WASHINGTON, Nov. 7 (UPI) -- No one likes complex challenges, particularly when there is no way to avoid dealing with them simultaneously. But there are several problem areas in national security where action has been neglected or deferred by the Bush administration to the point where the new administration was effectively out of time before it was even elected:

-- Redefining the relationship between U.S. national security efforts and the global economic system and "geo-economics."

-- Creating forces strong and flexible enough to hedge against the inability to predict the balance of conventional, asymmetric, WMD, stability/nation building activity.

-- Correcting the loss of credibility and support with traditional allies.

-- Defining immediate near-term ways to improve security relations with regional allies: NATO, Japan-South Korea, Gulf Cooperation Council nations, Latin America, etc.

-- Length and character of Afghan-Pakistan War.

-- "Withdrawal" from Iraq.

-- Iranian threats: Proxy, WMD, asymmetric, direct?

-- North Korea.

-- Taiwan-China.

-- Containment of (or improved security relations with) Russia.

-- Latin American tensions: Venezuela/Cuba.

-- "War on Terrorism" = struggle against violent Islamic extremism.

-- Nuclear, non-nuclear, missile defense, WMD terrorism.

-- Energy security and restructuring the U.S. posture in the Gulf/Middle East.

-- Wild cards in the form of unpredictable tasks and threats.

Some of these issues can be deferred for a year or so, but none without cost and making the situation worse. All require tangible solutions in terms of clear operational or contingency plans, U.S. military action or plans, and resources.

It is also critical for those advising the new president to understand that none of these challenges can be dealt with simply by issuing conceptual plans, calling for dialogue, and using vague terms like "soft" or "smart" power.

The fact that the new presidency faces so many near-term challenges does not mean, however, that it will have more than a year or so before its new team also must take on long-term national security challenges. These challenges are harder to predict, but the long-term institutional and resource challenges to American military power will almost certainly include:

-- Impact of the entitlement crisis on the size and structure of federal budget, Fiscal Year 2012 onward.

-- Recreating effective defense planning structures and cycles.

-- Making U.S. force and procurement plans real and affordable.

-- Deciding on tradeoffs between active/reserve/civilian/contract manpower.

-- Hard, resource-driven future planning, programming, and budgeting tradeoffs between brains (manpower quality), boots (manpower numbers) and toys (procurement quality and numbers).

-- Ability to create forces that can perform both "hard" and "soft/smart" power functions.

-- Ability to create forces that can fight/deter both conventional and asymmetric/irregular.

-- Post-crisis U.S. role in geo-economics, and the new global economic structure.

-- Real-world import, energy, trade vulnerability.

-- Success in restructuring traditional, local and regional alliances; interoperability and allied force generation capabilities.

These challenges will be matched by contingency challenges, many of which represent the broader and longer-term impacts of the short- to mid-term challenges the United States already faces:

-- U.S. success in global economic competition and "geo-economics."

-- Impact of technology and arms sales: U.S. lead and edge yields to near parity of competitors and diminishing returns.

-- Unstable balance of conventional, asymmetric, WMD, stability/nation building activity.

-- Competition or cooperation with China that may be dominant in Asia.

-- Status of Russia.

-- Will Europe be a working ally or have a largely separate agenda?

-- Iranian threat: Proxy, WMD, asymmetric, direct?

-- "War on Terrorism" = struggle against violent Islamic extremism.

-- Nuclear, non-nuclear, missile defense, biological, WMD terrorism.

-- Energy security.

-- Wild cards.

-- Status of cyber-warfare and other high-tech asymmetric conflict scenarios like EMP or financial warfare.

If these lists seem daunting, it is important to note that no new post-World War II administration has faced a simpler world upon taking office. Moreover, each new administration has had to deal with most of these challenges since the end of the Cold War.

The question is how realistic the new Obama presidency will be compared with the lack of realism in the Bush administration. One key will be, again, to look beyond vague conceptual transition planning and focus on clear real-world priorities.

If one looks beyond the most immediate crises, "getting real" means: the will to face, and live with, complexity and uncertainty; finishing the wars U.S. forces are already fighting; building on existing strengths and reducing weaknesses; creating real strategies, plans and budgets tailored to major missions and regions; making defense plans, programs and budgets integrated and affordable; making hard tradeoffs without abandoning key options; seeking dual capable forces for "hard" and "soft" power, "conventional" and "irregular" warfare.

It also means accepting the fact that the future will steadily limit the impact of U.S. economic power and technology -- not because America is weaker or declining but because other powers are growing stronger -- and focusing on the need to build and rebuild partners and alliances. And dealing with the reality that the United States cannot prevent the rise of local or regional peer competitors like Russia and China and must learn to live with them.

Above all, it means focusing on strategic interests, not transforming the world.

The extent to which the Obama administration acts on this basis, rather than the basis of the ideological extremism and failed management of the Bush administration, will determine much of its success and the state of U.S. national security. The United States had pragmatic, reality-based administrations for a half-century following World War II, and had extraordinary success. It is time to return to that realism.

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(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which first published a version of this piece, but the views in it are the author's alone.)

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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)