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15 octobre 2008 3 15 /10 /octobre /2008 18:51
US forces kill al Qaeda in Iraq's deputy commander
Abu-Qaswarah.jpg

Abu Qaswarah. Image courtsey of Multinational Forces Iraq.

US forces struck a major blow against al Qaeda in Iraq's beleaguered network. Abu Qaswarah, al Qaeda in Iraq's second in command, was killed in the northern city of Mosul during a targeted raid ten days ago.

Abu Qaswarah, who is also known as Abu Sara, was killed during an intelligence-driven raid on "a key command and control location" in Mosul on Oct. 5. He was the terrorist who detonated the suicide vest that killed three women and three children after being shot by Coalition Forces.

"Evidence after the operation indicates he was shot by Coalition forces who were acting in self defense and that he detonated his suicide vest after receiving mortal wounds from Coalition forces," Lieutenant Commander David Russell, a Public Affairs Officer in Baghdad, told The Long War Journal. "The innocent Iraqi victims were three women and three children who were also killed during the operation. This deliberate disregard for the safety of innocent Iraqi lives is characteristic of Abu Qaswarah’s nefarious operations."

The raid, likely carried out by the special operations hunter-killer teams of Task Force 88, resulted in five al Qaeda operatives killed, including Abu Qaswarah. Multinational Forces Iraq was able to positively identify Abu Qaswarah as being killed after the raid.

The US military described Abu Qaswarah as the senior operational commander and second in command to Abu Ayyub al Masri, al Qaeda's leader in Iraq. Qaswarah was "a charismatic AQI [al Qaeda in Iraq] leader who rallied AQI's northern network in the wake of major setbacks to the terrorist organization across Iraq," Multinational Forces Iraq stated. Prior to being appointed al Masri's deputy, he severed as al Qaeda's emir, or leader, in northern Iraq.

Like al Masri and much of al Qaeda in Iraq's senior leadership, Abu Qaswarah was a foreigner. Qaswarah was a Moroccan citizen "who trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan." He had "had historic ties to AQI founder Abu Musab al Zarqawi and senior al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan," the US military stated.

Abu Qaswarah also "directed the movement of foreign terrorists into northern Iraq," Multinational Forces Iraq said. Al Qaeda in Iraq has almost exclusively relied on ratlines from northwestern Iraq to move foreign fighters into the country. But that number has dwindled to about a dozen foreign fighters entering Iraq, down from a peak of almost 150 in 2006.

In addition to directed suicide attacks against civilians and the US and Iraqi military, Qaswarah also served as al Qaeda's enforcer. "Abu Qaswarah reportedly killed foreign terrorists who wanted to return to their home countries instead of carrying out attacks against Iraqi citizens," the US military stated.

The US military said Abu Qaswarah's death will "cause a major disruption" to al Qaeda in Iraq's network as he was a key link in coordinating al Qaeda's operations and operatives. "His death will significantly degrade AQI operations in Mosul and Northern Iraq, leaving the network without a leader to oversee and coordinate its operations in the region."

Al Qaeda in Iraq has attempted to regroup in Mosul and the surrounding areas since it was defeated in central and much of northern Iraq. The Iraqi and US military has heavily targeted al Qaeda's senior leadership since late 2007. Much of al Qaeda in Iraq's senior leadership is said to have fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda forums are suggesting jihadi recruits flock to Afghanistan instead of Iraq. The US military has intercepted communications between al Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan that show al Qaeda has suffered a major setback during 2007 and 2008.

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13 octobre 2008 1 13 /10 /octobre /2008 20:32
An interview with Ambassador Crocker
ambassador-crocker.jpg

Ambassador Ryan Crocker. AFP photo.

The following is a transcript from an Oct. 10 interview in Baghdad between Bill Murray and Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq. Crocker became Ambassador in March 2007 after spending three years in the same post to Pakistan. Ambassador Crocker assumed his duty in Iraq just as the US military was ramping up for the surge. He is one of the most experience diplomats in the US Foreign Service, having previously served as ambassador in Lebanon, Syria and Kuwait. Crocker joined the Foreign Service in 1971 and expects to retire in early 2009.

Murray: One of the biggest fears about Iraq currently is whether the central Shia-dominate government can integrate the Sunni-dominated Sons of Iraq program successfully while not abusing their power or causing sectarian violence to flare. Now that we have a provincial election scheduled for early next year, it seems that as long as nothing changes in terms of security we could have elections with very little gamesmanship going on. Is that what the US working is trying to accomplish right now?

Crocker: I think you can safely predict that there will be gamesmanship going on. These elections are important at a number of levels and it’s very good that the election law was passed and a `not-later-than date’ set in January. They are important because they are the second round of elections. A single election does not a democracy make, multiple election do. In these elections, the incumbents are going to be fighting for their jobs.

The second way in which they are significant is because of the boycotts surrounding the first provisional election. That left a lot of imbalances in certain key provincial councils in Diyala, Baghdad and Ninawa where Sunnis are dramatically underrepresented. It seems clear that as we approach these new elections, the Sunnis are going to turn out in force.

There will also be issues in the province of Anbar, which is predominately Sunni – but because of the boycott -- there are political forces in the province that did not contest past elections but will be this time. So you are going to see a lot of positive recalibration going on. It is important that these are, and are seen to be reasonably free and fair elections. We’re working with the United Nations, with the Iraqi Election High Commission and putting measures are in place that will give people a reasonable level of confidence that these elections are legitimate. It’s going to be important going forward and it’s going to be a challenge.

Murray: I understand the period for registration for the election is now closed, but it was clear when I watched it take place in Ninewa that people, especially Sunnis, were registering at a rapid rate.

Crocker: Among the Sunnis and in general among the Iraqis, there is a lot of interest in these elections. I think you are going to see very high turnouts, certainly among the Sunni. The joke is that only about 10 percent of Sunnis voted in the last election, about 110 percent will vote in the upcoming one.

Murray: Can you give a general outline about how the political parties in Iraq will be contesting the election?

Crocker: It’s still early in the process, because the law was just passed about two and a half weeks ago, and I think we’re going to see a period of maneuvering among parties and candidates as they test out the possibility of formal and informal coalitions. Among the Shia, will the Sadrists formally or informally [ally] with the Dawa Party or the Supreme Council or neither? How will the Dawa and the Supreme Council, the two major parties among the Shia, enter into any understandings? Among the Sunnis, with the Awakening movements which have organized as political parties, how they will coalesce, will they coalesce, and what possible relationships will emerge between them and the Islamic Party? How will independents take advantage of the system; all of these remains to be worked out. So you will see a lot of political maneuvering and it is too early to tell how that is working.

Murray: You’ve mentioned in the past several weeks how Iran has been impeding progress on the security agreement, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), that is being negotiated between the US and Iraq. Did the Bush Administration make a mistake by not guaranteeing Iraq’s foreign borders and making a choice -- by not having the agreement go through Congress -- that has allowed Iran to manipulate the discussions?

Crocker: I’m not sure I see a direct connection. The agreement is still under negotiation. We’ve been clear at the outset that this is an executive agreement and not a formal treaty, so there are not going to be these guarantees that would trigger treaty provisions. The Iranians do not want to see any kind of agreement. What they are driving for is an abrupt departure of US forces and the only interpretation we can give to that is that they are seeking destabilization.

Their stated policy is very close to the American policy – support of a stable security, democratic Iraq under the rule of law. Their actions are contrary and I can conclude from their actions, and especially their opposition to an agreement that would provide a legal basis for our troops after Jan. 1, that they are seeking instability here. They want a weak Iraq that is off-balance, that is dealing with significant security problems, because it's somehow in their best interest. This is beginning increasingly clear to Iraqis. You could argue that the more Iran pushes in opposition to an agreement, the more there is push back among Iraqis – you’ve seen this from statements by Iraqi President Talabani and other Iraqi leaders – deep resentment of Iranians telling them what they should do in a negotiations that doesn’t include Iran.

Second, increasingly we have seen what the consequences for Iraq will be if there isn’t an agreement. The Iranians create a lot of difficulties here, but they are essential a self-limiting phenomenon.

In the spring, we had the whole episode with Jaish al Mahdi (the Mahdi Army, the military arm of Iraqi leader Muqtada al Sadr). The Prime Minister took them on and it was widely seen as taking on not only extremist Shia militias, but the Iranian sponsorship behind them. That was pretty popular, not only among Sunnis, but among Shia, who had had it with the militias. And everyone saw Iran as responsible for the arming, training and support of Jaish al Mahdi.

In many ways, Iran tries to deal with Iraq like it deals with Lebanon. But as Iraqis are the first to tell you, Iraq is not Lebanon. They fought a vicious, brutal, eight-year war (with Iran) between 1980-1988 and Iraqis don’t forget that.

Saddam Hussein started that war and Iraqis all know that. Certainly in the governing structure, there are no friends of Saddam Hussein, yet that war is seen as a war between two countries, two states, two peoples, one Arab and one Persian.

I was having lunch with a retired Major General who is involved with the government; he was a Special Forces Officer, a Shia, and as I was asking questions about this battle and that battle, and as soldiers everywhere, he was starting to move silverware around the table to show troop positions, he had this intense pride of fighting for Iraq and fighting for an Arab Iraq against a Persian enemy. That whole history is out there and it doesn’t take too much of a scratch to bring it all back for Iraqis.

When we went through the rocket attacks in March and April which were launched from Sadr City, talking to an Iraqi in this area, the International Zone, he said some interesting things. He said `We remember this. This is the War of the Cities. This is the Iranian bombing Baghdad again, just like they did in the 1980s.’

So it is utterly wrong to think that somehow Iran dominates Iraqi or could dominate Iraq. When they push beyond what Iraqis are comfortable with, or when they push in ways that Iraqis view as negative, you get a sharp push back.

Murray: Does that mean that the January 1st deadline – how big a deal is the ending of the UN mandate which gives currently gives the US occupation powers in Iraq?

Crocker: It is important. Iraq has been the subject of a Chapter 7 resolution since 2003. In 2004, when an Iraqi government assumed responsibility, they continued under a Chapter 7 resolution, so the expiration of this resolution will mark a very important step in the history of a new Iraq. And things will be different.

We have to have a legal basis to operate here to do anything, whether it’s actually security operations or to train and equip [Iraqi forces], so there has to be a legal basis. The desire of the Iraqis is to move from the Security Council resolution to a bilateral agreement.

We’ve made very substantial progress, I think we’re getting to the endgame, but you don’t have an agreement until you have everything agreed and we’re not quite there yet. It is clear that this agreement is going to create a very different reality. It will affirm Iraqi sovereignty. In every respect in this agreement, Iraqi’s are controlling their own destiny in a way they don’t under the Security Council resolution, so it going to mark an important evolution in Iraq’s development as a state.

Murray: The chances of a decision before Dec. 31 are more than 50 percent?

Crocker: I think we’re going to have an agreement in place by then.

Murray: You arrived in Iraq as Ambassador in March of 2007; it’s now been about 18 months. If you were to rate Iraq right now compared to March 2007 or perhaps October 2006, rating that period perhaps as a 1, as a time of fear and loathing, versus where we are here today two years later, on a scale of 1 to 10, where do you think we are here in October 2008?

Crocker: If it’s a relative comparison, it’s well beyond 10. This is a transformed country since the time I’ve arrived. I will always remember my first visit to a Baghdad neighborhood as Ambassador. It was to Dora and the surge brigade had just moved in to the area. I’d been here in 2003 and lived here in the late 1970s, and walking through the streets of Dora a year and a half ago, it reminded me of Beirut in the 1980s, it was a war zone.

People were afraid to go out in the streets, to the big Dora market, which had only a dozen shops open, out of maybe 400. The residents were afraid to cross the bridge to go to the hospital because they thought the national police at the checkpoint would kill them because they were Sunnis. It was deeply depressing.

Dora is now utterly transformed. Not only are all 400 shops opened, the market has expanded well beyond that and during the commemoration of the birth of the last Shia Imam, tens of thousands of Iraqi Shia walked through Dora on their way to Karbala and were given food and drink by the Sunni residents. Contrast that to a time when if any Shia had tried to walk into Dora they wouldn’t have walked out, period. It’s that kind of transformation that is, to me, utterly striking.

That said, the threats are still there. Al Qaeda is diminished and in retreat, but not defeated. The Iranians clearly are trying to follow a Hezbollah model here as in Lebanon. The big Jaish al Mahdi militia model didn’t work for them. That is transforming into a non-militant organization but they are still working with Special Groups that are trained, equipped and directed by the Qods Force out of Tehran and the training is done by Lebanese Hezbollah.

So the Sunni extreme of al Qaeda, the Shia extreme of Hezbollah-like groups directed by the Qods Force represent real threats to this country and we and the Iraqis are going to have to be absolutely diligent in not letting up and tracking them down and eliminating them.

You have the challenge of services. A year ago, everybody was talking about security. Nobody worries much about security anymore in most of the country so now they’re all complaining about services. Where is the power, where is the water, where is the job opportunities and the government is going to have to step up to that? They are making progress but there is obviously a very long way to go.

And then there is the question of political evolution. There are lots of strains and pressures in this evolving system and how that evolution takes place is going to determine the future of the country. But there has been enormous progress -- coming back from Dora, putting my head on my desk, wishing I was back in Pakistan, from that moment I never would have hoped that Iraq would have come as far as it has in these 18 months, but there is still a long way to go, so we’re going to have to stay with this.

Murray: You mentioned going to Dora with the surge troops, the extra military units. The expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) is one of your bailiwicks and a success. Are we at a `surge’ capacity within the State Department for PRT Teams or is the more to offer and what can we expect in the next year?

Crocker: I don’t think we’ll be establishing any more PRTs. We’ve got the country pretty well covered. In terms of staffing levels, we stay very loose and flexible. We’ve plussed up staffing at a number of PRTs because improving security condition have more opportunities to do capacity building then there were before, so staffing numbers are going to fluctuate. In some areas we may see decreases as provincial governments demonstrate increasing ability to do things on their own.

Murray: The metrics used to track PRT success can be difficult because unemployment rates and electricity delivered in megawatts are just too broad a measure, so what are some of the things you have used for examples like advances on a budget but shortages in agricultural help? The State Department has to then shop for talent back in the US who need to be convinced to leave their families for a year to work in Iraq.

Crocker: We’ve developed what we call a maturity model that the PRTs use to assess progress in various areas.

Murray: So it’s a progression, in other words. There are things to check off a list and you can look at a province and know where you are?

Crocker: We’re in our fourth evolution of these models so you can start to see trends. And I’ve told people, gild no lily here. We’ve got to be very hard-eyed on this. We don’t do ourselves or the Iraqi any favors by trying to pretend things are better than they are. It is not always going to be one happy path ascending to a sun-dappled upland.

If this is going to be done honestly, you are going to see regressions. I give special brownie points for people who give me the truth about taking steps back. Because with all the challenges out there, it is inevitable that the will be set backs as well as progress. We’re using this fairly effectively to demonstrate where the provinces are going.

Success opens up new challenges and you have to be able to see them and staff them. There are a lot of people in Washington D.C. who are real tired of seeing my number pop up on their phone because I've got to have people to do this, and I have to have them yesterday. We are getting a lot better at that. There are a lot of lessons learned out of Iraq and one has to be, as a government, on the civilian side, how we staff a major contingency.

It isn’t just the State Department here. We have people from the whole federal government, including agencies that aren’t necessarily used to working in foreign environments. We’ve got almost every Cabinet agency in America out here and I’ve been impressed how they’ve stepped up to this. We have Treasury advisors all over this country helping Iraqis do budgets. When a new Minister of Health really wanted to expand relations with us and when provinces started to stabilize so health issues could get the salience they deserved, we got a tremendous response from the Health and Human Services. The Department of Agriculture has been great.

Murray: Is there a timeframe for when there will be a retail banking system in Iraq?

Crocker: A retail banking system is evolving. You have a number of private banks out there and we’ve worked very hard in introducing electronic banking. There are now ATM machines in Iraq; the first one was about six months ago. Banks are issuing credit cards here. You can get a MasterCard, issued by an Iraqi bank. If you want another example, the Iraq dinar continues to appreciate versus the US dollar. We’re now seeing increasing numbers of transactions and larger transactions done electronically.

Murray: What kind of political capital do you think the Iraqi government has right now to stay together and grow, with the center holding, if and when the US draws down?

Crocker: The US is drawing down and will continue to draw down.

Murray: You can see it on the Forward Operating Bases. The people you talk to. Their mission is moving things in other directions, transferring ownership, basically.

Crocker: Yep. That’s a great way to put it. It is transferring ownership. Iraq’s leaders want to be in charge of their own destiny. At the same time, they want to do it in a way that doesn’t risk everything they and we have paid so much in blood and treasure to achieve. This will be an evolving process. There will also be an evolving process of what shape this state will be.

You mentioned earlier, will the center hold? It’s not just a security question; it’s also a political question. What is going to be the relationship between the center and the provinces and the Kurdish region? The constitution laid out a frame work, the provincial powers law that was passed last February further refined that but there is still a lot of work to do. The commitment I see from Iraqi leaders is to say, `OK, there are a lot of issues here, but we have to solve them peacefully.’ And that’s important, because there are a lot of challenges.

Iraq, throughout its millennial history has been governed from a strong center. It is now a federal state, with significant authorities devolving to the provinces and to the one region that exists, the Kurdish region – the Constitution provides for the creation of other regions.

They balance their own budgets; that was never the case before, it all used to come from the center. There are those that argue that the center needs to be strong. There are those that argue that the center is already too strong and the provinces need more power. These things will take time. It’s just important that the security piece stay solid and that the challenge be managed in the context of peaceful evolution.

Murray: You’ve mentioned that you’re retiring from the Foreign Service soon, but that exit strategies are difficult.

Crocker: I’m in the process of drawing down.

Murray: So timing wise, when do you think that will be and where do you expect to retire to?

Crocker: I expect to leave Iraq early in the New Year. It will be roughly two years in Iraq and since 9/11 it will be five years that I will have been deployed, when you include Pakistan and Afghanistan. So, it’s enough.

Where? Eastern Washington. My wife and I bought property east of Spokane, between Spokane and the Idaho line some years ago, but never had a chance to build on it. We’ll be doing that and look forward to renewing my connection with Whitman College (his alma mater). I’m a member of the Board of Overseers and I’ll welcome finally having the time to pay some significant attention to those duties.

Beyond knowing where I’ll be physically and knowing that I’ve got some responsibilities as an Overseer, all the rest of it I’ll figure out when I’m not doing this anymore.

Murray: Yourself and General David Petreaus are often linked together and probably will be historically; you’re both runners and have run together often. Who’s faster?

Crocker: Oh he is. No question.

Murray: He’s a little younger than you, so there is some dispensation there.

Crocker: Absolutely right.

Murray: You say flat out he's faster, even though you’re slightly different distance runners. He’s more of a middle distance guy, while you’re a marathoner.

Crocker: Early on, it was fairly clear that even though he took it easy on me, he was definitely the better runner. We never really tried it, but I kind of thought that, if you can imagine two old guys running a 440-yard dash, that I might have had a certain early advantage.

Murray: But you guys don’t run together anymore.

Crocker: No, not anymore.

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12 octobre 2008 7 12 /10 /octobre /2008 21:22
Sunday, September 28, 2008


"Iran is Showing a Fundamental Desire to Oppose the Development of a Fully Secure and Stable Iraq"

September 28, 2008
The Associated Press
John Daniszewski



BAGHDAD -- U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker on Sunday accused Iran of trying to interfere with a new security pact between Iraq and the United States, and said Americans need to view Iraq with "a sense of strategic patience" because the stakes in the region are so high.

The 37-year veteran diplomat, interviewed by The Associated Press at his embassy in Baghdad, is in the middle of tough negotiations with Iraqi officials to define the basis for a continuing American military presence in the country beyond the end of this year.

The talks hit an impasse recently and are taking place against a backdrop of increasing calls in the United States for a U.S. withdrawal and declining interest in the war itself from many members of the American public.

Crocker struck an emotional note in discussing the recent accomplishments in Iraq, including a sharp decline in violence across much of the country and some preliminary steps toward political reconciliation, such as last week's agreement to schedule provincial elections by Jan. 31.

"All Americans should be and are proud of the achievements in Iraq and the American role in bringing about the change," he said. "Iraq is in a far, far better place than it was say 18 months ago."

However, he warned, those gains could be in jeopardy if U.S. interest in the country is allowed to flag. "So I think what Americans need going forward is a sense of strategic patience," he said.

"If we decide we are tired of it, if we decide we don't want to do it anymore and that it is time to turn our attention to other things, this could all go the other way," Crocker warned. "And it is certainly my sense as someone who has served in the Middle East for the better part of three decades, that you would pay a major long-term price."

He suggested it could be seen as a repeat of the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in the early 1980s, a move that led countries like Iran and Syria to draw assumptions about U.S. lack of resolve and to embrace an attitude of defiance. "These kinds of actions have profound and very far-reaching consequences," he said.

The talks on the military pact have hit an impasse recently over U.S. insistence on retaining sole legal jurisdiction over American troops and differences over a schedule for the departure of the U.S. military. Iraqi officials have said that they want all foreign troops out by the end of 2011.

Crocker, 59, who became ambassador in March 2007 and who is expected to leave his post around the end of the Bush administration, is one of the most experienced diplomats in the Middle East. He has served as ambassador in Lebanon, Syria and Kuwait, and was ambassador to Pakistan before his appointment to Iraq.

He said it is becoming obvious that Iran wants the current negotiations to fail.

"The evidence is pretty clear," said the ambassador. "It is the stream of public statements coming out of Tehran, political and clerical figures, all criticizing the agreement. So they are being very open about their interference."

In spite of Iran's insistence to the contrary, Crocker said Iran is showing a "fundamental desire to oppose the development of a fully secure and stable Iraq. I think they would like to keep Iraq off balance as a way of being able to control events here to the satisfaction of Tehran."

The negotiations for a long-term security agreement are being carried out with the government against the deadline of an expiring United Nations Security Council resolution at the end of this year that provides the legal basis for more than 140,000 U.S. forces in the country.

If and when an agreement is reacted, it still must be ratified by the Iraqi parliament, where it faces strong controversy.

Crocker said he is not worried that time is running out. There are still three months for discussions, he said, and the Iraqi parliament has been able to deal with complex issues quickly when it has to.

If the talks fail, the United States would have to go back to the United Nations to seek an extension of its mandate to be in Iraq, a potentially difficult move diplomatically.

Crocker said the Iraqi government itself is opposing Iranian meddling.

He credited Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for the decision in the spring to challenge the Shiite Mahdi Army militia with forces of the national army.

Crocker said that move was "strategically very, very important" and "a statement that Iraq is not going to tolerate illegal militia forces that challenge the state, whoever they are and whoever is behind them."

"With the improvement of conditions in Iraq regional powers are taking a new look at Iraq ... but also at the U.S.," he said. "And again I think that what happens going forward is going to have a profound effect on how the U.S. is perceived in this region and beyond."

"If we are seen as the catalyst that does produce a stable, secure democratic Iraq that never again threatens its own people or its neighbors, we will be seen as a power that came in and produced a fundamentally positive shift in this region."

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23 septembre 2008 2 23 /09 /septembre /2008 12:11
Un plan de déstabilisation de l’Irak mis au point par l’Iran, la Syrie et le Hezbollah, comporte des assassinats politiques et une relance d’Al-Qaïda

vendredi 19 septembre 2008 - 15h21, par Chawki Freïha - Beyrouth

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Le quotidien libanais « Al Mustaqbal » cite des sources des renseignements irakiens selon lesquelles l’Iran a mis au point un plan de déstabilisation de l’Irak en étroite coordination avec la Syrie, et avec la contribution du Hezbollah. Ce plan vise à empêcher les élections provinciales irakiennes, prévues avant la fin de l’année, de se tenir.

Selon ces sources, les Iraniens visent essentiellement à éliminer les responsables politiques hostiles à l’influence iranienne sur leur pays, et à frapper les Conseils de l’éveil composés des tribus sunnites, à travers la relance des cellules d’Al-Qaïda en Mésopotamie. Ce plan s’appuie sur la Syrie et sur le Hezbollah. Il est ainsi prévu que Damas resserre l’étau sur les Irakiens réfugiés en Syrie, notamment ceux qui s’opposent à l’iranisation de leur pays ; et que le Hezbollah active ses cellules en Irak, où ses cadres entrainement et encadrent les milices chiites (lire à ce sujet notre information du 6 juin 2008).

Ce plan met ainsi à contribution la Syrie et le Hezbollah, selon trois axes principaux visant essentiellement les milices et les personnalités sunnites. Le rôle de la Syrie sera capital dans la réactivation des cellules d’Al-Qaïda. Pour ce faire, une réunion s’est tenue fin août à Kermanshah, en Iran, en présence de responsables des Gardiens de la Révolutions (brigades Al-Quds) et de cadres du Hezbollah. La réunion a attribué les rôles à tous les acteurs impliqués dans ce plan, notamment aux agents iraniens travaillant en Irak sous couvert de tourisme religieux (pèlerinage à Karbala et Nadjaf) ou de commerce. Téhéran cherche ainsi à mettre en échec les médiations menées par l’Arabie et les Emirats, en déstabilisant l’Irak en vue de le désintégrer. Les Iraniens sont engagés dans une course contre la montre pour anéantir les efforts arabes de réhabiliter l’Irak, notamment à travers le retour des ambassades arabes à Bagdad.

Traduction et synthèse de Chawki Freïha

Lire l'article original : Al Mustaqbal (Liban)

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22 septembre 2008 1 22 /09 /septembre /2008 21:14
The Hot Holiday Destination: Iraq?  
By Amir Taheri
New York Post | Monday, September 22, 2008 The way Barack Obama talks of Iraq, you'd think the whole county is a sea of fire and blood, created by the United States. So he might be surprised to learn that tour operators in Europe and the Middle East are touting this "sea of fire and blood" as a new holiday destination.

One program just put on the market by Terre Entiere, a leading French tour operator, offers a "Christmas Pilgrimage" in December to Iraq's biblical sites, some of which date back more than 2,000 years.

Another program starts in January. Called "Forgotten History," it includes visits to some of the most ancient sites of human civilization in Iraq, the ancient Mesopotamia.

"Frankly, we were surprised by the positive echoes we had as soon as we launched our program," says Pierre Simon, a spokesman for the French company marketing the Iraqi holidays. "People from many European countries, not just France, are showing interest. They want to go and see for themselves."

That Iraq should be a tourist destination is no surprise. Mesopotamia, or the Land of the Two Rivers, is universally recognized as the birthplace of civilization.

It was there that the first cities appeared and the first governments took shape. Sumer and Akkad invented the first forms of writing, the first bureaucracies and the first organized religious doctrines. In its heyday, Babylon, with its "hanging gardens," was the world's largest metropolis.

The first ever book, the Epic of Gilgamesh, was written in Mesopotamia some 3,000 years ago.

The area also holds the location of many biblical stories. Abraham - the common father of Judaism, Christianity and Islam - is said to have been born in Ur, near the present-day city of Nasseriah. It was also there that Jacob first saw Rachel at the well and fell for her.

Iraq has an even greater wealth of relicts from Persian, Macedonian and Islamic empires. Ctesiphon, near present-day Baghdad, was capital of the Seleucid and Sassanid empires for almost 400 years. Baghdad, of course, was the capital of the Abbasid caliphs and, for two centuries, the world's largest city.

And, for those who look for rare natural sites, Iraq offers a unique ecological treasure in the marshlands of its southeast.

Saddam Hussein, the bloodthirsty despot overthrown by the US intervention in 2003, tried to drain the wetlands so that he could send his tanks against dissidents unhindered. In the past seven years, however, the marshes have been partly revived. (Two years ago, the United Nations announced that 60 percent of the work needed to restore the marshes to their former glory has been completed, and gave Iraq its environmental prize.)

With air and land links restored between Iraq and Middle Eastern countries, a growing numbers of Arabs, Turks and Iranians have been traveling to the newly liberated country for business or leisure.

While Westerners are just beginning to look to Iraq as a tourist destination, Shiite Muslims the world over have flocked there since 2003. The government estimates that some 12 million people visited the "holy shrines" of Najaf and Karbala in south central Iraq from 2003 and 2006. Most of these pilgrims came from neighboring Iran, at a rate of 3,000 a day. Other visitors have come from 40 different countries, from India to Brazil to Europe and Africa.

"The problem is that Iraq has become an issue of domestic politics in the US and other Western countries," says Fadel Sultani, a leading modernist Arab poet. "Those who opposed the toppling of Saddam Hussein are determined to prove that they were right. Thus, they insist on showing Iraq as a failure, a land unfit for democracy and human rights."

Sultani, who recently attended an arts and culture festival in Baghdad, where he read his latest poems to "packed halls," says he was surprised by the "contrast between the reality in Iraq and images" broadcast in the West.

The festival included the staging of three new Iraqi plays, the screening of the first Iraqi feature-length film, a series of musical concerts, exhibitions of paintings, several lectures and stand-up comedy evenings. It attracted hundreds of writers and artists from across the Arab world.

This was the first festival of art and culture organized in an Arab country free of government censorship or intervention by the security services. Some of the participants later traveled through what was once known as "The Triangle of Death" to visit ancient sites south of Baghdad.

"We all agreed that the place should be renamed The Triangle of Life," Sultani says.

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12 septembre 2008 5 12 /09 /septembre /2008 14:03
10:58 Irak : émoi dans le monde politique après la visite d'un parlementaire irakien en Israël. Mithal Aloussi, chef du Parti de la nation démocratique, s'était rendu dans le passé dans l'Etat juif alors que Saddam Hussein était au pouvoir. Ses deux enfants avaient été assassinés par le pouvoir en réaction.  (Guysen.International.News)
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5 septembre 2008 5 05 /09 /septembre /2008 21:02
U.S. Spied on Iraqi Leaders, Book Says

Woodward Also Reveals That Political Fears Kept War Strategy Review 'Under the Radar'


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/04/AR2008090403160.html

By Steve Luxenberg
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, September 5, 2008; Page A01

The Bush administration has conducted an extensive spying operation on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, his staff and others in the Iraqi government, according to a new book by Washington Post associate editor Bob Woodward.

"We know everything he says," according to one of multiple sources Woodward cites about the practice in "The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008," scheduled for release Monday.

The book also says that the U.S. troop "surge" of 2007, in which President Bush sent nearly 30,000 additional U.S. combat forces and support troops to Iraq, was not the primary factor behind the steep drop in violence there during the past 16 months.

Rather, Woodward reports, "groundbreaking" new covert techniques enabled U.S. military and intelligence officials to locate, target and kill insurgent leaders and key individuals in extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Woodward does not disclose the code names of these covert programs or provide much detail about them, saying in the book that White House and other officials cited national security concerns in asking him to withhold specifics.

Overall, Woodward writes, four factors combined to reduce the violence: the covert operations; the influx of troops; the decision by militant cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to rein in his powerful Mahdi Army; and the so-called Anbar Awakening, in which tens of thousands of Sunnis turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq and allied with U.S. forces.

The book is Woodward's fourth to examine the inner debates of the Bush administration and its handling of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The Washington Post will run a four-part series based on the book beginning Sunday. Fox News published a report about the book on its Web site last night after obtaining a copy ahead of the release date.

The 487-page book concentrates on Bush's leadership and governing style, based on more than 150 interviews with the president's national security team, senior deputies and other key intelligence, diplomatic and military players. Woodward also conducted two on-the-record interviews with Bush in May.

The book portrays an administration riven by dissension, either unwilling or slow to confront the deterioration of its strategy in Iraq during the summer and early fall of 2006. Publicly, Bush maintained that U.S. forces were "winning"; privately, he came to believe that the military's long-term strategy of training Iraq security forces and handing over responsibility to the new Iraqi government was failing. Eventually, Woodward writes, the president lost confidence in the two military commanders overseeing the war at the time: Gen. George W. Casey Jr., then commander of coalition forces in Iraq, and Gen. John P. Abizaid, then head of U.S. Central Command.

In October 2006, the book says, Bush asked Stephen J. Hadley, his national security adviser, to lead a closely guarded review of the Iraq war. That first assessment did not include military participants and proceeded secretly because of White House fears that news coverage of a review might damage Republican chances in the midterm congressional elections.

"We've got to do it under the radar screen because the electoral season is so hot," Hadley is quoted as telling Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who is described as challenging the president on the wisdom of sending additional troops to Iraq. "You're not getting a clear picture of what's going on on the ground," she told the president, the book says.

The quality and credibility of information about the war's progress became a source of ongoing tension within the administration, according to the book. Rice complained about the Defense Department's "overconfident" briefings during the tenure of Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Rather than receiving options on the war, Bush would get "a fable, a story . . . that skirted the real problems," Rice is quoted as saying.

According to Woodward, the president maintained an odd detachment from the reviews of war policy during this period, turning much of the process over to Hadley. "Let's cut to the chase," Bush told Woodward, "Hadley drove a lot of this."

Nor, Woodward reports, did Bush express much urgency for change during the months when sectarian killings and violent attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq began rising, reaching more than 1,400 incidents a week by October 2006 -- an average of more than eight an hour. "This is nothing that you hurry," he told Woodward in one of the interviews, when asked whether he had given his advisers a firm deadline for recommending a revised war strategy.

In response to a question about how the White House settled on a troop surge of five brigades after the military leadership in Washington had reluctantly said it could provide two, Bush said: "Okay, I don't know this. I'm not in these meetings, you'll be happy to hear, because I got other things to do."

The book presents an evolving portrait of the president's decision-making. On the one hand, the book portrays Bush as tentative and slow to react to the escalating violence in Iraq; on the other, once he decides that a surge is required, he is shown acting with focus and determination to move ahead with his plan in the face of strong resistance from his top military advisers at the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Woodward also depicts the development of a close working relationship between Bush and Maliki, with the president leaning on the Iraqi leader to govern evenhandedly and to take decisive action against sectarianism. "I've worked hard to get in a position where we can relate human being to human being, and where I try to understand his frustrations and his concerns, but also in a place where I am capable of getting him to listen to me," Bush told Woodward.

Given Bush's efforts to earn Maliki's trust, the surveillance of the Iraqi prime minister caused some consternation among several senior U.S. officials, who questioned whether it was worth the risk, Woodward reports. One official knowledgeable about the surveillance "recognized the sensitivity of the issue and then asked, 'Would it be better if we didn't?' "

Meanwhile, Woodward reports that Casey, the president's commanding general in Iraq from 2004 to 2007, came to believe that Bush did not understand the nature of the Iraq war, that the president focused too much on body counts as a measure of progress.

"Casey had long concluded that one big problem with the war was the president himself," Woodward writes. "He later told a colleague in private that he had the impression that Bush reflected the 'radical wing of the Republican Party that kept saying, "Kill the bastards! Kill the bastards! And you'll succeed." ' "

Asked about his interest in body counts, Bush told Woodward: "I asked that on occasion to find out whether or not we're fighting back. Because the perception is that our guys are dying and they're not. Because we don't put out numbers. We don't have a tally. On the other hand, if I'm sitting here watching the casualties come in, I'd at least like to know whether or not our soldiers are fighting."

The discord between Bush and Casey is one manifestation of the often-debilitating rift that Woodward portrays between the U.S. military and its civilian leadership. The book describes a "near revolt" in late 2006 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who felt that their advice was not reaching the president. Adm. Michael Mullen, then serving as chief of naval operations, expressed fear that the military would "take the fall" for a failure in Iraq. According to the book, Casey and Abizaid resolutely opposed the large surge that the president ultimately ordered, as did Rumsfeld. Casey went so far as to refer to Baghdad as a "troop sump." Within the administration, only the National Security Council staff strongly supported the surge plan.

In the midst of the surge debate, Bush decided to replace Rumsfeld, who had served as defense secretary throughout the war and had long argued that the United States should "take the training wheels off the Iraqi government." Bush chose Rumsfeld's replacement, Robert M. Gates, without consulting Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld's chief patron, the book reports. Bush informed Cheney of his decision on Nov. 6, 2006, the day before the mid-term elections. "Well, Mr. President, I disagree," Cheney is quoted as saying, "but obviously it's your call."

Woodward's account also includes a portrait of Gen. David H. Petraeus, who replaced Casey in Iraq. In one scene in the Oval Office in January 2007, Bush tells his new commander in Iraq that the surge is his attempt to "double down." According to Woodward, Petraeus replies, "Mr. President, this is not double down. This is all in."

"The War Within" also tells the story of retired Gen. Jack Keane, a former Army vice chief of staff who used his high-level contacts in the White House and the Pentagon to influence war policy and major military personnel moves. A friend and mentor of Petraeus, Keane made regular visits to Iraq to advise the new commanding general and then briefed Cheney about each trip. In turn, Woodward reports, Bush sent a back-channel message to Petraeus through Keane, circumventing the chain of command.

In a critical epilogue assessing the president's performance as commander-in-chief, Woodward concludes that Bush "rarely was the voice of realism on the Iraq war" and "too often failed to lead."

During the interviews with Woodward, the president spoke of the war as part of a recentering of American power in the Middle East. "And it should be," Bush said. "And the reason it should be: It is the place from which a deadly attack emanated. And it is the place where further deadly attacks could emanate."

The president also conceded: "This war has created a lot of really harsh emotion, out of which comes a lot of harsh rhetoric. One of my failures has been to change the tone in Washington."

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2 septembre 2008 2 02 /09 /septembre /2008 13:39
US detains 7 League of the Righteous operatives in Iraq

Coalition forces captured seven members of a little-known Shia terror group during raids in Baghdad and Muthanna over the past two days. The League of the Righteous (Asaib al Haq) is an Iranian-backed group that broke off from the Mahdi Army after Sadr declared a partial cease-fire and ordered most of the militia to transform into a civic organization.

Two members of the League of the Righteous were captured today in Ar Rumaythah in Muthanna province. Coalition special operations forces received intelligence on the location of the two operatives. A Dragunov sniper rifle was found at the scene.

Today's raid follows a successful operation against the League of the Righteous in the Adhamiyah district of Baghdad on Aug. 31. Coalition forces captured five suspected operatives, including a senior leader described by Multinational Forces-Iraq as a "logistician and financial manager" as well as a smuggler. The man is thought to be associated with group's senior commander.

Nine members of the League of the Righteous have been captured since the US military identified the group on Aug. 19. Coalition forces captured a senior leader in Diyala province who was working to reactivate terror cells in the region.

The Shia group "receives funding, training, weapons and even direction from the Qods Force," Multinational Forces-Iraq told The Long War Journal on Aug. 20. The group conducts attacks with the deadly, armor-piercing explosively formed projectiles, or EFPs.

The US military would not speculate on the size of the group, but hundreds of members of the group were killed, captured, or fled to Iran during the Iraqi government offensive against the Mahdi Army from March to July of this year.


For more information on the League of the Righteous and its connections to Iran's Qods Force, see New Special Groups splinter emerges on Iraqi scene.

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30 août 2008 6 30 /08 /août /2008 20:54
Coalition forces target Hezbollah Brigades in Baghdad
Hezbollah-brigades-logo.jpg

Hezbollah Brigades' logo is nearly identical to that of Lebanese Hezbollah.

Coalition special operations teams captured three Hezbollah Brigades operatives during raids inside Baghdad. The captures are the latest in an effort to dismantle the Iranian-backed terror group in Baghdad.

The Hezbollah Brigades operatives were captured in New Baghdad after Coalition forces received "sensitive intelligence" from other members of the group currently in custody. The information identified the location of a cell leader who "conspires with several known Khata'ib Hezbollah criminals" and was behind the deadly June 4 improvised rocket assisted mortar, or IRAM attack in The Sha'ab neighborhood in the Baghdad district of Adhamiyah. The attack, which was thought to be directed at a US forward operating base, killed 18 Iraqis and wounded 29 after the rockets detonated prematurely and fell short. The cell leader was among those captured.

Twenty Hezbollah Brigades operatives have been captured in Baghdad over the past two months. On Aug. 26, Coalition forces captured two operatives in Baghdad, including a propaganda facilitator who was "involved editing and posting of attack videos against Coalition and Iraqi forces."

Coalition forces captured two more Hezbollah Brigades operatives in New Baghdad on Aug. 22. One of the men was a propaganda expert who was "believed to have uploaded more than 30 attack videos to the criminal ring's now-defunct web site." One such website, www.alasaeb.com, was deactivated by the Hezbollah Brigades after the group realized the site administrator was captured, a public affairs officer from Multinational Forces Iraq told The Long War Journal.

Other Hezbollah Brigades websites are active, Multinational Forces Iraq told The Long War Journal. "As more of these propaganda experts are captured, we learn of more web sites," the public affairs officer stated. "[Hezbollah Brigades] criminals have also been known to use video sharing web sites already in existence."

The Long War Journal has traced two Hezbollah Brigades videos that have been uploaded on Live Leak, a web-based video sharing site. The group has posted the July 8 improvised rocket-assisted mortar, or IRAM, attack on Joint Security Station Ur in northeastern Baghdad on Live Leak]. One US soldier and one interpreter were wounded after eight of the makeshift "flying IEDs" detonated near the outpost. Shia terror groups have launched a handful of IRAM attacks on US and Iraqi outposts in Baghdad. Hezbollah Brigades also posted video of an attack on a US patrol with an Iranian-supplied, armor-piercing, explosively formed projectile, or EFP in Live Leak.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/coalition_forces_cap_1.php
In the largest series of raid, Coalition forces captured 9 Hezbollah Brigades operatives in Baghdad on Aug. 12. Among those captured were a commander in Basrah, an IRAM specialist, and several propaganda cell members. On July 31, Coalition forces detained a cell member who was responsible for videotaping attacks on US and Iraqi forces in Baghdad. On July 21, Coalition forces captured a member of a Hezbollah Brigades propaganda cell who was responsible for uploading attack videos to the Internet in New Baghdad.

Background on the Hezbollah Brigades

The US military says Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah has helped establish, fund, train, arm, and provide operational support for various Shia terror groups such as the Hezbollah Brigades and the Army of the Righteous. These groups train in camps inside Iran and, prior to operations against the Mahdi Army and the Shia terror groups during the spring and summer of this year, in camps in southern Iraq.

In these camps, the Hezbollah Brigades and the Special Groups receive training on a variety of small arms and explosives. "The training includes how to conduct reconnaissance to pinpoint targets, small arms and weapons training, small unit tactics and terrorist cell operations and communications," the Associated Press reported earlier this month. Training on the use of EFPs, armor-piercing RPG-29s, and various explosives and assassination techniques is also given.

Not mentioned in the AP is that the Qods Force and Hezbollah are also providing training on the building and use of improvised rocket-assisted mortars.

The Hezbollah Brigades receives support from Iran and is an “offshoot of Iranian-trained Special Groups," Sergeant Susan James, a Public Affairs NCO for Multinational Forces Iraq told The Long War Journal in July, when the group first emerged on the Iraqi scene . The US military has referred to the Iranian-backed elements of the Mahdi Army as the Special Groups. The Hezbollah Brigades is described as "a separate and independent organization from Special Groups,” said James.

“We believe that Hezbollah Brigades does receive support from Iran,” James said. “That support likely includes funding, training, logistics, and material.” Iran's Qods Force funds, trains, arms, and supports Mahdi Army operatives to facilitate attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces. "They are also believed to receive guidance or direction from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods Force," Multinational Forces Iraq stated in the latest press release on the capture of nine Hezbollah Brigades operatives in Baghdad.

The logo used by the Hezbollah Brigades is nearly an exact match of the one used by Lebanese Hezbollah, which is directly supported by Iran. The logo shows an arm extended vertically, with the fist grasping an AK-47 assault rifle. US forces captured Ali Mussa Daqduq inside Iraq in early 2007. Daqduq is a senior Hezbollah commander who was tasked with setting up the Mahdi Army Special Groups along the same lines as the Lebanese terror group.

Other senior Qods Force operatives have been captured inside Iraq, including one of the Qods Force's regional commanders inside Iraq.

Earlier this week, US forces captured an operative who was described as being "part of the most senior social and operational circles of Special Groups." The raid occurred at Baghdad International Airport as the operative got off a plane from Lebanon.

"The man has been known to travel in and out of Iraq to neighboring nations including Iran and Lebanon, where it is believed he meets and helps run the Iranian-backed Special Groups in Iraq," Multinational Forces-Iraq reported in a press release.

The Iraqi and US media later reported that Ali al Lami, the head of Iraq's de-Baathification committee, was the Special Groups leader detained at the airport. Al Lami is a member of the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi's political party. Chalabi, the former oil minister and deputy prime minister during the interim government, has been accused of providing intelligence to Iran after he fell out of favor with the US and his party failed to win a seat in parliament.

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28 août 2008 4 28 /08 /août /2008 08:15
Iraq official: U.S. forces arrest Ali al-Lami
Posted 4h 7m ago 
BAGHDAD (AP) — An Iraqi official says that U.S. forces have arrested Ali al-Lami, a top Shiite in charge of keeping senior supporters of Saddam Hussein out of the government.

The official, Qaiser Watout, is a member of a committee headed by al-Lami. He said al-Lami was arrested Wednesday at Baghdad's airport upon arrival from Lebanon.

Watout says U.S. forces were waiting for al-Lami as the plane's doors opened.

U.S. military officials said they arrested a senior Shiite militant at the airport on Wednesday, but did not release his name and wouldn't say if it was al-Lami.

The military says the suspect is believed to be behind a June bombing in Baghdad that killed four Americans and six Iraqis, and that he is believed to be a senior leader of "special groups" — Iranian-backed rogue militiamen in Iraq.

Senior Special Groups leader captured at Baghdad airport
Hasnawi.jpg

Click the image to view the most wanted Mahdi Army leaders in Baghdad.

The US military detained a senior Special Groups leader as he flew into Baghdad International Airport this morning. He was detained without incident after the US military received intelligence he was arriving in Baghdad via air.

The leader, who was not named, is described as being "part of the most senior social and operational circles of Special Groups" by Multinational Forces-Iraq. "The man has been known to travel in and out of Iraq to neighboring nations including Iran and Lebanon, where it is believed he meets and helps run the Iranian-backed Special Groups in Iraq," Multinational Forces-Iraq reported in a press release.

The leader is said to be behind the deadly bombing at the Sadr City District Advisory Council meeting on June 24 that killed two US soldiers, two members of the US State Department, and six Iraqis. The meeting took place after the Mahdi Army called for a cease-fire and allowed Iraqi troops to enter the northeastern Baghdad neighborhood.

The unnamed Special Groups leader is likely to have close connections to Hezbollah and Iran's Qods Force, which has established a command to fight a covert war inside Iraq. Hezbollah and Qods forces have established groups such as the Hezbollah Brigades and the Army of the Righteous to attack Coalition and Iraqi forces and to target Iraqi leaders with assassinations.

The US military claims the Mahdi Army is not part of the Special Groups, but the fighting this spring and early summer in Sadr City, Basrah, and much of southern and central Iraq was aimed at Mahdi Army strongholds. The senior most wanted Special Groups leaders are all senior Mahdi Army commanders.

The US military uses the term Special Groups as part of its strategy to divide the Mahdi Army and provide room for the moderate elements of the militia to join the political process.

The Mahdi Army took heavy casualties while opposing the Iraqi security forces in Basrah and the South and against US and Iraqi forces in Sadr City during operations to secure the areas in March, April, and May. More than 1,000 Mahdi Army fighters were killed in Sadr City alone, according to a Mahdi Army commander in Baghdad. Another 415 were killed in Basrah. More than 400 were killed during fighting in the southern cities of Najaf, Karbala, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Samawah, and Nasiriyah in late March and early April, according to numbers compiled by The Long War Journal. Thousands more have been wounded our captured.


For more information on the Special Groups and Iran's role in the Iraqi insurgency, see Iran continues to train Shia terror groups for attacks in Iraq, Iran's Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq, and Targeting the Iranian "Secret Cells." For more information on the Mahdi Army, see Sadr calls for Mahdi Army cease-fire and Dividing the Mahdi Army.


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Présentation

  • : Le blog de Gad
  • : Lessakele : déjouer les pièges de l'actualité Lessakele, verbe hébraïque qui signifie "déjouer" est un blog de commentaire libre d'une actualité disparate, visant à taquiner l'indépendance et l'esprit critique du lecteur et à lui prêter quelques clés de décrytage personnalisées.
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Magie de la langue hébraïque


A tous nos chers lecteurs.

 

Ne vous est-il jamais venu à l'esprit d'en savoir un peu plus sur le titre de ce blog ?

Puisque nous nous sommes aujourd'hui habillés de bleu, il conviendrait de rentrer plus a fond dans l'explication du mot lessakel.

En fait Lessakel n'est que la façon française de dire le mot léhasskil.

L'hébreu est une langue qui fonctionne en déclinant des racines.

Racines, bilitères, trilitères et quadrilitères.

La majorité d'entre elle sont trilitères.

Aussi Si Gad a souhaité appeler son site Lessakel, c'est parce qu'il souhaitait rendre hommage à l'intelligence.

Celle qui nous est demandée chaque jour.

La racine de l'intelligence est sé'hel שכל qui signifie l'intelligence pure.

De cette racine découlent plusieurs mots

Sé'hel > intelligence, esprit, raison, bon sens, prudence, mais aussi croiser

Léhasskil > Etre intelligent, cultivé, déjouer les pièges

Sé'hli > intelligent, mental, spirituel

Léhistakel > agir prudemment, être retenu et raisonnable, chercher à comprendre

Si'hloute > appréhension et compréhension

Haskala >  Instruction, culture, éducation

Lessa'hlen > rationaliser, intellectualiser

Heschkel > moralité

Si'htanout > rationalisme

Si'hloul > Amélioration, perfectionnement

 

Gageons que ce site puisse nous apporter quelques lumières.

Aschkel pour Lessakel.

 

 

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