filled plastic bottles with gasoline at a petrol station in downtown Tehran late last night.
Photo by Behrouz Mehri/AFP-Getty Images
An Iranian man shows his filled plastic bottles with gasoline at a petrol station in downtown Tehran late last night.

Tehran, IRAN: The ruins of a damaged petrol station lie on the ground in the northwest of Tehran today.
Photo by Behrouz Mehri/AFP-Getty Images
Tehran, IRAN: The ruins of a damaged petrol station lie on the ground in the northwest of Tehran today.

An Iranian man walks past cars lined up at a petrol station north of Tehran today.
Photo by Behrouz Mehri/AFP-Getty Images
An Iranian man walks past cars lined up at a petrol station north of Tehran today
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27 juin 2007 3 27 /06 /juin /2007 14:32


Comme nous l'annoncions hier dans la foulée du Sun qui le premier a révélé cette information, l'incursion des Pasdaran au Sud de l'Irak est une nouvelle donne de la guerre au Moyen-Orient menée par l'Iran, selon Debkafile qui reprend et détaille cette info.


Le Régime mollachique a, depuis hier 26 juin, à 2h, rationné les réserves disponibles pour la consommation d'essence, de dérivés du pétrole et de gaz, (qui pourraient être) réquisitionnées par l'Armée. De fait, des émeutes ont eu lieu autour des distributeurs et pompes à essence (une cinquantaine de stations détruites selon Iran-resist.org : http://www.iran-resist.org/article3575 ) , notamment dans la capitale Téhéran, faisant à cette heure, au moins 3 morts, selon Debka en milieu d'après-midi et 5 selon iran-resist.org).


L'incursion d'hier (25-26) semble avoir été réalisée par prévention d'une attaque américaine contre l'Iran, plus que comme tentative de conquête du Sud Shi'ite, quoi que plus facile à retourner au profit de l'Iran et à maîtriser du fait de la présence du seul contingent anglais. Un pré-positionnement, donc, les Mollahs étant persuadés qu'une incursion des Marine's se profile "au coin de la rue".

La "Guerre" qui ne dit pas son nom a bien débuté, par l'ouverture de plusieurs zones de confrontation dite "asymétrique" :

- au Liban via le Fatah-al-Islam, disposant d'environ 1600 hommes (dont 400 actuellement hors d'état de nuire), mais aussi par le soutien de pasdaran, envoyés ces jours derniers vers Damas (mediarabe.com), avec l'intention d'installer un "bouclier anti-missile" en Syrie, mais aussi de pouvoir prêter main forte au Hezbollah et, plus indirectement, au Fatah  al Islam ou à d'autres groupes des camps palestiniens pro-syriens, en cas de généralisation du conflit. La Syrie elle-même est en situation de mise sur le pied de guerre depuis longtemps, avec renfort de missiles anti-tanks de type Hornet, ayant fait leurs preuves entre les mains du Hezbollah, contre les Merkavim de Tsahal l'été dernier, fournitures d'armement et d'avions (Mig-29 et 31) par la Russie, qui les prétend "défensifs"...

- Elle se prolongerait via le PKK, dont certains éléments sont manipulés par la Syrie et l'Iran, en s'attaquant à la Turquie qui réplique au Nord de l'Irak, par le Kurdistan (entre deux feux, puisque les autres groupes sont alliés des Américains, mais jouent aussi la solidarité ethnique).

- La prise de Gaza par le Hamas est un nouvel épisode de cette guerre déclenchée simultanément sur plusieurs fronts.

- Et la confrontation directe anticipée avec l'Armée américaine et britannique en territoire irakien pourrait venir apporter la démonstration des vélléités d'en découdre des Mollahs, via des groupes-commandos spécialistes de la subversion et des menées insurrectionnelles islamiques, du sabotage et du terrorisme.


Précaution : Il se peut que ce préambule soit essentiellement traité à coup d'envois de forces spéciales, affaire de services secrets et d'unités d'élite spécialisées, de façon à le circonscrire à un des "nombreux incidents de frontière" coutumiers entre Irak et Iran (voir affaire des 15 marins enlevés), du fait que l'Iran ne reconnaît pas le tracé qui a découlé de la guerre Irak-Iran. Il se peut également que l'Iran appuie sur le "talon d'Achille" de l'opération "Sursaut" en Irak, pour ravitailler ses alliés shi'ites et les inciter à créer une enclave autonome débarrassée des soldats de sa Majesté... de façon à rééquilibrer le rapport de forces vis-à-vis des alliés en Irak et "échanger un territoire contre la paix" comme on braque une banque.... ???


La gestion politique de Bassorah par les Britanniques est aujourd'hui tenu pour être le contre-modèle parfait et le listing de toutes les erreurs à éviter en Irak. L'Iran semble chercher à utiliser cet enseignement à son profit...




1) il y a ces bruits de bottes un peu partout. Debkafile a repris l'info du Sun (british) d'avant-hier, faisant état d'hélicos et de troupes pasdaran prenant pied dans le sud de l'Irak, dans la région où se trouvent les Britanniques (Bassorah). Ce matin (27/06), 3 soldats britanniques ont été tués dans l'explosion d'une mine (roadsidebomb, selon la terminologie) dissimulée sur leur passage. Cela ne veut pas dire que les Pasdaran eux-mêmes soient entrés en action, mais signifie que la guerre de basse intensité, relayée par des groupes terroristes shi'ites (liés au Jaysh al-Mahdi- Milices du Mahdi), approvisionnée par les réseaux iraniens, se poursuit "as usual" ou/et s'accentue. Sur le plan tactique, les Pasdaran seraient dans le désert irakien (en territoire étranger où ils n'ont rien à faire et c'est une violation de fait) de façon préventive en cas d'attaque US sur leur territoire. Il y aurait donc des unités en Irak et le gros des troupes de l'autre côté de la frontière, soit-disant pour protéger les installations pétrolières, nucléaires etc. Pas nécessairement dans l'esquisse d'une "offensive" proprement dite. Mais la violation de frontières serait patente, raison pour laquelle on se garde de l'ébruiter.
2) Via Reuters http://lessakele.over-blog.fr/article-11076819.html ,etc., on parle plus ouvertement de la tension grandissante entre émissaires Américains et Iraniens, les premiers signalant à leurs homologues, que depuis la rencontre de Baghdad, fin mai, rien n'avait changé sur le terrain, au contraire : les Iraniens, clairement, ne tiennent aucun de leurs engagements pour faire baisser la tension. C'est l'inverse qui s'est produit : qu'il s'agisse de l'Irak ou de l'Afghanistan, les preuves de la fourniture d'armes, munitions, et des norias pour aller s'entraîner en Iran et revenir sur les divers théâtres d'opération, ne cessent d'augmenter. Les mises en cause sont passées d'un stade du constat opéré par les militaires (techniciens), il y a quelques mois, au niveau le plus officiel (politiques) des accusations.
3) D'autre part, il y a eu ces images d'émeutes en Iran-même, diffusées aussi bien sur France 2 que sur Iraqsblogger :http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/3364/Iranians_Outraged_by_Sudden_Gas_Rationing
Fr2 n'a évoqué que les conséquences visibles des sanctions contre l'Iran et jamais la mise sur le pied de guerre des forces iraniennes avec mise en place d'une économie de préparation à un conflit plus large.
En Iran-même, on parle de 50 stations services incendiées et détruites et surtout de 5 morts (Debka en annonçait déjà 3 un peu plus tôt) : http://www.iran-resist.org/article3575
4) Reste que les Pasdaran, prépositionnés, sont prêts à toute éventualité, en Syrie, vers le Liban (vélléités Onusiennes et du Quai de mieux contrôler les frontières, mais n'est-il pas un peu tard?), actifs dans les territoires...
Personne n'a intérêt à l'ouverture massive et officielle d'un nouveau front de confrontation directe entre Coalition multi-Nationale (OTAN en Afghanistan) et Iran. Peut-être ne s'agit-il que de rounds d'observation, de renforts de réseaux locaux déjà créés de longue date, de tension aggravante jusqu'à frôler le point de rupture (registre des menaces avant série d'ultimatum?). Pour le Sud irakien, il est possible que ça se joue entre SAS, Sils, Delta-force etc. contre Pasdaran, de façon à ébruiter le moins possible l'intrusion qui signifierait une entrée en guerre par casus-beli... D'autant que si les remous à l'intérieur de l'Iran devenaient trop importants, le Régime ne pourrait se lancer dans des guerres (ou guérillas) extérieures et assurer l'ordre en situation de pénurie à l'intérieur pendant longtemps. Cette histoire de rationnement donne une idée de la vulnérabilité de l'Iran, qui dépend à 40% de l'aide (investissements) extérieure pour raffiner son propre pétrole...
D'où peut-être, la stratégie de se montrer plus menaçant : "si le chaos se répand chez nous, nous déstabiliserons tout le Moyen-Orient" (?)...
Escarmouches démultipliées ou entrée en guerre? Il faut sans doute éviter de se tromper d'échelle, mais sutout de stratégie... Les Pasdaran sont les maîtres d'oeuvre des "guerres asymétriques" et les agents-traitants des mouvements tels que le Hezbollah. Des semeurs de chaos et de coups tordus, plus que l'avant-garde d'une armée régulière prête à entrer directement en action, lors de batailles rangées...

reports: Iranian Revolutionary Guards suicide unit’s incursion of S. Iraq is another step in undeclared war


June 27, 2007, 12:15 PM (GMT+02:00)

Revolutionary Guards Special Forces in training

Revolutionary Guards Special Forces in training


Early this week, Tehran deployed in southern Iraq and southern Iran contingents of Revolutionary Guards Corps of suicide fighters in anticipation of an American attack on Iranian soil.


Those units were posted to fight off a possible US Marines landing in southern Iran. Tehran believes the American force will be assigned with destroying RG bases and infrastructure in the south and sabotaging the oil wells and installations of Iranian province of Khuzestan.


The RG fighters were dropped by helicopter in southern Iraq on June 24 and 25. Their task will be to launch suicide attacks on US and British bases and command posts in the region the moment Iran comes under American attack.


Also in anticipation of a showdown, Tehran announced Tuesday at only two hours notice the rationing of gas for Iran’s private motorists to 100 liters per month. Protesters started torching gas stations Wednesday.


For lack of refining capacity, the oil-rich country imports 40% of its gasoline needs and oil products. Tehran sharply reined in private consumption to free up reserves for the armed forces in case of war and keep power stations and water supplies running in an emergency.


DEBKAfile’s military sources report that these two steps in three days attest to the certainty of Iran’s government and military that a military confrontation with the US is around the corner.


The British Sun newspaper first disclosed the Iranian troop thrust into southern Iraq Monday, June 25, reporting: “It is an extremely alarming development and raises the stakes considerably. In effect, it means we are in a full war with Iran – but nobody has officially declared it.”


DEBKAfile’s military experts add: In effect, the Iranian military incursion of Iraq is the fourth military invasion of foreign territory underway in the Middle East at this very moment. None are officially admitted.


1. The Turkish army is fighting Kurdish PKK rebels in Iraqi Kurdistan on the other side of their border. Almost daily, Turkish units backed by tanks, fighter planes and helicopters cross into northern Iraq and battle with the rebels. Washington, Ankara, Baghdad and Irbil blandly ignore this ongoing war.


2. In the second week of the six-week long confrontation between the Lebanese army and the pro-Damascus radical Palestinian Fatah al-Islam near Tripoli, the Syrian army and security service began pushing into the embattled camp reinforcements of hundreds Palestinian fighters, members of groups under their control. These fighters, an estimated 1,600-strong, have since fanned out in clusters in northern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, the mountains north of Tripoli and south of Beirut. The Syrian army keeps them well supplied with ammunition, food and fuel.


3. Israeli tank and armored infantry forces conduct ongoing counter-terror operations against Hamas, Jihad Islami and allied Palestinian terrorist groups in southern and northern Gaza. Since the Palestinian Islamist Hamas takeover of Gaza last week, Israeli tanks supported by helicopter and pilot-less aircraft are engaged in ongoing firefights with Palestinian anti-tank units.

autre information :


DEBKAfile reports: At least three Iranians killed in petrol rationing riots underlining the oil-rich country’s fuel vulnerability


June 27, 2007, 2:15 PM (GMT+02:00)

Fuel riots in Iran are popular demonstrations against Islamic government

Fuel riots in Iran are popular demonstrations against Islamic government


At only two hours notice, Tehran Tuesday, June 26, announced the rationing of gas for Iran’s private motorists to 100 liters per month as a war measure. This led to riots and the torching of gas stations across the country, including the capital.


For lack of refining capacity, the oil-rich country imports 40% of the gasoline and oil products consumed by its population of 70 million. This dependence constitutes one of Iran’s military vulnerabilities, curtailing its ability to endure a long war. Another is its elderly air force, consisting mainly of American warplanes of 1970s vintage.


The Islamic Republic has resorted to three emergency measures to alleviate its fuel shortage and boost allocations to the military in case of war:


1. Indiscriminate petrol rationing for all types of private vehicle and taxis in every parts of the country regardless of higher consumption in the cities compared with rural areas.


2. Instructions to Iran’s agents in the Gulf region to buy up as much fuel as they can lay their hands on, upping the price for fast delivery.


3. To instill popular confidence in the Islamic regime’s competence to run the country, various energy products including gas are heavily subsidized. A liter of gasoline costing 50 cents to buy is sold for 5 cents. Iran spends more than $8 billion a year on imported refined fuel products. According to DEBKAfile’s sources, $2.5 billion worth of fuel products were purchased in the last three months alone. Rationing civilian consumption was calculated to release funds for laying in military supplies.


The Tehran government failed to take into account that the rationing decree would spark violent anti-government protests – in actual fact demonstrations against government sleaze.


DEBKAfile discloses why Iran never built refineries at home:


The Islamic regime decided to allocate national funds for establishing oil refineries in Malaysia and Indonesia to enable its top officials to skim millions of dollars off those budgets and funnel them into their personal businesses and private bank accounts in the Far East. Like many a corrupt regime, its leaders fondly believed the people knew nothing of their abuses. The violent protests which the fuel rationing decree sparked across the country told them the population had not been fooled.



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26 juin 2007 2 26 /06 /juin /2007 19:20
L’Iran installe un bouclier anti-missile en Syrie ?

mardi 26 juin 2007 - 17h13, par Mediarabe.info

Le Daily Telegraph semble confirmer les informations parues le 25 juin relatives au « pont aérien » entre Téhéran et Damas, destiné à transporter des gardiens de la Révolution, avec armes et bagages, vers la Syrie. Selon le journal britannique, l’Iran installerait en Syrie un bouclier anti-missile qui serait utilisé pour riposter à toute attaque qui pourrait viser ses installations nucléaires.

Le site « Elaph.com » cite le « Daily Telegraph » pour affirmer que « la Syrie a accepté d’ouvrir son territoire à ce bouclier, conformément aux termes des accords stratégiques signés entre les deux pays, et particulièrement grâce à l’accord de défense commune conclu en 2005 ». Après une réunion du Haut conseil iranien de sécurité et de défense, tenue en mai dernier, Téhéran a décidé d’accélérer l’application de l’accord de défense commune et d’installer des batteries de lancement de missiles en Syrie pour défendre son programme nucléaire contre toute attaque. Des experts des Nations Unies confirme, selon la même source, que l’Iran installe effectivement des rampes de lancement de missiles en Syrie. « Elaph.com » ajoute que « les Iraniens s’apprêtent ainsi à transporter des dizaines de missiles Chehab-3, des Scud-C et Scud-B » (photo des missiles Shehab-3 lors de manoeuvres iranienns).

Rappelons que le quotidien koweïtien « Al Seyassah » avait affirmé, dans son édition du 25 juin, que la Syrie et l’Iran avaient installé un pont aérien, durant trois jours la semaine précédante, afin de transporter des unités des Gardiens de la Révolution et des armes vers Damas.

Lire l'article original : Elaph.com

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26 juin 2007 2 26 /06 /juin /2007 11:49
Les Forces iraniennes ont franchi la frontière irakienne : reportage
Jun 25 07:23 PM US/Eastern


View larger image

Des Gardiens de la Révolution iranienne ont été aperçus par les Troupes britanniques en train de franchir la frontière au Sud de l'Irak, ont rapporté les tabloïds du SUN, mardi.
Le Ministère de la défense britannique n'a pas souhaité ni confirmer ni infirmer ce rapport, son porte-parole refusant de commenter des informations relevant des services de renseignement.
Une source anonyme émanant de ces services de renseignement a déclaré au journal : "C'est un développement extrêmement alarmant qui augmente considérablement les enjeux (la tension). En effet, cela voudrait dire que nous sommes en guerre ouverte contre l'Iran -- Mais, personne ne l'a déclaré officiellement".
"Nous avons des preuves formelles que le Corps des Gardiens de la Révolution a franchi la frontière pour nous attaquer. Il est très difficile pour nous de répliquer. La seule chose que nous puissions faire est de nous défendre (adopter des mesures d'auto-défense). Le Sun précise que les indications des radars signalant le passage d'hélicoptères iraniens en train de pénétrer dans le désert irakien lui ont été confirmées par des sources militaires de très haut rang.
En réponse à ce rapport, un porte-parole du Ministère britannique de la Défense a affirmé : " Nous avons la preuve que les engins explosifs utilisés contre nos troupes dans le Sud irakien proviennent d'Iran."
"Tout Iranien en relation avec les milices armées en Irak, tout soutien concernant l'approvisionnement en armes, entraînement militaire ou soutien financier sont inacceptables". La Grande-Bretagne dispose d'environ 7 100 soldats en Irak, la plupart d'entre eux sont basés dans la ville du Sud de Bassorah (Basra) et dans les environs, alors que le Gouvernement souhaite réduire ce contingent  à un nombre situé entre 5000 et 5500 hommes cette année.

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Ne vous est-il jamais venu à l'esprit d'en savoir un peu plus sur le titre de ce blog ?

Puisque nous nous sommes aujourd'hui habillés de bleu, il conviendrait de rentrer plus a fond dans l'explication du mot lessakel.

En fait Lessakel n'est que la façon française de dire le mot léhasskil.

L'hébreu est une langue qui fonctionne en déclinant des racines.

Racines, bilitères, trilitères et quadrilitères.

La majorité d'entre elle sont trilitères.

Aussi Si Gad a souhaité appeler son site Lessakel, c'est parce qu'il souhaitait rendre hommage à l'intelligence.

Celle qui nous est demandée chaque jour.

La racine de l'intelligence est sé'hel שכל qui signifie l'intelligence pure.

De cette racine découlent plusieurs mots

Sé'hel > intelligence, esprit, raison, bon sens, prudence, mais aussi croiser

Léhasskil > Etre intelligent, cultivé, déjouer les pièges

Sé'hli > intelligent, mental, spirituel

Léhistakel > agir prudemment, être retenu et raisonnable, chercher à comprendre

Si'hloute > appréhension et compréhension

Haskala >  Instruction, culture, éducation

Lessa'hlen > rationaliser, intellectualiser

Heschkel > moralité

Si'htanout > rationalisme

Si'hloul > Amélioration, perfectionnement


Gageons que ce site puisse nous apporter quelques lumières.

Aschkel pour Lessakel.



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