Overblog
Suivre ce blog Administration + Créer mon blog
12 février 2009 4 12 /02 /février /2009 18:18

L'Iran en panne d'uranium? Ou rapport politique ad'hoc?

13:55 L'Iran en pénurie d'uranium? La République islamique devrait revoir ses ambitions nucléaires à la baisse à en croire le dernier rapport de l'ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security). L'étude rapporte que l'Iran a déjà épuisé près des trois-quarts des 600 tonnes de stocks de concentré d'uranium acquis par Téhéran dans les années 1970 et que seul un approvisionnement en provenance de l'étranger pourrait lui permettre de maintenir ses activités.  (Guysen.International.News)
 "L'actuelle pénurie de minerai d'uranium illustre une contradiction fondamentale entre les intentions de l'Etat iranien et ses capacités." écrit le rapport.

 Latest Reports:

Is Iran Running Out of Yellowcake?
David Albright, Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan
February 11, 2009

http://www.isis-online.org/

Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
11 février 2009 3 11 /02 /février /2009 23:21

Nuit de Cristal à Caracas?


Kristallnacht in Caracas?
By: Kathy Shaidle




Kristallnacht in Caracas? 		 
By Kathy Shaidle
 FrontPageMagazine.com | Wednesday, February 11, 2009

 

Is it a coincidence that in an authoritarian socialist state that has sidled up to the world's most dangerous Islamist state is home to an increasing spree of violence targeting the Jewish community? Is it a spree being directed by Hugo Chavez out of bigoted or self-aggrandizing reasons? Or is any collectivist nation dominated by a strongman an inevitable incubator of anti-Semitism and scapegoating of its Jewish minority?

Whatever the answers, Venezuela is providing the evidence. Observers like the Simon Wiesenthal Center and Latin America expert Andres Oppenheimer cite “a well-orchestrated [anti-Semitic] campaign” that has been taking place on Venezuela’s government sponsored radio and television stations, newspapers and websites such as Aporrea. Stoking anti-Semitic fervor, such outlets frequently compare Israel to Nazi Germany and denounce “international Jewish conspiracies.” Meanwhile, an association of reporters urged Venezuelans to boycott local businesses owned by Venezuelan Jews. And the media is not alone in fueling anti-Jewish incitement.

As in any authoritarian state, the media parrot the line originated by their leader, President Hugo Chavez. His bombastic condemnation of Israel’s invasion of Gaza shaded into overt anti-Semitism, and the nation is aware of his increasingly close ties with Iran’s Islamist regime.

Tensions escalated sharply in early January, when Chavez expelled Israel’s ambassador to protest Israel’s military offensive in Gaza. Shortly thereafter, approximately 15 individuals attacked the Tiferet synagogue in Caracas. According to Paul Hariton of the Caracas Ashkenazi community, the January 30 attack “was a well-organized event. The attackers were heavily armed. They jumped a wall and overcame two guards. They even took the videotape out of the security camera before they left.” The president of the Jewish Organization of Venezuela says that “the hoodlums occupied the building” for five hours, during which time “they profaned the holy Sefer Torah, which is the Jewish holy book of prayer and laws.” In an ominous sign for the rest of Venezuela's Jewish community, the hoodlums also stole a computer database containing the names and addresses of all the synagogue’s members.

At first, Chavez condemned the attack. However, his government now seems intent on blaming the synagogue’s desecration on Venezuelan Jews, depicting the vandalism as “deliberately self-inflicted act aimed at discrediting the regime.” This Sunday, Venezuelan authorities arrested a local rabbi’s former bodyguard and ten others in connection with the attack. In a televised interview following the arrest of the 11 suspects, Chavez remarked sarcastically, “What a coincidence, the gang leader is a metropolitan police officer who for the last four years was the personal bodyguard of the synagogue's rabbi.” When announcing the names of the suspects, Chavez’s Interior and Justice Minister Tarek El Aissami (who happens to be Muslim), similarly alleged that the synagogue’s rabbi had “directed” his former bodyguard and his compatriots to carry out the vandalism. Thus did an anti-Semitic conspiracy theory become the official position of Venezuela’s government.

There are even reports that Venezuela’s Jews have been punished for the attack on their synagogue. Examiner.com’s Aimee Kligman reported on January 31 that “without fanfare or publicity, three of the most important rabbis in the community were expelled from the country. Their names for the record are Rabbi Mizrahi, Rabbi Cohen, and Rabbi Brenner.”

Kligman added this may have been a cynical ploy of Chavez himself. Kligman noted, “the political message indicated that if Chavez does succeed in getting a constitutional amendment to lift term limitations, that this would mean that allegedly, Jews might have to leave lest they be killed.”

It is not only in Venezuela that Latin America’s Jews are becoming more concerned for their safety. Jewish groups in both Argentina and Bolivia say they feel increasingly under attack in their respective countries. According to leaders of the 250,000-person-strong Jewish community in Argentina, swastikas and anti-Semitic graffiti have recently become more commonplace, while demonstrators recently targeted the InterContinental Hotel because it is owned by Eduardo Elsztain, a Jewish businessman. Argentina hasn’t witnessed such public displays of anti-Semitism since 1994, when the offices of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association were bombed by suspected Iranian and Hezbollah operatives. Bolivia, too, is becoming more dangerous for Jews. Like his Venezuelan counterpart, Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled the Israeli ambassador during the Gaza invasion; anti-Semitic graffiti is reportedly becoming more common in Bolivia.

So far, the U.S. State Department’s response has been muted. At a February 9 press conference, State Department spokesman Robert Wood said, “We expect that the government of Venezuela will do what it can to make sure that that type of activity doesn't continue and to...arrest any perpetrators who may have carried out any type of anti-Semitic activity.”

Coming from an administration that has made a cardinal virtue of “diplomacy,” such a cautious statement was not surprising. But in the absence of more definitive condemnations, there is every reason to believe Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela will become an ever-more dangerous place for its besieged Jewish minority.

Kathy Shaidle blogs at FiveFeetOfFury.com. Her new book exposing abuses by Canada’s Human Rights Commissions, The Tyranny of Nice, includes an introduction by Mark Steyn.
Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
9 février 2009 1 09 /02 /février /2009 22:30

Les ambitions iraniennes en Amérique Latine et Afrique

Iran's ambitions in Latin America and Africa
http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?pageid=49&id=1022
By Dr. Fariborz Saremi, 9th February 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 

 - Iran has been working to forge and strengthen ties with countries opposed to the United States, in Latin America and in Africa.
 
 - Iran has forged diplomatic and economic links with the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba to form an anti-US bloc and to gain support for Iran’s position at the United Nations.
 
 - Iran has also sought to strengthen its influence in Islamic countries in Africa, such as Senegal and Sudan, as well as with other African states such as Zimbabwe and South Africa.
 
 - In return for Iranian investment, many of these countries have given support to Iran in the United Nations Security Council and other international institutions, opposing attempts to impose sanctions on Iran in order to stop its nuclear programme.
 

 
Quietly, behind the scenes, Iran has been working assiduously to foster strong ties with an anti-US bloc of countries in South America; Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua. The USA has largely failed to properly take note of Iran’s well-funded ambitions in these countries, and indeed in Africa as well.
 
The USA’s efforts to counter the influence of Iran’s post-Islamic Revolution government have generally concentrated on the Middle East and on Iran’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. In the meantime Iran, however, has acquired the financial means and confidence to forge alliances worldwide. The government of Ahmadinejad has employed diplomatic, economic and military strategies to gain a long-term foothold in Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua as well as in Senegal, Zimbabwe and South Africa.
 
Iran has had a long tradition of influence in South America, though with less emphasis on diplomacy and business than now. Iran has been accused of masterminding two Hezbollah bomb attacks in Argentina in 1992 and 1994.  Ahmadinejad now seems to have refocused Iran’s efforts to encourage anti-American sentiment in the three countries mentioned above. To do so, he has been prepared to free up considerable sums of money. Ahmadinejad’s Latin America’s policy has been met with open arms, especially by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez who has been a thorn in Washington’s side for the last ten years. Chavez has made several visits to Tehran, whilst Ahmadinejad has returned those visits by travelling to Caracas or meeting up with Chavez in Havana for the non-aligned movement conference in September 2006. They have gone so far as to form an “Axis of Unity” against the United States.
 
As both countries are oil-rich they can assist and support each other from an equal standing and with relative confidence. Chavez has supported Iran in its efforts to resist UN Security Council sanctions against Iran’s nuclear programme. In addition he has supplied Iran with an Airbus A-340-200 at a time when western countries were attempting to keep valuable aeronautical technology out of Iran’s hands.
 
The two Presidents have also done as much as they can to bolster each other’s positions in their own countries by making speeches either praising their economic leadership or condemning American interference, thus provoking further anti-American sentiment.
 
Venturing beyond mere rhetoric, the two countries have made moves to cement their economic ties. A joint Iran-Venezuela oil production project in east-central Venezuela worth $4 billion was announced by the Venezuelan state oil firm PDVSA. The level of bilateral ties is unclear but has clearly grown in recent years as is evidenced by the considerable number of Iranians staying in Venezuelan Hotels.


The comparative economic strength of Venezuela and Iran has enabled them to draw in other less well-situated countries antipathetic to the United States. The government of Cuba has set up a joint shipping line with the powers in Caracas and Tehran. This provides an easy and convenient way of bypassing sanctions.
 
Iran’s embassy is now the largest diplomatic presence in Managua, capital of Nicaragua. Only a number of days after Daniel Ortega returned to power, Ahmadinejad made it clear how pleased Iran was to welcome a leader whose prime enemy was the United States. Ortega for his part confirmed that the two countries had “common interests”. Ortega later visited Tehran, where he and Ayatollah Khamenei talked of their common antipathy towards the United States.
 
As with Venezuela, Iran has solidified relations by signing trade agreements; for example financing a Nicaraguan port for $350 Million. In return it seems Nicaragua is required to frequently cite its support of Tehran and to denounce the USA as a terrorist state. Iran has duplicated this trade off for industrial cooperation to the amount of $1.1 billion for Bolivia. As Nicaragua had done, Bolivia voiced its view that Iran was within its legitimate rights to pursue a nuclear programme.
 
All of these efforts would seem to be just the beginning of a campaign to win the hearts and minds of South Americans to the cause of resisting the USA. The Islamic Republic’s state broadcasting authority has now established joint operations with the Nicaraguan and Bolivian broadcasting authorities in order to spread its message across South America.
 
On July 22, 2007 Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi declared: “We believe it is our duty to expand ties with Islamic countries and use the capabilities and potentials of Muslim states to help the growth and spread of Islam”. That he was doing so when meeting President Wade of Senegal gives some indication of the future orientation of Iran in Africa. Iran has made it abundantly clear that it is interested in expanding a Muslim bloc in Africa. In fact, while attending the African Union summit in Addis Ababa a government official announced that Iran would soon host a summit of African foreign ministers in Tehran. Senegal, like Nicaragua and Bolivia, has been keen to wrap up economic deals with Iran. Thus Iran has agreed to build an oil refinery and a chemical plant.

Al Hussein orne la tribune
A la mémoire de cheïkh Ahmed Yacine, fondateur du Hamas palestinien, désormais sous l’emprise iranienne
Hassan Nasrallah, l’Ayatollah Khomeïny et le Guide de la Révolution iranienne, Ali Khamenaï, président le défilé
La branche nigériane du Hezbollah
Une unité féminine du Hezbollah nigérian
Un défilé paramilitaire dans la brousse. Bientôt ils marchent sur Abuja ?
Le Hezbollah au Nigeria
 
Sudan and Zimbabwe, two African countries that have fallen foul of the west - Sudan for genocide in Darfur and Zimbabwe because of Mugabe’s political excesses and his economic destruction of the country – have gratefully jumped at the chance to embrace Iran’s support in resisting the international community. Iran’s defense minister has even described Sudan as the cornerstone of the Islamic Republic’s Africa Policies. In lending support to both President Omar al Bashir in Sudan and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Tehran has shown great indifference to social justice and public health and confirmed its determination to undermine attempts to bring rogue states into line. As part of these diplomatic and economic efforts, Iran has also assisted Zimbabwe in trying to restart its oil refinery.
 
Iran tried and failed to get Venezuela onto the UN Security Council, where it could veto sanctions. Tehran has also been keen to pursue close ties with South Africa, a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This strategy has indeed had some success as South Africa used its rotating membership on the UN Security Council to argue against further sanctions against Iran for violating Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards.
 
The risks for the US in Iran’s expansion into South America and Africa may at first sight seem slight, but they should not be underestimated. Of course, support for Iran may wane in the countries we have mentioned as their regimes change and ideology changes with it. Some of the countries are willing to play along with Iran primarily for economic gain. However, a number of potential aspects make Iran’s global ambitions a serious threat. Iran can use these countries to outsource suspect weapons, to circumnavigate sanctions and embargos and to destabilize neighbouring countries such as Colombia which are allied to US. Iran could even use these countries as bases for terrorist attacks by proxies and indeed could organize terrorist attacks in South America itself, as it did in Buenos Aires in 1994.
 
 
Dr Fariborz Saremi is a graduate of Schiller International University in Heidelberg-Germany, Boston University’s overseas program in Heidelberg and the University of Houston-Texas, in the US. He majored in International Relations, specializing in the principles of Political-Military Strategy, Foreign and Security Policy and International Terrorism. He was a member of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York from 1996-2000. For the past 30 years, since the age of 13 he has been an activist in various Iranian nationalist movements and since 1994 he has been an active member of the Azadegan Foundation in Washington,DC. He is the author of numerous articles on Iran and the Middle East and a commentator on TV and Radio(German ARD/NDR, Voice of America, Radio Israel, Pars Network and Payam Azadi Network) regarding issues involving the Middle East and Northern Tier. Dr Saremi is currently also a senior member of International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA) based in Washington,DC.
Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
8 février 2009 7 08 /02 /février /2009 21:51

Une ouverture vers l'Iran? M. Rubin

An Opening to Iran?
They've sold us this rug before

by Michael Rubin
Weekly Standard
February 16, 2009

http://www.meforum.org/article/2062

Send RSS

During the Democratic primaries, Barack Obama promised to meet the leaders of Iran "without preconditions." He appears a man of his word. Within days of his election, the State Department began drafting a letter to Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad intended to pave the way for face-to-face talks. Then, less than a week after taking office, Obama told al-Arabiya's satellite network, "If countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us." The president dispatched former Defense Secretary William Perry to engage a high-level Iranian delegation led by a senior Ahmadinejad adviser.

The pundits and journalists may applaud, but their adulation for Obama's new approach is based more on myth than reality. "Not since before the 1979 Iranian revolution are U.S. officials believed to have conducted wide-ranging direct diplomacy with Iranian officials," the Associated Press reported. But Washington and Tehran have never stopped talking; indeed, many of Obama's supposedly bold initiatives have been tried before, often with disastrous results.

In 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini's return gave an urgency to U.S.-Iran diplomacy. Many in Washington had been happy to see the shah go, and sought a new beginning with the "moderate, progressive individuals" -- according to then Princeton professor (now a U.N. official) Richard Falk -- surrounding Khomeini. The State Department announced that it would maintain relations with the new government. Diplomats at the U.S. embassy in Tehran worked overtime to decipher the Islamic Republic's volatile political scene.

On November 1, 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser and now, ironically, an Obama adviser on Iranian affairs, met in Algiers with Iranian prime minister Mehdi Bazargan and foreign minister Ibrahim Yazdi to discuss normalization amidst continued uncertainty about the future of bilateral relations. Iranian students, outraged at the possibility, stormed the American embassy in Tehran, taking 52 diplomats hostage for 444 days.

But the hostage seizure did not end the dialogue. For five months, even as captors paraded blindfolded hostages on television, Carter kept Iran's embassy in Washington open, hoping for talks.

Should Obama send a letter to Iran's leaders, he would follow a path worn by Carter. Just days after the hostage seizure, Carter dispatched Ramsey Clark, a Kennedy-era attorney general who had championed Khomeini after meeting him in exile in France, and William Miller, a retired Foreign Service officer critical of U.S. policy under the shah, to deliver a letter to Khomeini. After word of their mission leaked, the Iranian leadership refused to receive them. After cooling their heels in Istanbul for a week, the two returned in failure. Shining a spotlight on private correspondence may score points in Washington, but it kills rather than creates opportunities.

Obama's inattention to timing and target replicates Carter's failure. His outreach to Ahmadinejad comes amidst Iran's most contentious election campaign since the revolution. Allowing Ahmadinejad to slap a U.S. president's outstretched hand is an Iranian populists' dream come true. Alas, this too was a lesson Obama might have learned from Carter. Three decades ago, desperate to engage, Carter grasped at any straw, believing, according to his secretary of state, that even a tenuous partner beat no partner at all. Each partner -- first foreign minister Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and then his successor Sadeq Qotbzadeh -- added demands to bolster his own revolutionary credentials, pushing diplomacy backward rather than forward. Thirty years later, the same pattern is back. Ahmadinejad's aides respond to every feeler Obama and his proxies at Track II talks send with new and more intrusive demands.

Once out of office, Carter aides sought to secure history's first draft with a flood of memoirs praising their own efforts. Kissinger aide Peter Rodman noted wryly in a 1981 essay, however, that pressure brought to bear by Iraq's invasion of Iran did more to break the negotiations impasse than Carter's pleading with a revolving door of Iranian officials.

Carter is not alone in his failed efforts to talk to Tehran. While the Iran-Contra affair is remembered today largely for the Reagan administration's desire to bypass a congressional prohibition on funding Nicaragua's anti-Communist insurgents, the scheme began as an attempt to engage Iran. On August 31, 1984, national security adviser Robert McFarlane ordered a review to determine what influence Washington might have in Tehran when the aging Khomeini passed away. Both the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency responded that they lacked influential contacts in Iran. Because weapons were the only incentive in which the war-weary ayatollahs had interest, McFarlane decided to ship arms both to cultivate contacts and win the goodwill necessary to free U.S. hostages held by Iranian proxies in Lebanon. He failed. Not only did the Iranian leadership stand McFarlane up during his trip to Tehran, but the incentive package also backfired: Hezbollah seized more hostages for Tehran to trade.

The stars seemed to align for George H.W. Bush, however. Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and, two months later, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose pragmatism realists like Secretary of State James Baker applauded, assumed Iran's presidency. In his first address, Rafsanjani suggested an end to the Lebanon hostage crisis might be possible. Like Obama, Bush spoke of a new era of "hope." State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler described Iran as "genuinely engaged." Alas, as Rafsanjani spoke publicly of pragmatism, he privately ordered both the revival of Iran's covert nuclear program and the murder of dissidents in Europe.

In his first term, Clinton signed three executive orders limiting trade with Iran and approved the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. He and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright changed tack in their second term. Both apologized for past U.S. policies. The State Department encouraged U.S. businessmen to visit Iran, until Iranian vigilantes attacked a busload of American visitors in 1998. Not discouraged, and lest U.S. rhetoric offend, Albright even ordered U.S. officials to cease referring to Iran as a rogue regime, and instead as a "state of concern." Rather than spark rapprochement, however, it was during this time that, according to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, Tehran sought to develop a nuclear warhead.

While the press paints George W. Bush as hostile to diplomacy and applauds the return of Bill Clinton's diplomatic team under his wife's leadership, it is ironic that the outgoing administration engaged Iran more than any U.S. presidency since Carter -- directing senior diplomats to hold more than two dozen meetings with their Iranian counterparts. Yet, after 30 years, Iran remains as intractable a problem as ever. Every new U.S. president has sought a new beginning with Iran, but whenever a president assumes the fault for our poor relationship lies with his predecessor more than with authorities in Tehran, the United States gets burned.

Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and editor of the Middle East Quarterly, was an Iran country director at the Pentagon between September 2002 and April 2004.

Related Topics: Iran, US policy

Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
6 février 2009 5 06 /02 /février /2009 17:10

Israël : la nouvelle épine dorsale de la résistance sunnite (contre l'Iran)

When Israel retaliated against Hezbollah in July of 2006, something strange and new and unexpected took place. Arab governments blamed Hezbollah for sparking the conflict and didn’t complain about Israeli behavior until later. During the more recent war in Gaza we saw something similar; only this time the de-facto alignment of Israeli and Sunni Arab state-interests was even more obvious. Most Arab governments blamed Hamas for starting the latest round, and Egypt worked openly with the Israelis to achieve a new ceasefire arrangement that left their mutual enemy in the Gaza Strip weakened. “Saudi Arabia is no longer the backbone of the Arab alliance against Iran,” Asher Susser from Tel Aviv University said to me as the ceasefire went into effect. “Israel is.”

It’s bizarre, to be sure, to think of Israel as the backbone of a Sunni Arab alliance against Iran and its proxies, but Israelis aren’t the only ones who see things that way. Disgruntled Arabs from Cairo to Beirut and Damascus have noticed the same thing, and they aren’t happy about it.

“Egyptians Seethe Over Gaza, and Their Leaders Feel Heat,” read a headline in the New York Times a few weeks ago. “It is understood that Egypt gave the green light for the attack,” Rannie Amiri wrote in the Palestine Chronicle. “There is true and full collaboration between certain Arab regimes,” said Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, “especially those who have already signed peace deals with Israel, to crush any form of resistance.”

I heard similar complaints myself after the Second Lebanon War. “Gulf Arabs give bombs to Israel to kill my people!” one Lebanese Shia man said to me in a hysterical tone of voice at a Hezbollah rally in Beirut December of 2006.

Some of these accusations are madness on stilts. Gulf Arabs will never give Israel weapons, for instance. But even the more hysterical residents of Arabic countries see clearly that the geopolitical tectonic plates in the region are shifting. The governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen came out strongly against Hamas and in favor of their Fatah rivals at a meeting in Abu Dhabi this week.

“Egypt is cooperating to a great extent with Israel,” Susser continued, “as are Abu Mazen and the Jordanians. There were more anti-Israel demonstrations in Dublin than there were in Ramallah.”

Most Arab governments, aside from Syria’s and possibly Qatar’s, are far more worried about Iranian regional dominance than they are about anything coming out of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. They know perfectly well that the State of Israel is not going to undermine or overthrow them, while radical Iranian-sponsored Islamists just might.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are threatening Iran with a nuclear arms race. Surely they weren’t happy when Israel developed nuclear weapons, but they never retaliated with programs of their own. Bombastic anti-Zionist rhetoric to the contrary, they know Israel isn’t really a threat. Nor are they a serious threat to Israel anymore.

It wasn’t always this way.

In the early days of the Arab-Israeli conflict, when Israel’s long-term survivability was more in doubt than it is now, some of these countries had to get in on the action whether they wanted to or not. Jordan was dragged kicking and screaming into the 1967 war against its will. Lebanon was transformed into a base for Palestinian attacks on Israel against the wishes of its hapless Christian and Shia residents. But this time not even Yasser Arafat’s old Fatah movement in the West Bank could be bothered. Hezbollah sat it out, as did the Syrians. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is so far removed from Iraq’s problems that the war in Gaza barely even registered there. Not only did Egypt refuse to help out Hamas, but Egypt clearly sided with the Israelis.

This strange new Israeli-Sunni “alliance,” if we dare call it that, is cynical and expedient. It’s an open secret, but the Arab states wish it were entirely secret. There is little or no affection for Israel in Arab capitals, and there probably won’t be for a long time. Most just don’t see the point in getting in Israel’s way of striking the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah — aside from the fact that refusing to do so angers the citizens who live in their countries.

“Tehran supports Hamas, as does Arab public opinion, while Arab governments, except Syria’s, tacitly support Israel,” an Israeli intelligence officer told me. “Iran doesn’t have to work very hard to gain influence with the Arab street.”

There’s a chance it might backfire on these Arab governments whose citizens, in the main, sympathize with Hamas and Hezbollah. They nurtured hysterical anti-Zionism among their populations because it served their own naked self-interest. “This is how our Arab dictators survive,” Palestinian journalist Khaled Abu Toameh said to me recently. “They constantly blame the miseries of our people on the Jews and the West and the Crusaders and the infidels and the Zionist lobby and the imperialists. They use all these slogans. Arab leaders always need to make sure that their people are busy hating somebody else, preferably the Jews and the Americans. Otherwise their people might rebel, and God forbid they might demand reforms and democracy.”

As usual, their people do want to rebel; only right now, on behalf of Hamas, at a time when anti-Zionism has outlived its usefulness. Cynical Arab regimes will have only themselves to blame if they’re toppled by their own political version of Frankenstein’s monster. Israelis should enjoy their tacit and hypocritical support while it lasts.

Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
6 février 2009 5 06 /02 /février /2009 16:50

Guerre froide au Moyen-Orient, la guerre de Gaza

MEMRI    Middle East Media Research Institute

Enquête et analyse n° 492

Guerre froide au Moyen-Orient

1ère partie : la Guerre de Gaza

Introduction

La Guerre de Gaza de 2009 a été qualifiée par les médias de conflit militaire opposant Israël et le Hamas. Cette guerre toutefois, à l´instar de la guerre du Liban de 2006 et d´autres événements militaires et politiques intervenus pendant les trois dernières décennies au Moyen-Orient, ont un dénominateur commun : ils découlent tous du conflit qui oppose l´Iran révolutionnaire et le Royaume d´Arabie saoudite et les camps respectifs de  chacun. Là se trouve la clé d´une bonne compréhension du Moyen-Orient du 21ème siècle.

Ce conflit irano-saoudien, dont les différents volets géostratégique, religieux, ethnique et économique affectent le Moyen-Orient depuis trente ans, a débuté avec la Révolution islamique d´Iran, sous l´ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeiny. Depuis, il y a eu des périodes d´accalmie (notamment sous la présidence du président iranien Mohammed Khatami), mais ce conflit s´est enflammé avec l´arrivée au pouvoir du président Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Il s´est dernièrement muté en véritable guerre froide, comme le reflète l´émergence de deux blocs distincts au Moyen-Orient : l´axe iranien (qui comprend l´Iran, la Syrie, le Qatar, le Hezbollah et le Hamas) et le camp égypto-saoudien, auquel s´identifie la plupart des autres pays

Ce chiisme et cette guerre froide ont un impact majeur au niveau national, régional et international, limitant considérablement la marge de manoeuvre diplomatique dans le règlement des conflits inter-palestinien, arabe-israélien et face au problème de la nucléarisation de l´Iran.

La Guerre de Gaza : chronologie des événements

La Guerre de Gaza a éclaté le 27 décembre 2008, après que le dirigeant du Hamas Khaled Mechaal eut refusé – apparemment sur les ordres du ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères Manouchehr Mottaki (1) – de participer aux pourparlers pour un accord inter-palestinien négocié par l´intermédiaire du Caire. Au lieu de quoi, il a annoncé de Damas que la Tahdia (période de calme) avec Israël avait pris fin et ne serait pas renouvelée, tandis que ses hommes lançaient des dizaines de roquettes sur le sud d´Israël.

 

Dès le déclenchement des hostilités, la Syrie et le Qatar se sont efforcés de réunir un sommet d´urgence de la Ligue arabe pour venir en aide au Hamas. Cette initiative a été bloquée par l´Egypte et l´Arabie saoudite lors de la réunion au Caire du 31 décembre 2008 des ministres arabes des Affaires étrangères, où il a été décidé de limiter l´activité diplomatique aux efforts visant à faire cesser les hostilités. Selon des rapports, le président égyptien Hosni Moubarak aurait déclaré lors d´un entretien à huis clos avec les ministres européens des Affaires étrangères que "le Hamas ne doit pas sortir gagnant des af

 

Le Qatar et la Syrie ont toutefois persévéré dans leur voie, avec le sommet d´urgence du 16 janvier 2009, auquel pouvaient assister tous ceux qui le souhaitaient. A ce stade, une campagne visant à faire pression sur les autres pays arabes fut lancée des deux côtés, l´Iran, la Syrie et le Qatar les invitant à participant au sommet, l´Arabie saoudite et l´Egypte à ne pas y assister.

 

Cette confrontation s´est terminée par la victoire du camp égypto-saoudien, vu que le sommet, tenu à Doha, a eu lieu en l´absence du quorum nécessaire. (3) A la consternation de certains pays arabes, le président iranien Mahmoud Ahmadinejad était invité en tant qu´observateur. Le Premier ministre turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan était aussi présent et y a manifesté son soutien total pour le Hamas. (4)

 

Pour consolider sa victoire politique, le camp égypto-saoudien a cherché le soutien international en convoquant tous les dirigeants européens à un week-end spécial à Charm el-Cheikh, le dimanche 18 janvier 2009. Les dirigeants européens ont tous participé au sommet, manifestant par là leur soutien au camp égypto-saoudien.

 

Le jour suivant (19 janvier), une conférence économique se tenait au Koweït et était partiellement consacrée à la Guerre de Gaza. Cette conférence, à laquelle ont assisté tous les dirigeants arabes, a révélé la prédominance du camp égypto-saoudien. Lors de la conférence, le Qatar a demandé l´approbation de la résolution de la conférence de Doha (selon laquelle l´Egypte abrogerait son Accord de paix avec Israël et l´Arabie saoudite reviendrait sur son Initiative de paix), demande rejetée par l´Arabie saoudite et l´Egypte. La conférence s´est achevée sans nouvelle résolution.

 

Le 18 janvier, le Hamas fut contraint d´accepter le cessez-le-feu déclaré unilatéralement par Israël le jour précédent, ainsi que la médiation égyptienne des pourparlers inter-palestiniens – deux demandes qui avaient été catégoriquement refusées avant la guerre.

 

On peut en conclure que contrairement à la Guerre du Liban de 2006 et aux affrontements consécutifs entre le Hezbollah et les Forces du 14 mars, qui ont conduit au contrôle du Liban par le Hezbollah et l´axe irano-syrien, (5) la Guerre de Gaza a favorisé la partie adverse : elle s´est terminée par la défaite du Hamas sur le terrain et la victoire politique du camp égypto-saoudien au niveau régional.

 

Notes:

 

(1) Al-Tayyeb Abdel Rahim, secrétaire général de la présidence de l´Autorité palestinienne, a affirmé que lors d´une visite à Damas, le ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères  Manouchehr Mottaki avait demandé aux dirigeants du Hamas de reprendre la résistance et d´empêcher l´Egypte de jouer un rôle dans le dialogue inter-palestinien. Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Autorité palestinienne), 1er janvier 2009

 

(2) Haaretz (Israël), 6 janvier 2009

 

(3) Selon la charte de la Ligue arabe, toute réunion d´urgence doit réunir un quorum d´au moins 15 Etats membres. Ainsi, en soutenant l´initiative du sommet d´urgence ou en la rejetant, chaque pays arabe s´est positionné dans l´un des deux camps.

 

Ont assisté au sommet de Doha la Syrie, le Soudan, l´Algérie, le Liban (dont le président, selon le Hezbollah, a tout fait pour montrer qu´il y assistait sous la contrainte), l´archipel des Comores, la Mauritanie, l´Irak, Oman, la Libye, le Maroc et Djibouti. Le président de l´Autorité palestinienne Mahmoud Abbas, qui coopère avec l´Egypte et l´Arabie saoudite, était absent. En revanche, des représentants de diverses factions palestiniennes, dont le Hamas, le Djihad islamique et le Front démocratique sont arrivés –&n

 

(4) Le ministre égyptien des Affaires étrangères Abu Al-Gheit a expliqué dans un entretien sur Orbit TV que l´Egypte avait contrecarré les efforts visant à réunir un sommet d´urgence parce que "l´action arabe ne peut dépendre du consentement de pays [non arabes] tels que l´archipel des Comores." Il a ajouté : "Où se trouvent les grands pays influents de la région, tels que l´Egypte et l´Arabie saoudite ?" Al-Masri Al-Yaum (Egypte), 29 janvier 2009.

 

(5) L´affrontement de 2008 entre le Hezbollah et les Forces du 14 mars s´est terminé par la victoire du Hezbollah, les exigences du mouvement ayant été exaucées : une majorité d´un tiers au cabinet, lui conférant le contrôle des décisions gouvernementales, et la nomination d´un président approuvé par le mouvement. En outre, le gouvernement du Premier ministre Fouad Siniora est revenu le 6 mai 2008 sur les décisions qui avaient déclenché l´affrontement entre Hezbollah et Forces du 14 mars, à savoir : le fait de déclarer illégal le réseau de communications privé du Hezbollah, accusé d´empiéter sur la souveraineté libanaise, et la poursuite de ceux l´ayant mis en place ; il et également revenu sur la décision de limoger le chef de la

 

Lire la suite du rapport en anglais : http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA49209.

 

Sommaire du rapport en anglais :

Introduction

The 2009 Gaza War: Timeline

The Iranian-Saudi/Shi´ite-Sunni Rivalry in the Wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution

The Escalation of the Conflict During Ahmadinejad´s Presidency

Iran Extends Its Influence Into the Arab World

The Emergence of the Iran-Syria-Qatar-Hizbullah Axis

The 2009 Gaza War Deepens the Schism Between the Two Camps

After The War - The Schism Between the Two Camps is An Acknowledged Fact

The Saudi Camp: Iran Is Responsible for the Rift in the Arab World

"The Trojan Horse" - Qatar´s Role in Consolidating the Iranian Axis

Two Camps, Two Contrasting Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict

 

 

Pour consulter l´intégralité des dépêches de MEMRI en français et les archives, libres d´accès, visiter le site www.memri.org/french.

 

Veuillez adresser vos emails à memri@memrieurope.org.

 

Le MEMRI détient les droits d´auteur sur toutes ses traductions. Celles-ci ne peuvent être citées qu´avec mention de la source.

 

 

 

 

 

Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
4 février 2009 3 04 /02 /février /2009 20:27

Le Trésor US bannit le PJAKurde pour séduire les Mollahs

La nouvelle pourrait passer inaperçue : le Trésor Américain bannit le PJA Kurde et le porte sur la liste des groupes terroristes. Les Anglo-Américains et les Israéliens sont souvent accusés par les Ayattolahs de manipuler les groupes autonomistes ou séparatistes pour porter des coups sur le sol iranien. Le gouvernement Obama nourrit ainsi son lapin à la carotte pour de futurs rendez-vous. Mais peut-être est-il en train de perdre le soutien d'un bâton que redoutent les Pasdaran, à l'heure où Reza Pahlavi appelle le peuple iranien à se soulever contre ses oppresseurs en place depuis 30 ans... t pour longtemps grâce à la nouvelle Administration américaine?
US brands anti-Iran Kurdish group terrorist

Published:  02.04.09, 21:09 / Israel News

The US Treasury on Wednesday branded the Kurdish group PJAK, whose guerrillas fight against government forces in Iran's Kurdish-populated areas, as a terrorist organization.

 

The group is a front for the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which has been fighting the Turkish government for 25 years, said Stuart Levey, US Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. (Reuters)

 

Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
3 février 2009 2 03 /02 /février /2009 14:26

L'axe Iran-Hezbollah-Syrie-Hamas-Qatar, après l'opération à Gaza

February 2, 2009 No. 492
blnk.gif
An Escalating Regional Cold War –
Part I: The 2009 Gaza War
By: Y. Carmon, Y. Yehoshua, A. Savyon, and H. Migron *

Table of Contents

Introduction

The 2009 Gaza War: Timeline

The Iranian-Saudi/Shi'ite-Sunni Rivalry in the Wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution

The Escalation of the Conflict During Ahmadinejad's Presidency

Iran Extends Its Influence Into the Arab World

The Emergence of the Iran-Syria-Qatar-Hizbullah Axis

The 2009 Gaza War Deepens the Schism Between the Two Camps

After The War - The Schism Between the Two Camps is An Acknowledged Fact

The Saudi Camp: Iran Is Responsible for the Rift in the Arab World

"The Trojan Horse" - Qatar's Role in Consolidating the Iranian Axis

Two Camps, Two Contrasting Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict

 

Introduction

The recent Gaza war was portrayed by the international media as a local military conflict between Israel and Hamas. However, this war, like the 2006 war in Lebanon and various other military and political events in the last three decades in the Middle East have a common denominator - namely, all stem from the conflict between revolutionary Iran and the Saudi Kingdom and the respective camps of each. This conflict is key to understanding the Middle East in the 21st century.

This Saudi-Iranian conflict, whose various aspects - geostrategic, religious, ethnic, and economic - have been affecting the Middle East for the past 30 years, began with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Since then, there have been lulls (especially during the era of former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami), but the conflict flared up again after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rose to power. The conflict has now escalated into an actual cold war, and is reflected in the emergence of two distinct blocs in the Middle East: the Iranian axis (comprising Iran, Syria, Qatar, Hizbullah and Hamas) and the Saudi-Egyptian camp, with which most of the other Arab countries are identified.

This schism, and cold war, will have a major impact on the local, regional, and international level, severely restricting options for diplomatic activity, to resolve the intra-Palestinian rift, the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the problem of a nuclear Iran.

 

 

The 2009 Gaza War: Timeline

The Gaza war broke out on December 27, 2008, after Hamas leader Khaled Mash'al refused - reportedly on orders from Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki [1] - to attend talks for a Cairo-brokered intra-Palestinian agreement. Instead, he announced in Damascus that the tahdia with Israel had ended and would not be renewed, as his men in Gaza fired dozens of rockets into southern Israel.

As soon as the fighting started, Syria and Qatar attempted to convene an emergency Arab League summit in order to help Hamas. This move was blocked by Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the December 31, 2008 Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo, where it was decided only to conduct international diplomatic activity aimed at stopping the hostilities. According to reports, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said at a closed meeting with E.U. foreign ministers that "Hamas must not be allowed to emerge triumphant from the present confrontation." [2]

Nevertheless, Qatar and Syria persisted in their efforts, setting the emergency summit for January 16, 2009, to be attended by anyone who wished. At this point, a campaign of pressure on the other Arab countries was launched by both sides: Iran, Syria, and Qatar urged them to attend, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt pressed them not to.

This clash ended with a victory for the Saudi-Egyptian camp, in that the summit, held in Doha, was convened in the absence of a legal quorum. [3] To the dismay of some Arab countries, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited to attend the summit as an observer. Also present as an observer was Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who expressed total support for Hamas. [4]

To reinforce its political victory, the Saudi-Egyptian camp enlisted international support by summoning all European leaders to a special weekend meeting at Sharm Al-Sheikh, on Sunday, January 18, 2009. The summit was attended by the entire European leadership, which rallied to show its endorsement of the Saudi-Egyptian camp.

The following day, January 19, an economic conference that had been planned in advance was held in Kuwait, and part of it was devoted to the war in Gaza. This conference, attended by all Arab leaders, was likewise dominated by the Saudi-Egyptian camp. At the conference, Qatar demanded that the resolution of the Doha conference be endorsed, but Saudi Arabia and Egypt rejected its demand, and the conference ended with no resolutions - namely, that Egypt revoke its peace agreement with Israel, and Saudi Arabia withdraw its Middle East peace initiative.

On January 18, Hamas was compelled to accept the ceasefire declared unilaterally by Israel the day before, as well as Egypt's mediation in the intra-Palestinian talks - two demands it had categorically rejected prior to the war.

It can therefore be said that, unlike the 2006 war in Lebanon and the subsequent clash, in 2008, between Hizbullah and the March 14 Forces, which ended in Lebanon's falling under the control of Hizbullah and the Iranian-Syrian axis, [5] the Gaza war yielded an achievement for the opposite side. It ended with Hamas defeated on the ground and with a political victory for the Saudi-Egyptian camp on the regional level.

 

 

The Iranian-Saudi/Shi'ite-Sunni Rivalry in the Wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution

The Iranian-Saudi conflict is rooted in Iran's aspirations to regional hegemony - both geostrategic and religious - which pose a threat to Saudi Arabia. From the onset of the Islamic Revolution era and Ayatollah Khomeini's rule (1979-89), Iran's attitude to Saudi Arabia was marked by ideological and political enmity, stemming from the centuries-old religious, social, and ethnic rift between the Sunni-Wahhabi Arab society and the Shi'ite Persian one. The Sunnis perceive the Shi'ites as a political sect that seceded from Islam, while the Shi'ites regard the Sunnis, and especially the Wahhabis, as a radical apostate political sect that has taken over the Muslim holy places.

This rivalry, which emanates from revolutionary Iran's competition with Saudi Arabia for the leadership of the Muslim world, reached its height in 1984, when thousands of Iranian pilgrims rioted in the streets of Mecca, calling for the overthrow of the Saudi regime. The Saudis forcibly quelled the riots, closing Mecca to Iranian pilgrims for several years. The Iranian threat also prompted the Saudis to support Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war.

The wave of solidarity with Iran's Islamic Revolution that engulfed the Sunni world prompted Saudi Arabia to exert great efforts in strengthening Sunni Islam in general and Wahhabi Islam in particular. To this end, Saudi Arabia acted mainly on two levels: giving massive support to the jihad in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s until the Soviets were defeated, and investing billions of dollars, over two decades and more, in establishing and maintaining schools, mosques, and other educational and religious institutions in Sunni communities worldwide. These efforts reversed much of the popularity of the Iranian revolution.

Saudi-Iranian enmity declined during the term of Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, and declined even more during the presidency of his successor, Mohammad Khatami. During Khatami's presidency, Iran strove to rejoin the international community by relaxing its efforts to export the revolution and by seeking to reconcile with its neighbors in the Gulf.

 

 

The Escalation of the Conflict During Ahmadinejad's Presidency

With Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rise to power in 2005, the conflict reemerged, with a vengeance. Ahmadinejad reverted to Iran's previous policy of anti-Saudi hegemony, by pushing the export of the revolution, and promoting a messianic Shi'ite vision that stresses the imminent appearance of the Mahdi and the reestablishment of the great Persian Empire. In his second television appearance following his election, he said: "The message of the [Islamic] Revolution is global, and not restricted to a specific time or place. It is a human message, and it will move forward. Have no doubt... Allah willing, Islam will conquer. Islam will conquer what? It will conquer all the mountaintops of the world." [6]

The message of reviving revolutionary values became a recurring motif in Ahmadinejad's speeches: "In the recent elections, the [Iranian] people proved that they believe in the [Islamic] Revolution and want to see its ideals revived… This revolution was a continuation of the movement of the prophets, and all the political, economic, and cultural goals of the [Iranian] state must therefore be geared towards realizing the Islamic ideals… The followers of this divine school of Islamic thought are doing everything in their power to prepare the ground for the coming [of the Shi'ite messiah, the Mahdi]… It is our duty to guide the people back to these glorious ideals, and to lead the way towards the establishment of an advanced and powerful Islamic society that will be a model [to others]… Iran must emerge as the most powerful and advanced state…" [7]

"The Iranian people, as well as the Iranian government, which has emerged out of the will of the Iranian people, will defend their right to nuclear research and technology... The older people present here surely remember that one of our slogans during the revolution was, 'We will convert the entire world to Islam with our logic.' We are confident that the Islamic logic, culture, and discourse can prove their superiority in all fields over all theories and schools of thought." [8]

In a recent speech at the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini marking the 30th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad said: "Even though the revolution took place in Iran, it is not confined to Iran alone... Even after 30 years, [the revolution] is alive. We are [still] at the beginning of our road, and there are great changes still before us. This great revolution will continue until justice is inculcated [throughout the world]." [9]

Ahmadinejad's declarations about restoring the glory of the Shi'ite Persian Empire in the region, and the revival of the revolutionary rhetoric by other Iranian leaders - all backed by the regime's leading ayatollahs - were perceived by the Arab countries, and especially by Saudi Arabia, as a reemergence of the Iranian threat.

The religious-ideological threat was compounded by Iran's attempt to position itself as a regional military superpower, and by its determination to develop nuclear capabilities in addition to its long-range missile capabilities. Iran's insistence on developing nuclear technology despite international opposition was perceived by the Sunni Muslim world as a threat to it.

 

 

Iran Extends Its Influence Into the Arab World

Another factor contributing to the conflict was Iran's effort to increase its influence throughout the Arab world. Iran's activity in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime, and the rise in the Shi'ites' status in that country after the war, intensified Saudi fears, and the fears of other Sunni countries, about the emergence of an "Iranian/Shi'ite crescent" in the very heart of the Sunni world.

Saudi Arabia responded by increasing its support for the Sunni minority in Iraq, for various Muslim and Christian forces in Lebanon, and for others who were confronting Iranian threats in their territory (e.g. in Yemen, Sudan, and Palestine).

The military and political achievements of Hizbullah, Iran's wing in Lebanon, during the 2006 war and in the 2008 Doha agreement (which de facto gave Lebanon to Hizbullah's control) were likewise perceived as part of Iran's bid for regional hegemony - especially in light of statements by Iranian officials. Iranian Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani said after the signing of the Doha agreement: "We see this political victory in the regional arena as a harbinger of [even] greater victories..." He added that Nasrallah had "carried out some of [Khomeini's] teachings." [10]

After the Lebanon war, Saudi-Sunni concerns about Iran's growing aspirations for regional dominance came under more intensive and open discussion in the Arab world. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu Al-Gheit said that the Iranians "were trying to spread [their influence] and impose their idiosyncratic ideology over the region." [11] He also accused Iran of "trying to use Arab cards to realize interests and goals that are not Arab," [12] and said, "It is necessary to ensure that Iran does not become a nuclear military power." [13]

Similar concerns were also voiced in the Saudi and Egyptian press. In the Saudi government daily Al-Riyadh, Saudi columnist Muhammad bin Ali Al-Mahmoud described Iran's policy under Ahmadinejad, stating: "The change in the Iranian arena has led to the emergence of a Nazi-like atmosphere [there, and to the voicing of] empty slogans that are [even] more violent and bombastic [than those heard] during the first [Iranian] revolution [of 1979]... [14] Sadly, the Iranian threat is not just a theoretical [construct] whose nature and course is a matter of debate among scholars. It has become a reality, and there is no difference between the model [represented by] the terroristic Al-Qaeda and the one [represented by] the Iranian party in Lebanon [i.e., Hizbullah]..."

Al-Mahmoud warned about Iran's "octopus-like expansion," saying: "Iran wants to control the region, not by spreading its ideology... but by maintaining armed organizations [in Arab countries]... it violates their loyalty to their homelands, replacing it with loyalty to Iran. This, especially since Iran is a country that does not spread tolerance or a culture of moderation, but... a culture of one-sided hegemony, as part of a racist effort to impose a kind of occupation..." [15]

In an article in the Saudi government daily Al-Watan, Saudi columnist 'Ali Sa'd Al-Moussa wrote that the Arab countries were being subjected to "Persian colonialism," as evidenced by the Iranian "cantons and districts on the map of the Arab world..." He added: "Iran has become a major and central player in Arab politics... Today we are seeing new signs of Persian colonialism. This is a [new], more advanced colonial model: We are no longer talking of troops occupying [certain] regions or of flags [flying] over public buildings. The colonialism of the modern era is manifested by the submission of [various regional forces to Iran]... Iran chose [regions] on the Arab map and attacked them without [even] pulling the trigger. Its entire plan is being implemented by Arabs." [16]

 

 

The Emergence of the Iran-Syria-Qatar-Hizbullah Axis

As part of Iran's bid for regional hegemony, a political and military axis has formed, comprising not only Iran and Shi'ites in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, but also various Sunni forces that have an interest in opposing Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It was during the 2006 Lebanon war that a distinct Iran-Syria-Qatar-Hizbullah axis first emerged to oppose the Saudi-Egyptian camp. [17] At a later stage, this axis expanded to include Hamas, which has in recent years received increasing support from Iran, as well as from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Lately, Syria and Iran have been striving to add Turkey to their ranks, and have met with some cooperation on the part of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. [18]

Saudi Arabia, for its part, has been trying to pry some of Iran's Sunni allies away from it. [19]

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mu'allem spoke of the "strategic alliance" among members of the Iranian axis, saying: "Our relations with Iran are strategic, and our relations with Turkey are also strategic, and we hope that our relations with the Arabs will be [strategic] as well. Our relations with Qatar are strategic, as are our relations with 'Oman, Algeria, and Libya, and we hope that in the future this [framework will expand] to include additional [countries] as well… We are acting in accordance with our interests and in the service of the Arab national cause and national security. To this end, we are coordinating with Iran and Turkey, and we are not ashamed of this… We coordinate [our efforts] towards our common goal - [which is finding a way] to protect the Palestinian resistance and the national resistance in Lebanon, by creating [strategic] depth for them." [20]

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad spoke in a similar vein in a September 2008 interview with Iran's Al-Alam TV: "The strategic ties [between Syria and Iran] have proved to be of importance for the region in recent decades, but their real results have emerged [only] in the last 10 years. These include the victory of the resistance in Lebanon, and the unswerving fortitude of the resistance in Palestine since the Intifada, which began in 2000… We see before us a black slate dotted with bright spots that were once tiny but are now steadily increasing in size. This underscores the importance of [Syrian-Iranian] cooperation and the correctness of the political policy of Syria and Iran. Many countries that once objected to this policy are now beginning to realize its correctness, and to pursue a similar policy themselves…" [21]

 

 

The 2009 Gaza War Deepens the Schism Between the Two Camps

Just prior to its outbreak, the two camps engaged in reciprocal attacks. Syria and Iran accused Saudi Arabia and Egypt of pursuing a pro-Israel and pro-American policy and of sabotaging the efforts of the resistance movements. Saudi King 'Abdallah was branded by Syria as an "infidel" and "collaborator with the Imperialist Satan," while Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was called a "traitor" and a "tyrant" who should be assassinated like Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for their part, claimed that Iran and Syria were striving to destabilize the region by interfering in internal Arab affairs and by nurturing the resistance movements in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority. They stressed that Syria was trying to divide the Arab ranks and was assisting Iran - a non-Arab country - in taking over the Middle East, to the detriment of Arab interests. [22]

After the war, the Iranian leaders boasted of the support they had given to Hamas - whose actions, they claimed, corresponded to the goals of the Islamic Revolution. The leaders also leveled harsh criticism at the Saudi-Egyptian axis. [23] Iranian Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani said that both Hizbullah's victory in 2006 and Hamas' victory in Gaza were fruits of the "great tree" that is Iran's Islamic Revolution. [24] Iranian Expediency Council Chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani declared at a rally that "the residents of Gaza, [just like] Hizbullah, have managed to defeat the army of the Zionist regime thanks to the beneficial influence of Iran." [25] Guardian Council Chairman Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati said in his Friday sermon in Tehran: "[In 2006], the host of Hizbullah [fighters], inspired by Islamic Iran, managed to deliver a crushing blow to Israel, to America and to the other Western countries supporting Israel. Now the same thing has happened in Gaza. Wherever Iran has a toehold, it will save and rescue [the Muslims]..." [26] The Iranian daily Kayhan, which is close to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, stated that Israel's war on Hamas had created a new Middle East, and had proved that the entire alliance consisting of Israel, the U.S., the European Union, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could not defeat a small organization like Hamas, despite the use of massive military force. [27]

The pro-Saudi camp, for its part, accused Hamas of serving Iranian and Syrian interests rather than those of the Palestinians. Egyptian President Mubarak declared that "Egypt will not let anyone make political profits and increase their [regional] influence at the expense of Palestinian blood." [28] Egyptian Foreign Minister Abu Al-Gheit accused Iran of using its Arab proxies to bargain with the U.S. and further its own ends. In an interview with Al-Arabiya TV, he said: "All non-Arab hands should be kept off the Palestinian cause, and even some Arab hands." He added, "Iran... seeks to grab as many Arab bargaining chips as possible, in order to tell the next U.S. administration: If you wish to discuss any subject - especially the security of the Gulf or Iran's nuclear dossier - you will have to speak with us..." [29] Abu Al-Gheit made similar statements in 2007, when he said that Iran's activities had encouraged Hamas to carry out the Gaza coup, and that this "threatened the national security of Egypt, which is only a stone's throw away from Gaza." [30]

Senior Palestinian Authority officials likewise pointed to Iranian involvement in Gaza. PA Presidency secretary-general Al-Tayyeb 'Abd Al-Rahim stated that Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki had told the Hamas leaders to resume the resistance, and to keep Egypt from playing any role in the Palestinian dialogue. This, Al-Rahim said, was why Hamas refused to renew the tahdia and to continue the dialogue with Fatah. [31] PLO Secretary Yasser 'Abd Rabbo said that Hamas was advancing a regional conspiracy to turn Gaza into an independent entity separate from the West Bank, and to establish an Islamic emirate there, supported by Iran. [32]

Several days before Israel launched its Gaza offensive, the editor of the Egyptian daily Al-Gumhouriyya, MP Muhammad 'Ali Ibrahim, published a series of articles under the title "Hamas-Damascus-Iran - The New Axis of Evil." [33] Once the Israeli offensive had begun, Ibrahim wrote: "Hamas, Hizbullah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Tehran have decided to put the Palestinian cause and its martyrs into Iran's hands. However, everyone is forgetting one important point - namely, that we will not hand over our people's capabilities to lunatics who hide out in Syria and who fire not a single bullet at Israel... There is a plan to set the entire region ablaze, and to kill as many Palestinian and Lebanese martyrs as possible, in order to expose the helplessness of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the [entire] moderate Arab axis... [34]

 

 

After The War - The Schism Between the Two Camps is An Acknowledged Fact

The Western media has largely ignored the new reality in the Middle East - namely, the schism and the escalating cold war between the two camps - as well as its far-reaching political implications. However, in the Arab world, this reality has become a publicly acknowledged fact, and is being intensely discussed.

Nasrallah's deputy Sheikh Na'im Qassem explained that Hizbullah was proud to belong the Iranian axis, which was hostile to the U.S. and its Arab supporters. He stated: "In today's world, there are two mutually opposing camps - the camp of the U.S. and its allies, and the camp of the resistance and its allies. The important point is that the American camp, which includes Israel [and is characterized by] corruption, aggression, and monopoly, is a hostile camp, and we, the resistance camp, must therefore oppose it staunchly and forcefully… [Our camp] will emerge triumphant. It is impossible to express solidarity [with the Palestinians] without supporting the resistance... Today, Gaza is the very embodiment of resistance. Everyone who supported Gaza [during the war] is on the side of the resistance, while everyone who did not support it, but was against it, is on the side of the U.S. and Israel…"

Qassem added: "Some thought that if they malign us [by calling us] allies of Iran, Syria, and Hamas, it would bother us. [Well], let me say that you can add Chavez and Bolivia [to the list of our allies], and all the free peoples in the world. We will [all] form a united front against the U.S. and Israel…" [35]

Dr. Majed Abu Madhi, columnist for the Syrian government daily Al-Ba'ath and lecturer at the University of Damascus, argued that the war in Gaza had exposed not only the rift in the Arab world between the regimes that support the resistance and those that oppose it, but also the conflict between the rulers who object to the resistance, and their peoples who support it. He wrote: "It has become patently clear which countries support the resistance. It has also become patently clear which [Arab] regimes are the ones that the U.S. calls 'moderate' -[those that] oppose the resistance and even conspire against it. In addition, there is another kind of division, [namely,] between countries where the position of the government and the political leadership is aligned with that of the general public, and countries in which the position of the government and the leaders is at odds with that of the public. We have discovered a gap - nay, a deep abyss - between the wishes of the rulers [who reject the resistance] and those of their people [who support it]." [36]

 

 

The Saudi Camp: Iran Is Responsible for the Rift in the Arab World

The pro-Saudi camp accused Iran of causing the rift in the Arab world. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal said that the current disagreement among the Arabs was the result of "intervention by non-Arab forces" in Arab affairs - referring to Iran. [37] During the Kuwait summit, Egyptian President Mubarak likewise hinted at Iranian interference, when he accused "internal and external" forces of dividing and weakening the Arab world. [38]

Editorials in newspapers associated with the Saudi-Egyptian camp stated that Iran was sowing division in the Arab world as part of its plan to achieve regional hegemony, and accused Arab forces such as Syria and Qatar of cooperating with this plan. Osama Saraya, editor-in-chief of the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram, wrote: "Like the Persians in all [past] eras, the contemporary [Iranian] clerics think that [all] the Arabs, from the ocean to the Gulf, are a bunch of camel herders or ignoramuses. [Therefore, they think] that they can still market illusions that hide their true intentions, which are to take control of our region and to annex it to the empire they hope [to reestablish]... You must stop spreading your religion [in other countries, and confine these efforts] to your land alone. You must respect the [other] Muslim countries and the treaties signed between the Sunnis and Shi'ites [in which they agreed] to refrain from spreading [their respective] religions and from taking over [each other's] lands." [39]

The editor of the Egyptian daily Al-Gumhouriyya, MP Muhammad 'Ali Ibrahim, wrote in his daily column: "Iran's ideology advocates eliminating [all] nationalities and national borders... The problem with the Iranian ideas is that [Iran] has passed them on to its followers in the Middle East... And the most dangerous [problem] with this Iranian philosophy... is that it calls for establishing states within states... This philosophy has indeed borne fruit in some parts of the Arab world. We have several examples of this: Hizbullah won the elections in Lebanon, and its state [within a state] was naturally stronger than Lebanon [itself]. [Furthermore], its militias were stronger than the government's armed forces. [The same thing] has happened with Hamas... [and with] the Shi'ites in Bahrain, who are wreaking havoc in their country [in an attempt to establish] a Shi'ite state alongside the Sunni Bahraini kingdom. In Kuwait, Egypt, and Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood is using its representation in parliament to try and take over the government and the leadership of the state... It is a dangerous and destructive idea to sacrifice the country for the sake of religion..." [40]

 

 

"The Trojan Horse" - Qatar's Role in Consolidating the Iranian Axis

It should be noted that Qatar has played a crucial role in exacerbating the rift in the Arab world by initiating the January 16, 2009 Doha summit, to the dismay of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Qatar's inviting of Iranian President Ahmadinejad to the summit against the will of several Arab countries (such as the UAE, which responded by canceled its participation) clearly identified the summit as a convention of the Iranian-Syrian axis. The summit's pro-Iranian and anti-Saudi orientation was underscored by the fact that it called on Egypt to revoke its peace agreement with Israel, and on Saudi Arabia to withdraw its initiative for peace with it.

After the war ended, Hamas leader Khaled Mash'al thanked Qatar for its support for his movement during the fighting. In a speech in Doha, he said: "Two weeks ago, we came to you and asked you to stand by our side, and today we thank Qatar, its Emir, and its people [for responding to this request]."

Galal Dweidar, former editor-in-chief of the Egyptian government daily Al-Akhbar, characterized the Doha summit as "a conference in support of the Persian [expansionist] ambitions" and called Qatar "a Trojan horse designed to pave the way for the Shi'ite Persian invasion of [the lands belonging to] Muhammad's nation and the Sunnis." [41]

Al-Ahram editor Osama Saraya wrote in a similar vein: "By calling the Doha summit, Qatar hoped not only to undermine all the Arab actions, but also to deepen the rift among the Arabs and to put the joint Arab action in the hands of the axis of destruction and evil… [i.e. in the hands of] the Iranian axis - whose role was exposed and rendered completely transparent during the recent events in the region, and in the wake of Israel's Gaza offensive." [42]

 

 

Two Camps, Two Contrasting Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Iran's and Syria's support of the resistance, as well as Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's support of a peace agreement with Israel, can both be understood in light of the Iranian - Saudi schism.

The Saudi camp's opposition to Hizbullah during the 2006 war, and its opposition to Hamas during the Gaza war, were both part of its conflict with Iran. Likewise, the Saudi camp's determination to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is meant to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Iran and its allies. Egypt is demanding to sponsor the intra-Palestinian dialogue and the current arrangements between Gaza and Israel, in order to prevent Iran from taking over Gaza via Hamas. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is striving to promote its peace initiative with Israel as a strategic option that will consolidate its position vis-à-vis the Iranian axis - at the same time as this axis attempts to undermine the Saudi position through its support for the resistance against Israel.

In fact, the Iranian axis has called to revoke all initiatives for peace with Israel and all manifestations of normalization with it - which it terms "collaboration" by the Arab regimes with Israel and the U.S. As part of this approach, Qatar and Mauritania announced at the Doha summit that they were severing diplomatic ties with Israel. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei even equated the moderate Arab leaders who maintain ties with Israel with the Jews at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, who were considered to be his enemies. In a letter to Hamas leader Isma'il Haniya, Khamenei said: "The Arab traitors must realize that their fate will be no better than that of the Jews at the Battle of Al-Ahzab [i.e. the Jews of the Al-Quraidha tribe who were killed for allegedly conspiring against the Prophet]." [43]

The Iranian axis contends that the correct course of action vis-à-vis Israel is resistance. Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad declared the Arab Peace Initiative "dead," and coined a new phrase by defining the resistance as "a way to achieve peace," explaining that "peace without resistance is surrender." [44]

Editor of the Egyptian government daily Teshreen Samira Al-Masalma explained that the disagreement between the camps was profound and could not be bridged: "The dispute between the Arabs is no longer a matter of different positions or different approaches to the solution, as was the case in the past. [Today,] the dispute is about the fundamentals, the means, the [proper] conduct and the practical approach to the crucial issues. This is what makes the disagreements so blatant.

"Both in July 2006 and during the aggression against Gaza… two [different] positions emerged among the official Arab regimes... According to one position, there is no peace without resistance, while according to the other, surrender is the key to peace and resistance is but meaningless 'adventurism.' These two positions are not merely theoretical. The [proponents of] the former support the resistance in every possible way, while the [proponents of] the latter are openly involved in destroying it." [45]

Furthermore, spokesmen for the Iranian-Syrian axis hinted at the possibility of a further escalation in the region. Syrian President Al-Assad said: "It was the 1982 [Lebanon-Israel] war that gave birth to the resistance in its present form and brought about the liberation [of Lebanon]. The 2002 massacre in Jenin [sparked] a situation of resistance in Palestine. In 2006, the same thing happened [in Lebanon], and today [in 2009] we see the same thing [in Gaza]... There are displays of resistance, and each of these [further] consolidates the course of the resistance and the validity of its ideologies... These are small victories that are part of a great triumph. They will continue in the future, and undoubtedly there will be further confrontations in one form or another - not all of them necessarily armed. But these victories are like steps on a ladder leading to further victories, and we cannot attain the final victory without them." [46]

Ibrahim Al-Amin, chairman of the pro-Syrian and pro-Hizbullah Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, claimed that the Doha summit had provided a new impetus for the resistance, which would now become the preferred strategy not only of the resistance organizations themselves but also of certain Arab regimes. He wrote: "The most important point is that the Arab-Israeli conflict has entered a new phase… The meeting in Doha served as a lever for the camp that advocates resistance, [and resistance] has now become a dominant part of the operation methods employed [vis-à-vis Israel] - also by the [Arab] regimes and governments. This will have repercussions for relations with Europe and the U.S. It will also affect the situation in Iraq, which is the largest Arab country under U.S. occupation…"

Al-Amin contended that "the Arab world would [now] face a spell of score-settling even worse than the one witnessed by Lebanon in 2006 in the wake of the [Israeli] aggression." [47]

Hizbullah deputy leader Sheikh Na'im Qassem said: "We believe in resistance as a means [of bringing about] liberation and change... [for] the land and the people cannot be liberated from the force of arrogance [i.e. the U.S.] and from its pampered protectorate, Israel, in any other way... We carry out this resistance with our own hands in order to take back our rights. We do not [intend to count on] the [U.N.] Security Council or the superpowers; we will liberate our lands with our [own] weapons, as we did in the past and will [continue] to do [in the future]... The resistance we mean [to carry out] is military, and we say to the world: We will arm ourselves more and more, and we call to arm all the resistance [movements] that fight the enemy who occupies the land..." [48]

The Saudi-Egyptian camp, on the other hand, opposed the resistance strategy, and rejected calls to sever ties with Israel or withdraw the Arab Peace Initiative. The Saudi foreign minister said, "The Arab Initiative is still relevant," adding that it "places Israel under considerable pressure." [49]

Some even called to return to the original version of the Saudi Peace Initiative, before amendments were introduced in 2002 in response to demands by Syria, such as a clause acknowledging the Palestinian right of return. An editorial in the Lebanese daily Al-Mustaqbal stated: "The Arab Peace Initiative, especially in its original form, before it was injected with Syrian-Lahoudian [50] corruption during the 2002 Beirut summit [meaning the inclusion of the right of return for the Palestinian refugees], was a comprehensive strategic vision... Lasting peace is a condition for the success of the programs for reform in all the Arab countries. For the sake of all this, the Arab peace initiative was and still is alive and well, and is the only strategy that the Arabs can propose in today's world."

The daily also called "to remove the Syrian-Lahoudian flaws from the Arab Peace Initiative, and to reintroduce as it was it in its original form." [51]

 

*Y. Carmon is the President of MEMRI; Y. Yehoshua is Director of Research at MEMRI; A. Savyon is director of MEMRI's Iranian Media Project; and H. Migron is a Research Fellow at MEMRI

[1] Al-Tayyeb 'Abd Al-Rahim, secretary-general of the Palestinian Authority Presidency, stated that during a visit to Damascus, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki had told the Hamas leaders to resume the resistance, and to keep Egypt from playing any role in the Palestinian dialogue. Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), January 1, 2009.

[2] Ha'aretz (Israel), January 6, 2009.

[3] According to the Arab League charter, an emergency meeting must be convened by a quorum of at least 15 member states. Consequently, each of the Arab countries was forced to take a side in the conflict by either supporting the initiative of the emergency summit or rejecting it, and thus effectively declaring its membership in one camp or the other.

The summit in Doha was eventually attended by Syria, Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon (whose president, according to Hizbullah, made a great show of attending under duress), Comoro Islands, Mauritania, Iraq, Oman, Libya, Morocco, and Djibouti. It should be mentioned that PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas, who is cooperating with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, did not attend. Conversely, representatives of several Palestinian factions, namely Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Democratic Front - General Command, did arrive, in the Qatari Emir's private jet.

[4] Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu Al-Gheit explained in an interview with Orbit TV that Egypt had thwarted attempts to hold an emergency Arab League summit because "the Arab actions cannot be contingent upon the consent of [non-Arab] countries like Comoro Islands..." He added: "Where are the large and influential countries in the region, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia?" Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), January 29, 2009.

[5] The 2008 confrontation between Hizbullah and the March 14 Forces ended with a victory for the former, since the organization's major demands were met: a one-third majority in cabinet giving it control over government decisions, and the nomination of a president approved by the organization. In addition, the government of Prime Minister Fuad Al-Siniora reversed its May 6, 2008 decisions which had been the immediate trigger for the clash between Hizbullah and the March 14 Forces - namely, the decision to declare Hizbullah's private communications network an illegal enterprise undermining Lebanon's sovereignty and to charge those responsible for establishing it, as well as the decision to fire Beirut airport security chief Wafiq Shuqair, who is affiliated with Hizbullah. Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), May 15, 2008.

Hizbullah's takeover of Lebanon was facilitated by Qatar, who convened the May 21, 2008 Doha summit, in which the political achievements of Hizbullah and the Iranian-Syrian-Qatari axis were consolidated.

[6] http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/782.htm, July 25, 2005.

[7] Sharq, IRNA (Iran), November 15, 2005.

[8] See MEMRI TV Clip No. 782, http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/782.htm.

[9] IRNA (Iran), January 31, 2009

[10] Al-Hayat (London), May 29, 2008.

[11] Al-Hayat (London), December 15, 2008.

[12] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 3, 2007.

[13] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 19, 2006.

[14] Ahmadinejad's rise to power is sometimes referred to as the "Second Islamic Revolution." See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 229, "Iran's ‘Second Islamic Revolution': Fulfilled by Election of Conservative President," June 28, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA22905 and MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 253, "The 'Second Islamic Revolution' in Iran: Power Struggle at the Top," November 17, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA25305.

[15] Al-Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), May 29, 2008.

[16] Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), May 15, 2008.

[17] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1249, "Arab Media Accuses Iran and Syria of Direct Involvement in Lebanon War," August 15, 2006, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=lebanon&ID=SP124906.

[18] Sunni countries and forces, such as Syria, Qatar, Turkey, and Hamas, have various motivations in joining the axis of Shi'ite Iran. Syria, whose standing in the Arab world is at odds with its self-perception as the cradle of Arab civilization and of pan-Arab ideology, sees the Iranian axis as a framework for enhancing its regional status. In addition, it is probably motivated by considerations of political survival. Faced with the danger of conviction by the international tribunal for the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, Syria hopes that its alliance with Iran will provide it with some backing against this tribunal (like the backing extended by the Arab countries to Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir). See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 490, "Recent Attempts to Form Strategic Regional Bloc: Syria, Turkey and Iran," January 6, 2009, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA49009.

Qatar likewise sees the Iranian axis as a platform for elevating its regional status and also for challenging Saudi Arabia's dominance in the Arabian Peninsula. The policy of Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani is one of blatant opposition to Saudi Arabia, which did not support him in his 1995 coup attempt against his father. To counterbalance the fact that Qatar is home to the largest U.S. air base in the Middle East, and has ties with Israel, the Qatari Emir uses Al-Jazeera TV - his long arm in the Arab and Muslim world - to attack the Arab regimes and the U.S., and to support the global jihad organizations, the ideology of resistance, and the Nasserist pan-Arab ideology.

In the past few years, Qatar has been actively supporting Syria, Iran and the resistance movements. In 2006, it assisted Hizbullah in the passing of U.N. Resolution 1701 for ending the Lebanon war, and, unlike the other Gulf states, it refrained from condemning Hamas' 2007 takeover of Gaza. Additionally, in an attempt to prevent the isolation of Syria, it was the only Arab country that abstained in the vote on Security Council Resolution 1737 on establishing an international tribunal for the Al-Hariri assassination. Finally, it served Iran's interests by inviting Ahmadinejad to the December 2007 GCC summit in Doha - to the astonishment and consternation of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia - in an attempt to break up the anti-Iranian Gulf bloc. See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 416, "The Collapse of the Saudi Sunni Bloc against Iran's Aspirations for Regional Hegemony in the Gulf," January 11, 2008, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA41608. (A further report on Qatar's policy will be published by MEMRI in the near future).

Hamas likewise regards the Iranian axis as a suitable framework of operation, since its political goals are at odds with the positions of the Saudi-Egyptian axis.

As for Turkey, in the past few years it too has been inclining towards the Iranian axis. During the 2009 Gaza war, it expressed solidarity with Hamas, and Prime Minister Erdogan attended only the forum of the Iranian axis (e.g. the Doha Summit) and did not attend the summit at Sharm Al-Sheikh. He offered to mediate between the Palestinian factions in coordination with Syria, but not in coordination with Egypt. On the recent Turkish-Iranian rapprochement, see MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 490, "Recent Attempts to Form Strategic Regional Bloc: Syria, Turkey and Iran," January 6, 2009, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA49009.

[19] In 2007 and in 2009, Saudi Arabia tried but failed to bring Syria and Hamas back into the Arab Saudi-Egyptian fold.

[20] Al-Manar TV, January 7, 2009.

[21] Al-Thawra (Syria), September 18, 2008.

[22] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 485, "Rising Inter-Arab Tensions: Saudi Arabia and Egypt versus Syria and Iran, Part I - Deepening Crisis in Saudi-Syrian Relations," December 22, 2008, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA48508 ; Inquiry and Analysis No. 486, "Rising Inter-Arab Tensions: Saudi Arabia and Egypt versus Syria and Iran, Part II - Egypt Trades Accusations with Hamas, Syria, Iran," December 22, 2008, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA48608 ; Inquiry and Analysis No. 487, "Rising Inter-Arab Tensions: Saudi Arabia and Egypt versus Syria and Iran, Part III - Syria, Saudi Arabia Clash over Fath Al-Islam," December 22, 2008, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA48708.

[23] In demonstrations in Tehran, strong accusations were made against the Arab regimes, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. During the war, and even before it, there were calls to bring down the Egyptian regime and assassinate Mubarak, like Sadat. See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 479, "Calls in Iran to Topple Egyptian, Saudi Regimes," December 12, 2008,

http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=egypt&ID=IA47908.

[24] IRNA (Iran), January 22, 2009; Ayandenews News (Iran), January 21, 2009.

[25] IRNA (Iran), January 31, 2009.

[26] ISNA (Iran), January 16, 2009.

[27] Kayhan (Iran), January 27, 2009.

[28] Al-Ahram (Egypt), December 31, 2008.

[29] www.alarabiya.net, January 1, 2009.

[30] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), June 20, 2007.

[31] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), January 1, 2009.

[32] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 23, 2009.

[33] The articles appeared on December 22, 23, and 24, 2008.

[34] Al-Gumhouriyya (Egypt), December 29, 2008.

[35] www.alintiqad.com, January 17, 2009.

[36] Al-Ba'ath (Syria), January 19, 2009.

[37] Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), January 18, 2009.

[38] Al-Ahram (Egypt), January 20, 2009.

[39] Al-Ahram (Egypt), January 16, 2009.

[40] Al-Gumhouriyya (Egypt), December 19, 2008.

[41] Al-Akhbar (Egypt), January 18, 2009.

[42] Al-Ahram (Egypt), January 16, 2009.

[43] Fars (Iran), January 15, 2009. In a recent Friday sermon, Ayatollah Jannati called Saudi Arabia "a U.S. puppet" and Egypt "an ally of Israel," adding that the heads of those countries should fear an uprising by their people and the wrath of God. ISNA (Iran), January 16, 2009.

[44] Al-Ba'ath (Syria), January 17, 2009.

[45] Teshreen (Syria), January 17, 2009.

[46] Al-Thawra (Syria), January 27, 2009.

[47] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), January 17, 2009.

[48] www.alintiqad.com, January 17, 2009.

[49] Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), January 17, 2009.

[50] A reference to then-Lebanese president Emil Lahoud.

[51] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), January 17, 2009.

Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
25 janvier 2009 7 25 /01 /janvier /2009 22:53

De Gaza au prix du gaz, Gil Mihaely

De Gaza au prix du gaz

Le Qatar, sponsor avisé du Hamas

24 janvier 2009 •


Gil Mihaely

Gil Mihaely, né en 1965 en Israël, est historien et journaliste. Après des études à l'Université de Tel-Aviv, il a soutenu une thèse d'Histoire (XIXe siècle) à l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales à Paris. Depuis il associe travail de recherche journalisme et publie régulièrement en Israël et en France.

Bonne nouvelle pour les Gazaouis : ils n’ont pas souffert pour rien ! Grâce à leurs sacrifices, le Qatar a pu consolider sa place, aux côtés de l’Iran et de la Russie, dans le cartel du gaz nouvellement créé. Heureusement, les Qataris ne sont pas chiens, et après avoir contribué à déclencher la crise entre Israël et le Hamas, ils vont envoyer un chèque. On peut compter sur eux : après la guerre du Liban de l’été 2006, ils avaient payé rubis sur l’ongle.

Il faut dire que le petit émirat mène une politique aussi ambitieuse qu’audacieuse. Avec la place qu’il occupe au soleil, il ne peut pas se permettre d’être trop timide. Tous les Etats du golfe arabo-persique, pour n’offenser personne, qu’ils soient minuscules comme le Bahreïn ou le Qatar ou grands comme l’Arabie Saoudite, ont un cauchemar commun : un Iran nucléaire. Ils savent pertinemment que si Saddam Hussein avait disposé de la bombe en 1990, le Koweit serait aujourd’hui une province irakienne. De Doha à Abu Dhabi en passant par les autres capitales plantées sur des champs de pétrole et de gaz, les dirigeants font le même constat : du jour où il se sentira intouchable grâce à la bombe, l’Iran s’emparera de leurs gisements pour les partager d’une manière plus islamiquement correcte. Des prétextes, ça se trouve – avec un peu de mauvaise foi et une carte d’état-major britannique des années 1920, n’importe qui peut toujours concocter un petit conflit frontalier.

On me fera remarquer que cette configuration géopolitique ne date pas d’hier. La réponse stratégique traditionnelle est l’alliance américaine : en cas d’urgence, il suffit d’appeler le 911 et les porte-avions sont là sous quinzaine. Mais Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, le très habile émir du Qatar, a choisi une autre voie : pour être absolument sûr de ne pas perdre son pantalon, c’est ceinture et bretelles. Si celles-ci sont made in US, ce grand-croix de la Légion d’honneur (1998) a opté pour une ceinture iranienne. Base américaine (et relations discrètes avec Israël) d’un côté, alliance avec l’Iran et la Russie de l’autre.

Dans le vaste monopoly régional, le Qatar dispose de deux cartes majeures : le gaz, d’une part, son influence dans la Ligue arabe et dans le monde arabe en général, de l’autre. L’émirat possède 15 % des réserves mondiales de gaz, ce qui en fait la troisième puissance dans ce domaine, après la Russie et l’Iran. En matière de GNL (gaz naturel liquéfié), produit d’un processus couteux et compliqué, le Qatar, qui a fait les investissements nécessaires, s’impose déjà comme numéro un mondial. Pour Moscou et Téhéran qui cherchent à maximiser le bénéfice géostratégique de leurs ressources énergétiques, et se verraient bien verrouiller le marché à travers une sorte d’OPEP du gaz, Doha est incontournable. Depuis octobre dernier, cette triple-alliance gazière contrôlant 60 % des réserves mondiales est une réalité.

Pour un petit pays qui prétend peser sur la politique arabe, l’argent est nécessaire mais pas suffisant. Il lui faut faire parler de lui. L’émir a donc lancé la chaîne Al-Jazeera qui, en quelques années, a transformé Doha en une sorte de Mecque médiatique. Pour la visibilité, c’est donc fait et bien fait. D’autre part, pour accroître son poids politique, l’émir a systématiquement noué des liens avec les bêtes noires du monde arabe : le Hezbollah au Liban, le Hamas en Palestine et la Syrie. Pas besoin d’être Alexandre Adler pour voir que cette short-list correspond à la bande à Ahmadinejad.

Depuis le début de la décennie, le Qatar s’est imposé comme un intermédiaire incontournable dans les affaires libanaises. Ainsi alors que le traité interlibanais qui avait mis fin à la guerre civile dans le pays du Cèdre avait été signé en Arabie Saoudite, à Taëf, le compromis qui a ouvert l’an dernier la voie à l’élection d’un nouveau président à Beyrouth a été négocié à Doha. Rien de plus logique : pendant la guerre au Liban en 2006, Riad a ouvertement critiqué la milice chiite pour son aventurisme alors qu’à Doha, on n’était pas loin de qualifier de “collabos” les pays arabes qui avaient émis des doutes sur la stratégie du Hezbollah. Une position qui révèle un certain culot : Israël avait une représentation quasi-officielle à Doha, ce qui serait impensable à Riad.

Le Qatar profite en fait du déclin de l’Arabie Saoudite, dont l’hégémonie régionale a été sévèrement ébranlée par le 11 septembre et les tensions qui s’en sont ensuivies entre Riad et Washington. Mais c’est surtout le retour de la Russie qui a radicalement changé la donne. Moscou précipite la région dans une nouvelle guerre froide où Gazprom remplace le Komintern/Kominform. Pour s’imposer, Moscou souffle sur les braises iraniennes : sans bénéficier en sous-main d’un soutien russe, Téhéran ne se serait pas engagé dans son délire nucléaire et hégémonique.

Voilà donc à quelle table s’est invité l’émir du Qatar, un pays qui, malgré son triple voire quadruple jeu, a bel et bien choisi son camp. Et tant pis pour ceux qui en meurent, au Liban et à Gaza1. Le chèque est dans la boîte à lettres.

Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …
20 janvier 2009 2 20 /01 /janvier /2009 19:57

LE HAMAS BRAS ARMé DE L’IRAN

LE HAMAS

BRAS ARMé DE L’IRAN


Par Dimitri DOMBRET

Chercheur associé à l’ESISC

 

 En remportant les élections législatives de janvier 2006 puis en s’emparant de la bande de Gaza lors du putsch sanglant de juin 2007, le Hamas est devenu la force incontournable de la scène politique palestinienne. Depuis, le mouvement de la résistance islamique n’a cessé d’être une organisation terroriste[1], responsable de la mort de centaines de civils israéliens – et désormais de civils palestiniens – dont tant la charte fondatrice que la perpétuelle propagande appellent à la violence et à la destruction de l’Etat hébreu. 

 A l’heure où l’avenir du Proche-Orient se joue toujours à Gaza – malgré le cessez-le-feu unilatéral décrété par le cabinet de sécurité israélien, suivi ensuite par le Hamas – éclairages sur la genèse du mouvement islamiste jusqu’à aujourd’hui, sa doctrine, ses objectifs, ses moyens et les soutiens dont il dispose.

 Lire la suite sur www.esisc.org

                                      


[1] Le Hamas est inscrit sur la liste noire des groupes terroristes des Etats-Unis, du Canada et, depuis 2003, de l’Union européenne.

Le Hamas est un sigle

H.A.M.A.S

Hide Among Mosques And Schools

ce qui, en français, donne à peu près ceci

Caché derrière Mosquées et Ecoles

 

http://www.primo-europe.org/actualites.php

 

Partager cet article
Repost0
Published by Gad - dans Provocations mollachiques
commenter cet article …

Présentation

  • : Le blog de Gad
  • : Lessakele : déjouer les pièges de l'actualité Lessakele, verbe hébraïque qui signifie "déjouer" est un blog de commentaire libre d'une actualité disparate, visant à taquiner l'indépendance et l'esprit critique du lecteur et à lui prêter quelques clés de décrytage personnalisées.
  • Contact

 

Traducteur

English German Spanish Portuguese Italian Dutch
Russian Polish Hebrew Czech Greek Hindi

 

Recherche

Recherche

 

Magie de la langue hébraïque

A tous nos chers lecteurs.

 

Ne vous est-il jamais venu à l'esprit d'en savoir un peu plus sur le titre de ce blog ?

Puisque nous nous sommes aujourd'hui habillés de bleu, il conviendrait de rentrer plus a fond dans l'explication du mot lessakel.

En fait Lessakel n'est que la façon française de dire le mot léhasskil.

L'hébreu est une langue qui fonctionne en déclinant des racines.

Racines, bilitères, trilitères et quadrilitères.

La majorité d'entre elle sont trilitères.

Aussi Si Gad a souhaité appeler son site Lessakel, c'est parce qu'il souhaitait rendre hommage à l'intelligence.

Celle qui nous est demandée chaque jour.

La racine de l'intelligence est sé'hel שכל qui signifie l'intelligence pure.

De cette racine découlent plusieurs mots

Sé'hel > intelligence, esprit, raison, bon sens, prudence, mais aussi croiser

Léhasskil > Etre intelligent, cultivé, déjouer les pièges

Sé'hli > intelligent, mental, spirituel

Léhistakel > agir prudemment, être retenu et raisonnable, chercher à comprendre

Si'hloute > appréhension et compréhension

Haskala >  Instruction, culture, éducation

Lessa'hlen > rationaliser, intellectualiser

Heschkel > moralité

Si'htanout > rationalisme

Si'hloul > Amélioration, perfectionnement

 

Gageons que ce site puisse nous apporter quelques lumières.

Aschkel pour Lessakel.

 

 

 

Les news de blogs amis

 

Articles Récents

 

Pages

 

Liens

 

Créer un blog gratuit sur overblog.com